Federal Circuits, 8th Cir. (February 25, 1998)
Docket number: 97-2682
Permanent Link:
http://vlex.com/vid/18512308
Id. vLex: VLEX-18512308
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U.S. Code - Title 18: Crimes and Criminal Procedure - 18 USC 4 - Sec. 4. Misprision of felony
US Code - Title 21: Food and Drugs - 21 USC 841 - Sec. 841. Prohibited acts A
U.S. Supreme Court - United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987)
John Wesley Hall, Jr., Little Rock, AR, argued, for Appellants.
Kevin T. Alexander, Asst.U.S.Atty., Little Rock, AR, argued (Paula J. Casey and Jill Handey, on the brief), for Appellees.Before FAGG, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.FAGG, Circuit Judge.After receiving information about drug activity on a farm owned by James L. Mooring and Cheryl D. Mooring, the police placed the farm under surveillance. Observing the farm at night, the police saw light coming from a barn and used a thermal imager to identify the barn as a heat source. An officer then entered the property, walked next to the barn and heard a buzzing noise the officer recognized as coming from electrical equipment used to grow marihuana. The police obtained a warrant and searched the barn, finding more than 250 marihuana plants growing there. The Moorings moved to suppress this evidence, asserting the officer's entry onto their property was a warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the barn was within the farmhouse's curtilage. After a hearing, the district court denied the Moorings' motion. Mr. Mooring entered conditional guilty pleas to charges of manufacturing and possessing with intent to distribute marihuana, see 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) (1994), and Ms. Mooring entered a conditional guilty plea to misprision of a felony, see 18 U.S.C. 4 (1994). The Moorings now appeal the denial of their suppression motion. We affirm.The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches of their home and buildings within the home's curtilage, but police officers may enter a resident's property to observe buildings located outside the home's curtilage. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300-04, 107 S.Ct. 1134, 1139-41, 94 L.Ed.2d 326 (1987). In deciding whether the Moorings' barn was within their farmhouse's curtilage, the "central component" we consider is "whether the [barn] harbor[ed] the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of [the Moorings' farmhouse] and the privacies of [their] life." Id. at 300, 107 S.Ct. at 1139 (internal quotations omitted). Several factors are relevant to our decision: the proximity of the barn to the farmhouse, whether the farmhouse and barn are within the same enclosure, the nature and uses of the barn, and the steps the Moorings took to protect the barn from being seen by others. See id. at 301, 107 S.Ct. at 1140. We do not apply these factors mechanically, but use them to consider if the Moorings' barn "is so intimately tied to the [farmhouse] itself that [the barn] should be placed under the [farmhouse's] 'umbrella' of Fourth Amendment protection." Id. After reviewing the record in light of the relevant factors, we conclude the district court's finding that the barn was not within the farmhouse's curtilage was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Friend, 50 F.3d 548, 552 (8th Cir.1995), vacated on other grounds,