U.S. Supreme Court TAYLOR v. STERNBERG, 293 U.S. 470 (1935)

[Page 293 U.S. 470, 473]

filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the power of the state court in that respect ceased; and its order fixing the compensation of the receiver and his counsel was a nullity because made without jurisdiction, such jurisdiction then having passed to the bankruptcy court. Gross v. Irving Trust Co., supra.

Since the order of the state court was the sole foundation for their claims and that was void, petitioners had no more right to the sums subtracted or to be subtracted from the estate than they had to the remainder of the estate. That estate, including such sums, was still in custodia legis-only the possession had passed automatically from the state court to the bankruptcy court. Thereafter, the estate in its entirety was held by the receiver as a mere repository for the bankruptcy court and therefore not adversely; and petitioners, in respect of that part of it erroneously awarded as compensation, were in no sense adverse claimants. Their claims were colorable only and subject to the summary power of the bankruptcy court. In re Watts & Sachs, 190 U.S. 1, 27, 23 S.Ct. 718; In re Diamond's Estate, supra, at page 74 of 259 F.; Moore v. Scott (C.C.A.) 55 F.(2d) 863; Bank of Andrews v. Gudger (C.C.A.) 212 F. 49; In re Crosby Stores, Inc. (C.C.A.) 61 F.(2d) 812, 814.

Cases dealing with assignments, like Louisville Trust Co. v. Comingor, , 22 S.Ct. 293, cited by petitioners, in no way militate against this conclusion. The situation presented in each of those cases substantially differs from that presented here. See May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111, 115, 116 S., 45 S.Ct. 456; In re Louis Neuburger, Inc. (D.C.) 233 F. 701, affirmed Id. (C.C.A.) 240 F. 947. Moreover, the status of a receiver and that of an assignee, as already sufficiently appears, is essentially different.

Judgment affirmed.