Articles

The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution: An Introduction

The No Economic Sense Test for Exclusionary Conduct

I. Introduction. II. The Trinko Case.III. Policies Underlying The "No Economic Sense" Test.IV. The "No Economic Sense" Test Is Not A Test For Short-Run Profit Sacrifice. V. A Role For The "No Economic Sense" Test.VI. Applying The "No Economic Sense" Test. VII. Conclusion.

Resale Requirements and the Intersection of Antitrust and Regulated Industries

I. Introduction. II. Regulated Industries´ Nondiscrimination Requirement. III. Freight Forwarding. IV. Resale Rules In Long Distance Telecommunications. V. Resale Under The 1996 Act.

Predatory Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Do Recent Cases Illuminate the Boundaries?

I. Introduction. II. Historic Overview: Sherman Act Section 2 Predation . III. Predatory Pricing . IV. Emerging Theories and Recent Cases . V. MICROSOFT CASES. VI. Concord Boat. VII. Lepage´S V. 3M. VIII. R.J. Reynolds V. Philip Morris. IX. Pepsico V. Coca-Cola . X. Dentsply . XI. American Airlines. XII. Per se Defenses Proffered by Monopolists . XIII. Factual Defenses Offered by Monopolists . XIV. Important Economic Issues Raised By These Cases .

Of Trinko, Tea Leaves, and Intellectual Property

I. Introduction . II. The Setting . III. The Opinion. A. Antitrust Immunity B. Monopoly Power and Incentives. C. Sharing. D. Aspen Skiing and Refusals to Deal. E. Essential Facilities. F. Regulatory Regime. G. Antitrust´s Costs. H. Monopoly Leveraging . I. Finale . IV. Analysis . A. Antitrust Immunity. B. Monopoly Power and Incentives. C. Sharing. D. Aspen Skiing and Refusals to Deal. E. Essential Facilities. F. Regulatory Regime. G. Antitrust´s Costs. H. Monopoly Leveraging . I. Finale . V. ...

Employment Mobility Laws and Competition

I. Introduction . II. Background . III. Do Employment Mobility Restrictions Matter?. IV. Overview of the Analysis . V. THe Formal Model . A. Environment . B. Retain or Not? No CNC Protection . C. Retain or Not? CNC Protection . D. Value of Entry . E. Number of Firms. VI. Conclusion .

Mandatory Access Obligations and Standing

I. Introduction . II. A Quick Tour of the Cases . III. Enforcing Access Rights. IV. Matching the Model and the Law. A. Integrating Antitrust Substantive Law and the 1996 Act . B. Standing. V. Conclusion .

Antitrust Injury and Standing in Foreclosure Cases

I. Introduction . II. The Trinko Litigation. A. Antitrust Background. B. The Telecommunications Act Requirements . C. The Trinko Litigation . III. Private Damage Actions . A. Antitrust Injury . B. Antitrust Standing. IV. The Economics of Foreclosure . A. Implications for Standing . V. Proving Antitrust Damages. A. Standards of Proof. B. Measurement of Damages . C. Estimating Overcharges . D. Estimating Lost Profits. E. Summary. VI. Complications of Duopoly Theory. A. Cournot Behavior . B. Ber...

Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability

I. Introduction . II. The Prisoner´S Dilemma Model. A. Prosecutors´ Efforts to Create a Prisoner´s Dilemma. B. Prisoners Solving Their Dilemma. C. Summary . III. Creating Cartel Instability Through Antitrust Leniency Guidelines . A. Using Distrust to Create a Prisoner´s Dilemma. B. Creating Distrust . 1. The Incentive to Defect. 2. The Cost of Betrayal. IV. Maximizing Distrust . A. Amnesty Eligibility for Cartel Ringleaders. B. Amnesty Regardless of Government Investigations . C. The "Prompt ...

Antitrust Amnesty, Game Theory, and Cartel Stability

I. Introduction . II. The Prisoner´S Dilemma Model. A. Prosecutors´ Efforts to Create a Prisoner´s Dilemma. B. Prisoners Solving Their Dilemma. C. Summary . III. Creating Cartel Instability Through Antitrust Leniency Guidelines . A. Using Distrust to Create a Prisoner´s Dilemma. B. Creating Distrust . 1. The Incentive to Defect. 2. The Cost of Betrayal. IV. Maximizing Distrust . A. Amnesty Eligibility for Cartel Ringleaders. B. Amnesty Regardless of Government Investigations . C. The "Prompt ...

Doing Good Economics in the Courtroom: Thoughts on Daubert and Expert Testimony in Antitrust

I. Introduction . II. The Daubert Standard. III. Daubert and Economic Science . IV. The Challenge of Applying Daubert in Antitrust Cases. V. Conclusion .

Using Ex Post Evaluations to Improve the Performance of Competition Policy Authorities

I. Introduction . II. The Evaluation of Competition Agencies: Two Forms of Performance Measurement . III. The Rationale for Ex Post Evaluation in Making Competition Policy . A. Uncertainty: Competition Policy as Experimentation. B. Limited Transparency: The Impact of Policymaking by Settlement . C. The Evolutionary Quality of Antitrust Jurisprudence and Enforcement Policy . D. Institutional Multiplicity: Concurrent Oversight. E. Institutional Multiplicity: Benchmarking Operational Processes....

The Role of Compulsory Licensing in Unilateral Refusals to Deal: Have the United States and European Approaches Grown Further Apart After IMS?

I. Introduction . II. Background . A. European Community Compulsory Licensing . 1. Treaty Provisions Dealing with Intellectual Property and Competition Matters: Articles 81 and 82. 2. EC Refusal to License Cases . a. The ECJ in Magill . b. The ECJ in Oscar Bronner . c. The ECJ in IMS Health . 3. Current State of EU Law . B. U.S. Compulsory Licensing and Unilateral Refusals to Deal: Statutory and Case Law. 1. The Sherman Act and Intellectual Property Statutes . 2. U.S. Unilateral Refusal to De...

Is Changing Patent Infringement Liability the Appropriate Mechanism for Allocating the Cost of Pollen Drift?

I. Introduction . II. Background . A. The Source of Discussion-Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser . 1. The Trial Court Decision . 2. The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal Decision . 3. The Canadian Supreme Court Decision . B. Understanding the Source of Controversy-Genetically Modified Plants. 1. What is "Genetic Modification" of Plants?. 2. The Rise of Genetically Modified Plants. 3. How Genetic Modification is Transforming Plant Performance . C. Understanding the Source of Controversy-The Ris...