U.S. Supreme Court, (May 18, 1936)
Docket number: 656
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U.S. Supreme Court UNITED STATES v. CORRICK, 298 U.S. 435 (1936)
[Page 298 U.S. 435, 438] tion whether the court abused its discretion. 2 The appellants urge that the action taken constituted such an abuse for the reason that want of jurisdiction is evident upon the face of the bill. With this contention we agree. Section 316 of the Packers and Stockyards Act3 adopts the same procedure for restraining enforcement of or setting aside orders of the secretary as is provided by law with respect to orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. By section 1 of the Commerce Court Act4 jurisdiction was conferred upon the Commerce Court 'over all cases ... brought to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend in whole or in part any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.' The Urgent Deficiencies Act of October 22, 1913,5 transferred the jurisdiction of the Commerce Court to the district courts and provided that such cases should be heard by three judges. The words of the statute exclude a mere refusal to act from the section conferring jurisdiction, and this court has accordingly held that an order negative in form and substance is not within the relief accorded. [Footnote 6] It is clear that [Page 298 U.S. 435, 440] suant to section 310, orders specified rates thereafter to be charged, these become the only lawful rates and so remain until the further order of the secretary. [Footnote 9] The bill shows that the secretary, after inquiry and full hearing, fixed rates thereafter to be charged by the appellees, and these had not been set aside or enjoined in any appropriate judicial proceeding or been altered by subsequent order of the secretary. The court was, therefore, without power to enjoin the prosecution of the appellees for charging rates other than those established by the secretary. The appellants did not raise the question of jurisdiction at the hearing below. But the lack of jurisdiction of a federal court touching the subject-matter of the litigation cannot be waived by the parties, and the District Court should, therefore, have declined sua sponte to proceed in the cause. [Footnote 10] And if the record discloses that the lower court was without jurisdiction this court will notice the defect, although the parties make no contention concerning it. [Footnote 11] While the District Court lacked jurisdiction, we have jurisdiction on appeal, not of the merits, but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in entertaining the suit. [Footnote 12] The decree must, therefore, be reversed, and the cause remanded, with dire tions to dismiss the bill. So ordered. Footnotes [Footnote *] Rehearing denied 298 U.S. 692, 56 S.Ct. 951, 80 L.Ed. --. Footnote 1 42 Stat. 159, U.S.C. tit. 7, c. 9 (7 U.S.C.A. 181-229). Footnote 2 Farrington v. T. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 290, 47 S.Ct. 406; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 278 U.S. 322, 326, 49 S. Ct. 157; State of Alabama v. United States, 279 U.S. 229, 230, 49 S.Ct. 266; National Fire Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 U.S. 331, 338, 50 S.Ct. 288. Footnote 3 42 Stat. 168, U.S.C. Tit. 7, Sec. 217 (7 U.S.C.A. 217): 'The provisions of all laws relating to the suspending or restraining the enforcement, operation, or execution of, or the setting aside in whole or in part the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, are made applicable to the jurisdiction, powers, and duties of the Secretary in enforcing the provisions of this title (sections 201 to 217 inclusive of this chapter), and to any person subject to the provisions of this title ( sections 201 to 217 inclusive of this chapter).' Footnote 4 c. 309, 36 Stat. 539. Footnote 5 c. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219, U.S.C., tit. 28, 41(8)(27)(28), 47 (28 U.S.C.A. 41 (8, 27, 28) 47). Footnote 6 Procter & Gamble v. United States, 225 U.S. 282, 292, 32 S.Ct. 761; Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. v. United States, , 37 S. Ct. 397; United States v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 244 U.S. 82, 37 S.Ct. 584; United States v. Atlanta, B. & C.R. Co., 282 U.S. 522, 51 S.Ct. 237; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 235, 238, 51 S.Ct. 429. Footnote 7 Chapter 64, 42 Stat. 164, U.S.C. tit. 7, 207 (7 U.S.C.A. 207). Footnote 8 Chapter 64, 42 Stat. 166, U.S.C. tit. 7, 211 (7 U.S.C.A. 211). Footnote 9 Compare Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 386, 387 S., 52 S.Ct. 183. Footnote 10 See Cutler v. Rae, 7 How. 729, 731, 8 How. 615 Appx., 1221; Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 325, 9 S.Ct. 289; Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. 48, 62, 24 S.Ct. 598; Mattingly v. Northwestern V.R.R. Co., , 15 S.Ct. 725; 443 Cans v. United States, 226 U.S. 172, 33 S.Ct. 50; Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244, 55 S.Ct. 162. Footnote 11 Fernandez Y Perez v. Fernandez, 202 U.S. 80, 100, 26 S.Ct. 561; Stratton v. St. Louis S.W. Ry., 282 U.S. 10, 13, 51 S.Ct. 8. Footnote 12 United States v. Huckabee, 16 Wall. 414, 435; Stickney v. Wilt, 23 Wall. 150, 163; Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 292 U.S. 16, 19, 54 S.Ct. 565.