U.S. Supreme Court HEALY v. RATTA, 292 U.S. 263 (1934)

[Page 292 U.S. 263, 270]

states, or involving federal questions, could neither be brought in the federal courts nor removed to them, unless the value of the matter in controversy was more than a specified amount. Cases involving lesser amounts have been left to be dealt with exclusively by state courts, except that judgment of the highest court of a state adjudicating a federal right may be reviewed by this court. Pursuant to this policy the jurisdiction of federal courts of first instance has been narrowed by successive acts of Congress, which have progressively increased the jurisdictional amount. [Footnote 2] The policy of the statute calls for its strict construction. The power reserved to the states, under the Constitution ( Amendment 10), to provide for the determination of controversies in their courts, may be restricted only by the action of Congress in conformity to the judiciary sections of the Constitution (article 3). See Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233, 234 S., 43 S.Ct. 79, 24 A. L.R. 1077. Due regard for the rightful independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined. See Matthews v. Rodgers, supra at page 525 of 284 U.S., 52 S.Ct. 217; compare Town of Elgin v. Marshall, , 1 S.Ct. 484.

[Page 292 U.S. 263, 272]

Here the record shows affirmatively, see Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co . (No. 2), , 18 S.Ct. 645, that the total amount of the tax demanded, or which may be demanded, within any time reasonably required to conclude the litigation, is less than the jurisdictional amount; that any action by appellant to compel compliance by appellee or his salesmen with the taxing act in future years is at most conjectural; and that the effect of any decree rendered in the present suit upon the tax for other years, or with respect to appellee's business outside the city of Manchester is collateral to the present controversy. The decree will be reversed, with instructions to the district court to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction.

Reversed. Footnotes

Footnote 1 These and other authorities are discussed in 34 Columbia Law Rev. 311.

Footnote 2 The amount originally fixed by section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 at $500, exclusive of costs, 1 Stat. 78, was increased to $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs by Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, and to $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs, by the Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1091; see 28 USCA 41(1).