U.S. Supreme Court W. B. WORTHEN CO. v. THOMAS, 292 U.S. 426 (1934)

[Page 292 U.S. 426, 429]

Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.

Appellee, Mrs. W. D. Thomas, and her husband, Ralph Thomas, were engaged in business as copartners in Little Rock, Arkansas, under the name of Enterprise Harness Company. The became indebted for the rent of premises leased o the partnership by appellant, W. B. Worthen Company, Agent. On August 31, 1932, judgment for the amount thus due ($1,200), with interest, was recovered against both partners. Ralph Thomas died on March 5, 1933. Thereupon, on March 10, 1933, a writ of garnishment was served upon the Missouri State Life Insurance Company alleging the indebtedness of that Company to Mrs. Thomas, in the sum of $5,000 as the beneficiary of a policy of insurance upon the life of Ralph Thomas. The service of the writ, under the laws of Arkansas, created a lien upon the indebtedness. [Footnote 1]

[Page 292 U.S. 426, 430]

of any debt by contract or otherwise by any writ, order, judgment, or decree of any court, provided, that the validity of any sale, assignment, mortgage, pledge or hypothecation of any policy of insurance or if any avails, proceeds or benefits thereof, now made, or hereafter made, shall in no way be affected by the provisions of this act.'

Appellee, on April 5, 1933, filed a motion to dismiss the writ of garnishment and for the purpose of scheduling the money owing to her by the Insurance Company as being exempt from seizure under judicial process. On April 6, 1933, the Insurance Company answered the garnishment, admitting its indebtedness. The court then ordered the payment of $2,000 into its registry as sufficient to cover appellant's claim and released the garnishee from further liability. Appellant responded to the motion to dismiss the garnishment, and to the claim of exemption, by insisting that Act No. 102 (p. 321) of the Laws of 1933, if so applied, contravened article 1, section 10, of the Constitution of the United States by impairing the obligation of appellant's contract. The court of first instance overruling that contention, and holding the insurance moneys to be free from all judicial process, dismissed the garnishment and granted the schedule of exemption. The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State. 65 S.W.(2d) 917. The constitutional question was again urged by petition for rehearing, which was denied. The case comes here on appeal.

1. There is no question that the state court gave effect to the Act of 1933, and we are not concerned with any earlier state statute in relation to policies of insurance. [Footnote 2] The debt of the wife herself, as a member of a business partnership, is involved. We have not been referred to any

[Page 292 U.S. 426, 431]

statute of Arkansas, existing prior to the firm's contract and to the incurring by appellee of the debt in question, which in such a case, either by the terms of the statute or by the construction of it by the state court, precluded resort to insurance moneys such as those in question. [Footnote 3] The state court has mentioned none. On the contrary, the state court recognized the greater breadth of the Act of 1933, as compared with earlier statutes, and its controlling operation, and with this recognition sustained and applied it. [Footnote 4] 'The only question,' said the court, 'for determination here is the constitutionality of Act No. 102 (p. 321) of 1933, approved March 16, 1933.'

[Page 292 U.S. 426, 435]

upon state power in respect of the impairment of contractual obligations. Acceptance of such a view takes us beyond the fixed and secure boundaries of the fundamental law into a precarious fringe of extraconstitutional territory in which no real boundaries exist. We reject as unsound and dangerous doctrine, threatening the stability of the deliberately framed and wise provisions of the Constitution, the notion that violations of those provisions may be measured by the length of time they are to continue r the extent of the infraction, and that only those of long duration or of large importance are to be held bad. Such was not the intention of those who framed and adopted that instrument. The power of this court is not to amend but only to expound the Constitution as an agency of the sovereign people who made it and who alone have authority to alter or unmake it. We do not possess the benevolent power to compare and contrast infringements of the Constitution and condemn them when they are long-lived or great or unqualified, and condone them when they are temporary or small or conditioned. Footnotes

Footnote 1 See Desha v. Baker, 3 Ark. 509, 520, 521; Martin v. Foreman, 18 Ark. 249, 251; Smith v. Butler, 72 Ark. 350, 351, 80 S.W. 580; St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Vanderberg, 91 Ark. 252, 255, 120 S.W. 993; Foster v. Pollack Co., 173 Ark. 48, 51, 291 S.W. 989.

Footnote 2 Compare section 5579, Crawford & Moses' Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas, 1921; Act Nos. 76 and 141 (pages 214 and 378) of the Laws of Arkansas 1931; Mente v. Townsend, 68 Ark. 391, 397, 59 S.W. 41; Townes v. Krumpen, 184 Ark. 910 913, 43 S.W.(2d) 1083.

Footnote 3 As to moneys payable by fraternal benefit societies, see Act No. 462 (page 2087) of Laws of Arkansas, 1917; Acree v. Whitley, 136 Ark. 149, 206 S.W. 137.

Footnote 4 See Wilmington & Weldon Railroad Co. v. Alsbrook, 146 U.S. 279, 293, 13 S.Ct. 72; McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102, 116, 117 S., 19 S.Ct. 134; Houston & Texas Railroad Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 66, 77, 20 S.Ct. 545; Appleby v. City of New York, , 46 S.Ct. 569.

Footnote 5 See Morley v. Lake Shore & M.S. Railway Co., 146 U.S. 162, 169, 13 S.Ct. 54.