U.S. Supreme Court, (May 22, 1933)
Docket number: 685
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Constitution of the United States (Annotated) - Section 2: Interstate Comity
U.S. Supreme Court - California v. Superior Court of Cal., San Bernardino Cty., 482 U.S. 400 (1987)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Cir. - United States of America Ex Rel. Frank Grano, Jr., Appellant, v. Raymond T. Anderson, Warden, New Castle County Correctional Institution, Department of Corrections, State of Delaware., 446 F.2d 272 (3rd Cir. 1971) Jr., Appellant, v. Raymond T. Anderson, Warden, New Castle County Correctional Institution, Department of Corrections, State of Delaware.
U.S. Supreme Court SOUTH CAROLINA v. BAILEY, 289 U.S. 412 (1933)
[Page 289 U.S. 412, 420] These questions of federal right were properly submitted for consideration by the state court upon the return to the writ of habeas corpus. And it was the duty of that court to administer the law prescribed by the Constitution and statute of the United States, as construed by this court. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 55, 32 S.Ct. 169, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44; Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U.S. 319, 326, 36 S.Ct. 555, L.R.A. 1917A, 265. In effect the matter for determination was whether the accused appeared to be held contrary to the Federal Constitution and laws. The ultimate question of his guilt or innocence of the charge of murder preferred against him did not arise-the sole point for decision related to his absence from the state of South Carolina at the time of the crime. It was wholly beyond the province of the judge to speculate, as he seems to have done, concerning the probable outcome of any trial which might follow rendition to the demanding state. The circumstances require this Court to search the record and determine for ourselves whether upon the facts presented the courts below reached the proper conclusion. The applicable provision of the Federal Constitution and of the statute intended to supplement it have often been considered here. Some of the more important cases are collected in the margin. [Footnote 3] [Page 289 U.S. 412, 422] Carolina at the time of the homicide. Stated otherwise, he should not have been released unless it appeared beyond reasonable doubt that he was without the state of South Carolina when the alleged offense was committed and, consequently, could not be a fugitive from her justice. The record discloses only a conflict of evidence; the requirement which we have indicated has not been met; and the challenged judgment must be reversed. The cause will be remanded to the Supreme Court of North Carolina for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. REVERSED. Mr. Justice BRANDEIS and Mr. Justice BUTLER are of the opinion that the evidence, while possibly sufficient to sustain, does not require a finding that there is probable cause to believe that the accused was a fugitive from South Carolina, and therefore this court is not warranted in reversing the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. Footnotes Footnote 1 'A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be deli ered up to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.' Footnote 2 Rev. St. 5278 (18 USCA 662). 'Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, it shall be the duty of the executive authority of the State or Territory to which such person has fled to cause him to be arrested and secured, and to cause notice of the arrest to be given to the executive authority making such demand, or to the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and to cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within six months from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged. All costs or expenses incurred in the apprehending, securing, and transmitting such fugitive to the State or Territory making such demand, shall be paid by such State or Territory.' Footnote 3 Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66; Ex parte Reggel, 114 U.S. 643, 5 S.Ct. 1148; Roberts v. Reilly, , 6 S.Ct. 291 29 L.Ed. 544; Hyatt v. People of New York ex rel Corkran, 188 U.S. 691, 23 S.Ct. 456; Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 25 S. Ct. 282; Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 27 S.Ct. 122, 7 Ann.Cas. 1073; McNichols v. Pease, 207 U.S. 100, 28 S. Ct. 58; Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 35 S.Ct. 137; Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127, 36 S.Ct. 290; Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police of City of New York, 245 U.S. 128, 38 S.Ct. 41.