Articles

Pay without Performance: Overview of the Issues

I. Introduction II. The stakes.III. The arm's-length contracting view . IV. Limits of the arm's-length view. A. Incentives to be Reelected.B. CEO Power to Benefit Directors.C.Friendship and Loyalty.D. Collegiality and Authority.E. Cognitive Dissonance and Solidarity.F. The Small Cost of Favoring Executives. G. Ratcheting.H. Limits of Market Forces.I. New CEOs.J. Firing of Executives.V. POWER AND PAY.A. Power-Pay Relationships.B. Limits of Managerial Influence.C. Camouflage and Stealth Compe...

Executive Compensation: If Theres A Problem, Whats the Remedy? The Case for

High levels of executive compensation have triggered an intense debate over whether compensation results primarily from competitive pressures in the market for managerial services or from managerial overreaching. Professors Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have advanced the debate with their recent book, Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, which forcefully argues that current compensation levels are best explained by managerial rent-seeking, not by arm's-...

Pay without Performance and the Managerial Power Hypothesis: A Comment

I.Introduction.II. An anecdotal piece of evidence. III. What explains the level of pay? .IV. The structure of pay. V. Changing the balance of power.VI. Concluding remark

Pay without Performance: A Market Equilibrium Critique

Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive Compensation in Speculative Markets

We argue that the root cause behind the recent corporate scandals associated with CEO pay is the technology bubble of the latter half of the 1990s. Far from rejecting the optimal incentive contracting theory of executive compensation, the recent evidence on executive pay can be reconciled with classical agency theory once one expands the framework to allow for speculative stock markets.

Corporate Culture and the Problem of Executive Compensation

Executive Compensation: Perspectives from a Former CEO

The Executive Compensation System Is Broken

A Real World Critique Of Pay without Performance

Pay Without Performance: The Institutional Shareholder Perspective

Comments on Pay without Performance

I.Introduction.II. A Response To Pay Without Performance. A. Salary And Bonus Growth Versus Stock Option Growth.1. Salary And Bonus Growth. 2. Stock Option Growth.3. Black-Scholes And Stock Options.B. Asset Manager Pay Versus CEO Pay. 1. Asset Managers Are Generally Businesses While CEOs Are Individuals. 2. Asset Managers Do Not Always Get One Percent On The Assets They Manage Because Formulas Vary.C. A Changing Perspective On CEOs: 1953-2003.III. Conclusion

Ceo Pay For Performance: The Solution To

I. Introduction. II. What About The Managerial Power Theory Do I Agree With? III. What About The Managerial Power Theory Do I Disagree With? IV. Is A High Level Of Ceo "Pay For Performance" Compatible With The Managerial Power Theory? And Does Ceo Pay For Performance Exist? V.Conclusion

Pay without Performance: An Executives Perspective

The Media and Executive Compensation: A Panel Discussion

Executive Compensation at Fannie Mae: A Case Study of Perverse Incentives, Nonperformance Pay, and Camouflage

I. Incentives To Inflate Earnings. II. Soft Landing . III. Pay Decoupled From Performance.IV.Camouflage.V.Conclusion.

Executive Pensions

I. Introduction . II. The Non-Transparency of Pension Pay. III. The Puzzle of Executive Pensions. A. Tax Benefits? . B. Reduction in Risk-Bearing Costs? . C. Aligning the Interests of Executives and Debtholders? . D. Camouflage?. IV. Motivating Examples. A. Pfizer´s $80 Million Pension Benefit. B. UnitedHealth Group: Making CEO Retention More Difficult. C. Black & Decker: The Significance of Pensions to Shareholder Value. D. Home Depot: High Pensions, Brief Tenure . V. The Significance of P...

Taxpayers as Investors: The Case for Applying Sarbanes- Oxley to Public Development Authorities

I. Introduction . II.Background . A. River Park Square, the Spokane Downtown Foundation, and the City of Spokane . B. Public Development Authorities . 1. Public Purpose . 2. The Benefits of Municipal Bonds . C. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . 1. Auditing . 2. Corporate Responsibility . 3. Enhanced Disclosures . III. Discussion and Analysis . A. SOX Best Practices. B. PDAs, Nonprofits, and SOX. C. Taxpayer and Investor Protection . IV. Recommendation . A. SOX Best Practices Will Increase PDA ...

Protecting the Keys to the Magic Kingdom: Shareholders´ Rights of Inspection and Disclosure in Light of Disney

I. Introduction. II. Background . A. Who´s the Leader of this Club?. B. The Screenplay: The Delaware Inspection Scheme . 1. The Statutory Language. a. Access to the Stock Ledger . b. Access to Other Corporate Books and Records . 2. Judicial Gloss on the Right of Inspection . a. Defining the Interests of the Individual Shareholder . b. Defining the Parameters of Protection for the Corporate Interest . III. Analysis. A. The Cast of Characters . 1. The Fairy Tale: Interests in the Ideal Corporat...