U.S. Supreme Court HELVERING v. UNION PAC. R. CO., 293 U.S. 282 (1934)

[Page 293 U.S. 282, 285]

as losses sustained on payment of the bonds at maturity, and taxpayers were permitted to amortize them over the life of the bonds and deduct them as amortized from gross income in each year. These regulations were continued under the 1918 and 1921 Acts, but the reference to commissions was omitted. [Footnote 1] Art. 544 of T.R. 45; Art. 545 of T.R. 62. The Board of Tax Appeals has consistently applied the regulations as to bond discount allowed before 1913 and in each case, as in the present, the Government, by failing to seek review of the ruling, has acquiesced in it. [Footnote 2]

[Page 293 U.S. 282, 286]

Both commissions and discount, as the Government concedes, are factors in arriving at the actual amount of interest paid for the use of capital procured by a bond issue. The difference between the capital realized by the issue and par value, which is to be paid at maturity, must be added to the aggregate coupon payments in order to arrive at the total interest paid. Both discount and commissions are included in this difference. If the difference be viewed as a loss resulting from the funding operation, it is one which is realized only upon the payment of the bonds at maturity.

But even if the commissions, unlike discount, may, as the Government insists, be regarded as a contemporary expense of procuring capital, it is one property chargeable to capital account. In practice it is taken out of the proceeds of the bonds by the banker. But in any case it must be deducted from the selling price to arrive at the capital realized by the taxpayer from the sale of the bonds, in return for which he must, at maturity, pay the face value of the bonds. The effect of the transaction in reducing the capital realized, whether through the payment of commissions or the allowance of discount, is the same. In this respect the commissions do not differ from brokerage commissions paid upon the purchase or sale of property. The regulations have consistently treated such commissions, not as items of current expense, but as additions to the cost of the property or deductions from the proceeds of sale, in arriving at net capital profit or loss for purposes of computing the tax. [Footnote 3]

[Page 293 U.S. 282, 288]

2. Our decision in Old Colony Railroad Co. v. Commissioner, supra, does not require a different conclusion because the commissions in the present case were allowed before 1913. It was recognized in that case that premiums on a bond issue received after the Sixteenth Amendment might be prorated over the period of the life of the bonds and taxed annually as income during this period. In refusing to allow premiums received before 1913 to be thus prorated and taxed, the Court was moved by the consideration that the premiums, which were received as income and had become a part of the taxpayer's capital before the Sixteenth Amendment, could not be taxed as income by virtue of that amendment and legislation under it.

No such consideration is presented here where the question is only of the deduction of an expense incurred before the amendment. Hence, the decision in the Old Colony Case can militate against our conclusion here only if returns, prepared in conformity to it, would fail to reflect true income if the rule announced in the Old Colony Case were also complied with. Plainly such is not the case. There can be no question of receipt of a premium where the bonds are sold at a discount. When sold at a premium, as in any other case, commissions must be deducted from gross proceeds in arriving at the capital realized upon the bond issue. There is no occasion for deduction of commissions from gross income at a later time unless the total amount realized by the sale of the bonds is less than their par value. In that case the difference alone is the amount to be amortized and deducted from gross income in the annual returns of the taxpayer. This would reflect his true income, where, as in the present case, his accounts are kept on the accrual basis.

Affirmed. Footnotes

Footnote 1 Notwithstanding this change in the regulations, the Commissioner appears to have continued to permit taxpayers to amortize and deduct commissions paid on bond issues prior to 1913, as the regulations under the 1916 Act had expressly permitted. A change of practice was sanctioned in Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 988, 1034, affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit, 47 F.(2d) 990, 991, where the taxpayer, while allowed to deduct bond discount, was not allowed to deduct from gross income the amortized expenses of a bond issue incurred before 1913. This refusal to allow amortization of commissions was confined to the case of bonds issued before 1913.

Treasury regulations have also been silent as to commissions on bonds issued after that date. Art. 544 of T.R. 45; Art. 545 of T.R. 62, 65, 69; Art. 68 of T.R. 75, 77. But there are a number of Treasury rulings which permit the amortization of commissions on bonds issued after 1913. O.D. 936, 4 Cum.Bul. 276; O.D. 959, 4 Cum.Bul. 129; I.T. 1412, I-2 Cum.Bul. 91; I.T. 1962, III-1 Cum.Bul. 291; S.M. 3691, IV-1 Cum.Bul. 145.

Footnote 2 Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 988, 1027-1034; Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 665, 686; Terminal Railroad Ass'n of St. Louis v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 1135, 1169; Chicago & North Western Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 1407. In one case the Board refused to allow the amortization, on the theory that the bonds were issued not by the taxpayer but by a predecessor corporation. Western Maryland Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 889, 907. On appeal by the taxpayer the Board was reversed. 33 F.(2d) 695, 697 (C.C. A.4th). The Government did not seek review.

Footnote 3 Art. 8 of T.R. 33, revised; Art. 293 of T.R. 45, 62; Art. 292 of T. R. 65, 69; Art. 282 of T.R. 74, 77; Hutton v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 265, 266. Commissions paid to a banker for selling the taxpayer's corporate stock have not been allowed to be deducted as a current business expense, but have been treated as a capital expenditure. Simmons Co. v. Commissioner, 33 F.(2d) 75, 76 (C.C.A.1st); Appeal of Charles H. Lilly Co., 2 B.T.A. 1058; Appeal of Emerson Electric Manufacturing Co., 3 B.T.A. 932, 935; Harrisburg Hospital, Inc., v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 1014, 1017; Frischkorn Real Estate Co. v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 965, 969, 970. Compare the requirement that commissions and expenses paid by a lessor in order to secure a tenant be prorated over the term of the lease. Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 1019, 1024; Howard v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 865, 866; Clawson v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 1253; Roby Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 696, 698; Butler v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 718, 729, 730; Central Bank Block Association v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 1183, 1185; Webb v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 274; Spinks Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 21 B.T.A. 674, 677; Young v. Commissioner, 20 B.T.A. 692, 695. Compare also the compulsory proration of fees and commissions paid by a borrower in order to obtain a loan. Lovejoy v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 1179, 1182, 1183; S. & L. Building Corp. v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 788, 794.