U.S. Supreme Court KENTUCKY WHIP & COLLAR CO. v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO., 299 U.S. 334 (1937)

[Page 299 U.S. 334, 344]

location of the penal or reformatory institution where produced. [Footnote 1] Violation is punished by fine and forfeiture. [Footnote 2]

[Page 299 U.S. 334, 346]

Petitioner's argument necessarily recognizes that in certain circumstances an absolute prohibition of interstate transportation is constitutional regulation. The power to prohibit interstate transportation has been upheld by this Court in relation to diseased live stock,3 lottery tickets,4 commodities owned by the interstate carrier transporting them, except such as may be required in the conduct of its business as a common carrier,5 adulterated and misbranded articles, under the Pure Food and Drugs Act,6 women, for immoral purposes,7 intoxicating liquors,8 diseased plants, 9 stolen motor vehicles,10 and kidnaped persons. [Footnote 11]

[Page 299 U.S. 334, 352]

In the congressional action there is nothing arbitrary or capricious bringing the statute into collision with the requirements of due process of law. The Congress in exercising the power confided to it by the Constitution is as free as the states to recognize the fundamental interests of free labor. [Footnote 19] Nor has the Congress attempted to delegate its authority to the states. The Congress has not sought to exercise a power not granted or to usurp the police powers of the states. It has not acted on any assumption of a power enlarged by virtue of state action. The Congress has exercised its plenary power which is subject to no limitation other than that which is found in the Constitution itself. The Congress has formulated its own policy and established its own rule. The fact that it has adopted its rule in order to aid the enforcement of valid state laws affords no ground for constitutional objection.

[Page 299 U.S. 334, 353]

containing convict-made goods to be labeled as required by section 2. The requirement of labels, disclosing the nature of the contents, the name and location of the penal institution where the goods were produced, and the names and addresses of shippers and consignees, was manifestly reasonable and appropriate for the carrying out of the prohibition. Seven Cases v. United States, supra; United States v. Freeman, 239 U.S. 117, 36 S.Ct. 32; Weeks v. United States, 245 U.S. 618, 622, 38 S.Ct. 219. The fact that the labeling was required in all shipments of convict-made goods, regardless of the law of the state of destination, does not invalidate the provision as its scope could reasonably be deemed to be necessary to accomplish the legitimate purpose of the Act Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 609, 23 S.Ct. 168; New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 40, 29 S.Ct. 10; Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 201, 33 S.Ct. 44; Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 560, 44 S.Ct. 628, 631.

The decree is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

Mr. Justice STONE took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Footnotes

Footnote 1 Section 1 and 2 (49 U.S.C.A. 61, 62) are as follows:'That it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to transport or cause to be transported in any manner or by any means whatsoever, or aid or assist in obtaining transportation for or in transporting any goods, wares, and merchandise manufactured, produced, or mined wholly or in part by convicts or prisoners (except convicts or prisoners on parole or probation), or in any penal or reformatory institution, from one State, Territory, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, or from any foreign country, into any State, Territory, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, where said goods, wares, and merchandise are intended by any person interested therein to be received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original package or otherwise in violation of any law of such State, Territory, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, or District of the United States, or place noncontiguous but subject to the jurisdiction thereof. Nothing herein shall apply to commodities manufactured in Federal penal and correctional institutions for use by the Federal Government.'Sec. 2. All packages containing any goods, wares, and merchandise manufactured, produced, or mined wholly or in part by convicts or prisoners, except convicts or prisoners on parole or probation, or in any penal or reformatory institution, when shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce shall be plainly and clearly marked, so that the name and address of the shipper, the name and address of the consignee, the nature of the contents, and the name and location of the penal or reformatory institution where produced wholly or in part may be readily ascertained on an inspection of the outside of such package.'

Footnote 2 Id., sections 3 and 4 (49 U.S.C.A. 63, 64).

Footnote 3 Act of May 29, 1884, 23 Stat. 31; Reid v. Colorado, , 23 S.Ct. 92. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 358, 359 S., 23 S.Ct. 321.

Footnote 4 Act of March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 963 (18 U.S.C.A. 387 and note); Champion v. Ames, , 23 S.Ct. 321.

Footnote 5 Act of June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584; United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 415, 29 S.Ct. 527.

Footnote 6 Act of June 30, 1906, 34 Stat. 768 (21 U.S.C.A. 1 et seq.); Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, , 31 S.Ct. 364; Seven Cases v. United States, 239 U.S. 510, 36 S.Ct. 190, L. R.A.1916D, 164.

Footnote 7 Act of June 25, 1910, 36 Stat. 825 (18 U.S.C.A. 397-404); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 33 S.Ct. 281, 43 L.R.A.(N.S.) 906, Ann.Cas.1913E, 905; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 37 S.Ct. 192, L.R.A.1917F, 502, Ann.Cas.1917B, 1168.

Footnote 8 Act of March 1, 1913, 37 Stat. 699 (27 U.S.C.A. 122 and note); Act of March 3, 1917, 5, 39 Stat. 1069 (18 U.S.C.A. 341, 27 U.S.C.A. 1 note); Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland R. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 37 S.Ct. 180, L.R.A.1917B, 1218, Ann.Cas.1917B, 845; United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 39 S.Ct. 143; McCormick & Co. v. Brown, 286 U.S. 131, 52 S.Ct. 522, 87 A.L.R. 448.

Footnote 9 Act of March 4, 1917, 39 Stat. 1165 (7 U.S.C.A. 161); Oregon- Washington R. & N. Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87, 46 S.Ct. 279.

Footnote 10 Act of October 29, 1919, 41 Stat. 324 (18 U.S.C.A. 408); Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 45 S.Ct. 345, 37 A.L.R. 1407.

Footnote 11 Act of June 22, 1932, 47 Stat. 326 as amended, Act of May 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 781 (18 U.S.C.A. 408a to 408c); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 395.

See, also, Act of May 25, 1900, 31 Stat. 187 (16 U.S.C.A. 701, 18 U. S.C.A. 391-395 and notes); Rupert v. United States (C.C.A.) 181 F. 87; Act of July 3, 1918, 40 Stat. 755 (16 U.S.C.A. 703 and note, 704 et seq .); Bogle v. White (C.C.A.) 61 F.(2d) 930.

Footnote 12 See Note 10.

Footnote 13 See Note 11.

Footnote 14 26 Stat. 313 (27 U.S.C.A. 121).

Footnote 15 37 Stat. 699 (27 U.S.C.A. 122 and note).

Footnote 16 39 Stat. 1069, 5 (18 U.S.C.A. 341, 27 U.S.C.A. 1 note).

Footnote 17 45 Stat. 1084 (49 U.S.C.A. 60).

Footnote 18 Act of June 17, 1930, 307, 46 Stat. 689 (19 U.S.C.A. 1307).

Footnote 19 In the report of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, recommending the passage of the Ashurst-Sumners Act, the Committee said ( Sen. Rep. No. 906, 74th Cong., 1st sess.):'For many years the Congress has considered bills relating to the sale of prison-made goods. Extensive hearings have been held on these measures which have thoroughly revealed the evils attending the sale of such goods, in the open market, in competition with goods manufactured and produced by free labor. These evils impelled the Congress in 1929 to enact the Hawes-Cooper law, by virtue of which prison-made goods, upon their entry and delivery into a State, became subject to the laws of that State.'At present 21 States, with a population in excess of 75 millions, have enacted laws prohibiting the sale, in the open market, of prison-made goods. This bill is designed to prohibit the transportation of such goods into the States which have thus legislated, in cases in which such goods are to be received or used in violation of the State law. The principle involved in this bill has been frequently sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States.'