U.S. Supreme Court GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. V. STATE OF WASHINGTON , 300 U.S. 154 (1937)

300 U.S. 154

GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO.v. STATE OF WASHINGTON. * No. 20.

Argued Dec. 7, 8, 1936.Decided Feb. 1, 1937.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Washington.

[ Great Northern Ry. Co. v. State of Washington 300 U.S. 154 (1937) ]

[Page 300 U.S. 154 , 160]

roads; may delegate the duty to an officer or commission; and may exact the reasonable cost of such supervision and regulation from the utilities concerned and allocate the exaction amongst the members of the affected class without violating the rule of equality imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote 5] The supervision and regulation of the local structures and activities of a corporation engaged in interstate commerce, and the imposition of the reasonable expense thereof upon such corporation, is not a burden upon, or regulation of, interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution. [Footnote 6] A law exhibiting the intent to impose a compensatory fee for such a legitimate purpose is prima facie reasonable. [Footnote 7] If the exaction be so unreasonable and disproportionate to the service as to impugn the good faith of the law8 it cannot stand either under the commerce clause or the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote 9] The State is not bound to adjust the charge after the fact, but may, in anticipation, fix what the legislature deems to be a fair fee for the expected service, the presumption being that if, in practice, the sum charged appears inordinate the legislative body will reduce it in the light of experience. [Footnote 10] Such a statute may, in spite of the presumption of validity, show on its

[Page 300 U.S. 154 , 161]

face that some part of the exaction is to be used for a purpose other than the legitimate one of supervision and regulation and may, for that reason, be void. [Footnote 11] And a statute fair upon its face may be shown to be void and unenforceable on account of its actual operation. [Footnote 12] If the exaction be clearly excessive it is bad in toto and the state cannot collect any part of it. [Footnote 13]

[Page 300 U.S. 154 , 174]

to doubt that such a statute would be valid. It would not even involve an extreme departure from common law analogies rooted in the presumption of official regularity. What a state may do in changing the rules of evidence through the action of its legislature, it may do with equal competence through the action of its judges, for anything to the contrary in the Constitution of the United States.

4. Appellant did not discharge its burden by proving in a vague way that some of the disbursements classified by the auditor as a charge against the railroads were incidental to proceedings conducted before the Interstate Commerce Commission or elsewhere for the benefit of private shippers and were not properly a part of the expense of local regulation.

The Attorney General takes the ground that disbursements from the revolving fund, if made for that purpose, were without authority of law. If that be so, they cannot avail to invalidate the statute, though they may lay the basis for a remedy in behalf of the state or others against the officers or agents guilty of unintentional misfeasance. Aside, however, from that objection, there was no attempt by appellant to prove the amount of these or like withdrawals in even the roughest fashion. There was no suggestion, much less evidence, that they would wipe out the excess of $37, 833.14 stated by the auditor. An inquiry directed to the point would have yielded in all likelihood an estimate at least approximately correct. If such inquiry was inadequate, the slips and vouchers were available for scrutiny and dissection. Examination of the auditor in connection with the documents would have shown forth the truth.

The presumption of validity which sustains an act of legislation is unbroken by the evidence.

The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, and Mr. Justice STONE join in this opinion. Footnotes

[Footnote *] Rehearing denied 300 U.S. 686, 81 L.Ed. Ä-.

Footnote 1 184 Wash. 648, 52 P.(2d) 1274.

Footnote 2 Chapter 107, p. 209, Washington Session Laws of 1929. (Remington's Revised Statutes 10417, 10418.) This act amended section 1 of c. 113, p. 354, of the Laws of 1921, as amended by 1, c. 107, p. 290 of the Laws of 1923. It left section 2 of c. 113, p. 354 Laws of 1921, in effect.

Footnote 3 Pacific T. & T. Co. v. Seattle, 172 Wash. 649, 21 P.(2d) 721, affirmed on other questions 291 U.S. 300. See, also, the opinion below, 184 Wash. 648, at pages 650, 651, 52 P.(2d) 1274, at page 1275.

Footnote 4 The complaint as filed sought recovery also of sums paid pursuant to other statutory provisions. The appellant, however, abandoned these items of claim.

Footnote 5 Charlotte, etc., Railroad Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386; New York v. Squire, 145 U.S. 175, 191.

Footnote 6 Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, ; Mackay Tel. Co. v. Little Rock, 250 U.S. 94, 99, 39 S. Ct. 428.

Footnote 7 Western Union Tel. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U.S. 419, 425; Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U.S. 158, 162.

Footnote 8 McLean & Co. v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 203 U.S. 38, 55; Compare Red 'C' Oil Co. v. Board of Agriculture of North Carolina, 222 U.S. 380, 393; Western Union Tel. Co. v. New Hope, supra.

Footnote 9 Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 83; Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Taylor, ; Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, supra, 248 U.S. 158, at page 162.

Footnote 10 Atlantic, etc., Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, supra, 190 U.S. 160, at page 164; Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Taylor, supra, 192 U.S. 64, at page 69; Foote & Co., Inc., v. Stanley, 232 U.S. 494, 503, 504.

Footnote 11 Foote & Co., Inc., v. Stanley, supra, , at page 505; Lugo v. Suazo (C.C.A.) 59 F.(2d) 386.

Footnote 12 Western Union Tel. Co. v. New Hope, supra, 187 U.S. 419, at page 425; Foote & Co., Inc., v. Stanley, supra, 232 U.S. 494, at page 507.

Footnote 13 Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. New Hope, 192 U.S. 55; Foote & Co., Inc. v. Stanley, supra, 232 U.S. 494, at page 508.

Footnote 14 Compare McKay v. Dillon, 4 How. 421, 447; Dower v. Richards, 151 U.S. 658, 667; Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 439, 443; Cedar Rapids Gas Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 223 U.S. 655, 668; Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 239; Central Vermont R. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 512, Ann.Cas.1916B, 252; Hill v. Smith, 260 U.S. 592, 594, 220.

Footnote 15 Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. C. H. Albers Comm. Co., 223 U.S. 573, 591; Creswill v. Grand Lodge, 225 U.S. 246, 261; Northern Pacific Railway v. North Dakota, 236 U.S. 585, 593, L.R.A.1917F, 1148, Ann.Cas.1916A, 1; Interstate Amusement Company v. Albert, 239 U.S. 560, 566; Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 324, 126, 27 A.L.R. 375; Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503, 511, 532, 28 A.L.R. 1207; AEtna Life Insurance Company v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389, 394, 130; Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385, 656; Ancient Order v. Michaux, 279 U.S. 737, 745, 488; Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U.S. 85, 86.