U.S. Supreme Court, (January 19, 1934)
Docket number: 308
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U.S. Supreme Court - United States v. Tax Comm'n of Miss., 412 U.S. 363 (1973)
U.S. Supreme Court MURRAY v. JOE GERRICK & CO., 291 U.S. 315 (1934)
[Page 291 U.S. 315, 316] Messrs. Roszel C. Thomsen and Walter L. Clark, both of Baltimore, Md., for respondents. Mr. Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. Louis H. Murray, a steel erector, died as the result of a fall from a crane which was being erected by his employers, the respondents, in the Puget Sound Navy Yard at Bremerton, Wash. The petitioner, his widow, brought action, on her own and her minor child's behalf, alleging the decedent's death was caused by the respondents' negligence. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the declaration, holding the action was not maintainable by the widow and daughter as beneficiaries under the Washington Workmen's Compensation Act, since that act was not in force in the navy yard; and if it were considered a suit for death by wrongful act, the applicable state statute required that it be instituted by the personal representative of the decedent. The petitioner, although she was also administratrix, refused to amend and claim in virtue of her status as such, and stood upon the declaration. A judgment in favor of respondents was affirmed by the Supreme Court. [Footnote 1] [Page 291 U.S. 315, 317] over the same to the federal government, retaining only concurrent jurisdiction for the service of civil and criminal process issued under the authority of the state. Pursuant to this consent, the United States acquired what is now known as Puget Sound Navy Yard. At that time a state statute was in force permitting the heirs or personal representatives of one dying as a result of negligence to maintain suit against the wrongdoer. 3 In 1911 Washington adopted an industrial insurance law or Workmen's Compensation Act which required every employer engaged in extrahazardous occupation to report the work undertaken by him and to pay to a state insurance fund certain sums measured by the payroll for the work. The act abolished all actions by employees against employers for injury in extrahazardous occupations, and, in lieu thereof, conferred upon the injured workman the right to be paid from the fund; gave a similar right to named beneficiaries in case of an employee's death, and further provided that if an employer should fail to report or to pay to the state fund, the employee, or his beneficiaries in case of death, might sue the employer for negligence. [Footnote 4] In 1917 the prior statute relating to suits for death by wrongful act was superseded by an act vesting the right to sue in the personal representatives of the decedent. [Footnote 5] [Page 291 U.S. 315, 320] by the act of 1917, has substituted for the action, given in the alternative to heirs or personal representatives by the Code of 1881, one vested exclusively in the personal representative. It results that the petitioner could sue only under the act of 1917 The judgment is affirmed. Footnotes Footnote 1 172 Wash. 365, 20 P.(2d) 591. Footnote 2 Laws of 1891, p. 31; Remington's Revised Statutes, 8108. Footnote 3 Section, 8, Code of 1881, Remington & Ballinger's Ann. Code, 183. Footnote 4 Rem. Rev. Stat. Wash. 7673, 7674, 7676, 7679. Footnote 5 Rem. Rev. Stat. Wash. 183, 183-1. Footnote 6 Act of February 1, 1928, c. 15, 45 Stat. 54, U.S. Code title 16, 457 (16 USCA 457).