U.S. Supreme Court, (October 15, 1934)
Docket number: 18
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Constitution of the United States (Annotated) - Section 6: Rigths and Disabilities of Members
U.S. Supreme Court - United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972)
U.S. Supreme Court - Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979)
U.S. Supreme Court - Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972)
U.S. Supreme Court LONG v. ANSELL, 293 U.S. 76 (1934)
[Page 293 U.S. 76, 82] gress, while in attendance within the District, immunity in civil cases not only from arrest, but also from service of process. Neither the Senate, nor the House of Representatives, has ever asserted such a claim in behalf of its members. Clause 1 defines the extent of the immunity. Its language is exact and leaves no room for a construction which would extend the privilege beyond the terms of the grant. In Kimberly v. Butler, Fed. Cas. No. 7,777, Mr. Chief Justice Chase, sitting in the Circuit Court for the District of Maryland, held that the privilege was limited to exemption from arrest. Compare Mr. Justice Grier, sitting in the Circuit Court of the District of New Jersey in Nones v. Edsall, 1 Wall.Jr. 189, Fed. Cas. No. 10,290. The courts of the District of Columbia, where the question has been raised from time to time since 1868, have consistently denied the immunity asserted. Merrick v. Giddings, McArthur & M. (11 D.C.) 55, 67; Howard v. Citizens' Bank & Trust Co., 12 App.D.C. 222.1 State cases passing on similar provisions so hold. [Footnote 2] [Page 293 U.S. 76, 83] should be subject to civil process, provided that they were not 'arrested or imprisoned.' When the Constitution was adopted, arrests in civil suits were still common in America. [Footnote 4] It is only to such arrests that the provision applies. Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 28 S.Ct. 163. The constitutional privilege here asserted must not be confused with the common-law rule that witnesses, suitors, and their attorneys, while in attendance in connection with the conduct of one suit, are immune from service in another. That rule of practice is founded upon the needs of the court, not upon the convenience or preference of the individuals concerned. And the immunity conferred by the court is extended or withheld as judicial necessities require. See Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 225, 226 S., 52 S.Ct. 317. Affirmed. Footnotes Footnote 1 See, also, Worth v. Norton, 56 S.C. 56, 33 S.E. 792, 45 L.R.A. 563, 76 Am.St.Rep. 524; Bartlett v. Blair, 68 N.H. 232, 38 A. 1004. Footnote 2 Phillips v. Browne, 270 Ill. 450, 110 N.E. 601, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 637; Berlet v. Weary, 67 Neb. 75, 93 N.W. 238, 60 L.R.A. 609, 108 Am.St. Rep. 616, 2 Ann.Cas. 610; Rhodes v. Walsh, 55 Minn. 542, 57 N.W. 212, 23 L. R.A. 632; Gentry v. Griffith, Hyatt & Co., 27 Tex. 461; Catlett v. Morton, 4 Litt. (Ky.) 122; compare Doyle-Kidd Dry Goods Co. v. Munn, 151 Ark. 629, 238 S.W. 40; Huntington v. Shultz and McKenna, Harp. (S.C.) 452, 18 Am.Dec. 660; Hart and Foster v. Flynn's Executor, 8 Dana (Ky.) 190. Footnote 3 See Bolton v. Martin, 1 Dall. 296; Geyer's Lessee v. Irwin, 4 Dall. 107; Doty v. Strong, 1 Pin. (Wis.) 84; Anderson v. Rountree, 1 Pin. (Wis.) 115; Miner v. Markham (C.C.) 28 F. 387. The first of these cases relied upon a passage in Blackstone in which it is stated that no member of either house may be 'served with any process of the courts of law ... without a breach of the privilege of parliament.' The passage appears as quoted in the fourth edition of Blackstone (1771), v. 1, p. 165. In the fifth edition (1773), however, the phrase 'served with any process of the courts of law' is deleted and other changes made in the same paragraph, so as to correspond with the statute of 10 George III, c. 50. In Miner v. Markham, the passage is quoted in its original form. Footnote 4 Wyche, Practice of the Supreme Court of the State of New York (2d Ed., 1794), p. 50 et seq.; Robinson, Practice in Courts of Law and Equity in Virginia (1832) pp. 126-130; Howe, Practice in Civil Actions and Proceedings at Law in Massachusetts (1834) pp. 55, 56, 141-148, 181-187; Troubat & Haly, Practice in Civil Actions and Proceedings in Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (1837) pp. 170-189. An early Virginia statute provided that, in actions against the Governor and certain other officers of the Commonwealth, a summons should issue 'instead of the ordinary process,' the capias ad respondendum. Collection of the Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, Published Pursuant to the Act of 1792 (See Laws 1794) c. 66, 23, p. 83; Rev. Code (1819), c. 128, 68, p. 506.