U.S. Supreme Court CLYDE MALLORY LINES v. STATE OF ALABAMA EX REL. STATE DOCKS, 296 U.S. 261 (1935)

[Page 296 U.S. 261, 265]

see Southern Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 6 Wall. 31, 35; Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 87, 88 S., by forbidding a corresponding tax on the privilege of access by vessels to the ports of a state, and to their doubts whether the commerce clause would accomplish that purpose. [Footnote 1] If the states had been left free to tax the privilege of access by vessels to their harbors the prohibition against duties on imports and exports could have been nullified by taxing the vessels transporting the merchandise. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution 'tonnage' was a well-understood commercial term signifying in America the internal cubic capacity of a vessel. See Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, , 243. And duties of tonnage and duties on imports were known to commerce as levies upon the privilege of access by vessels or goods to the ports or to the territorial limits of a state and were distinct from fees or charges by authority of a state for services facilitating commerce, such as pilotage, towage, charges for loading and unloading cargoes, wharfage, storage, and the like. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, 314; Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, supra, 94 U.S. 238, 243.

[Page 296 U.S. 261, 268]

spection or license fees incident to or in support of local regulations of interstate commerce. Patapsco Guano Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 171 U.S. 345, 18 S.Ct. 862; New Mexico ex rel. E. J. McLean & Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 203 U.S. 38, 54, 27 S.Ct. 1; Red 'C' Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Agriculture, , 32 S.Ct. 152; Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 32 S.Ct. 715; Merchants' Exchange v. Missouri, 248 U.S. 365, 39 S.Ct. 114; Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U.S. 158, 39 S.Ct. 35. Its most recent manifestation is the levy of a tax which represents a reasonable charge upon interstate automobile traffic passing over state highways, upheld in Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 37 S.Ct. 30; Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554, 47 S.Ct. 702; Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245, 48 S.Ct. 230; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 35 S.Ct. 140.

Affirmed. Footnotes

Footnote 1 The adoption of the duty of tonnage clause followed a motion of Maryland delegates that: 'No state shall be restricted from laying duties of tonnage for the purpose of clearing harbors and erecting light houses.' Despite the assertion that such works were peculiarly necessary in the Chesapeake, the convention proved hostile to state tonnage levies. There was uncertainty whether the commerce clause would forbid such duties: Gouverneur Morris said that it would not, Madison thought that it should, Sherman argued for a concurrent power over commerce with power in the United States to control state regulations. Whereupon the clause was added in its present form. See Madison's Notes of the Convention (for Sept. 15, 1787).