U.S. Supreme Court DUGAS V. AMERICAN SURETY CO. OF NEW YORK , 300 U.S. 414 (1937)

300 U.S. 414

DUGASv. AMERICAN SURETY CO. OF NEW YORK. * No. 340.

Argued Jan. 13, 14, 1937.Decided March 29, 1937.

[ Dugas v. American Surety Co. of New York 300 U.S. 414 (1937) ]

[Page 300 U.S. 414 , 421]

the amount for which judgment was prayed was reduced to $2,999 to forestall a removal to the federal court.

To the new suit the New York Casualty Company interposed the exception of prematurity, among others. The court sustained that exception, without ruling on the others, and dismissed the suit. Dugas appealed to the Supreme Court of the state, which, on January 7, 1935, reversed the judgment of dismissal and remanded the suit for further proceedings. [Footnote 5]

[Page 300 U.S. 414 , 426]

operated, under recognized principles of law and equity, to extinguish his right under the judgment. He relied on the judgment in his several pleadings and the decrees fixed the measure of his claim conformably to the judgment. Even the costs awarded to him by the judgment were included in the computation. Thus it is plain that the interpleader suit and the decrees therein dealt with his claim as it was embodied in and evidenced by the judgment.

4. Whether, in subsequently bringing suit in the state court on the appeal bond, Dugas contravened the fair intendment of the decrees in the interpleader suit is the principal question arising on the supplemental bill. Both courts below answered the question in the affirmative.

The appeal bond was in the nature of a security for the satisfaction of the judgment in Dugas' suit on the qualifying bond; and in attempting to enforce this security he obviously was seeking to realize on the judgment. If his right under the judgment was extinguished, he was not entitled to resort to the security; for the relation of one to the other was such that the extinguishment of his right under the judgment terminated his right in the security. [Footnote 6]

[Page 300 U.S. 414 , 428]

that in such as involved questions approximately like those presented to the District Court in the original suit there were locally appropriate applications for the exercise of appellate authority before the rulings became conclusive, which was not the case here.

Some reliance is placed on the fact that the suit on the appeal bond was against the surety thereon alone. But this does not make for a different result. As Dugas' right under the judgment was extinguished, he was no more entitled to realize on the judgment by suing the surety on the appeal bond than by suing the principal. Besides, the surety, if cast in the suit and compelled to pay, would be entitled to reimbursement by the principal. The latter, therefore, may be heard to complain in the circumstances shown here.

5. The jurisdiction to entertain the supplemental bill is free from doubt. Such a bill may be brught in a federal court in aid of and to effectuate its prior decree to the end either that the decree may be carried fully into execution or that it may be given fuller effect, but subject to the qualification that the relief be not of a different kind or a different principle. [Footnote 7] Such a bill is ancillary and dependent, and therefore the jurisdiction follows that of the original suit, regardless of the citizenship of the parties to the bill or the amount in controversy. 8

[Page 300 U.S. 414 , 429]

respecting the power of a federal court to protect its jurisdiction and decrees. [Footnote 9]

Decree affirmed.

The CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice CARDOZO are of opinion that the decree should be reversed for the reasons stated by SIBLEY, J., in the court below.

Mr. Justice STONE did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. Footnotes

[Footnote *] Rehearing denied 301 U.S. 712, 81 L.Ed. Ä-.

Footnote 1 Chapter 273, 44 Stat., Pt. 2, 416. Repealed and new act substituted January 20, 1936, c. 13, 49 Stat. 1096 (28 U.S.C.A. 41(26), but with saving clause respecting any act done or any right, accruing or accrued, in any suit or proceeding had or commenced under the earlier act prior to its repeal.

Footnote 2 Act La. No. 172, 1908, p. 232.

Footnote 3 Code Prac.La. arts. 575, 579.

Footnote 4 The master found Dugas' disability was materially relieved at the time the hearing began (October 26, 1932) and recommended that his claim be allowed at $20 per week for the 127 weeks preceding the hearing, at $8 per week for 173 weeks, discounted at 8 per cent., and at $250 for medical bills and $97.40 for costs and expert testimony, making a total of $4,160. 68.

Footnote 5 Dugas v. New York Casualty Co., 181 La. 322, 159 So. 572.

Footnote 6 Cage's Executors v. Cassidy, 23 How. 109, 116; Carpenter v. Longan, 16 Wall. 271, 275; Dodge v. Freedman's Savings & Trust Co., 93 U.S. 379, 382; United States v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603, 610, 611. And see Illinois Surety Co. v. U.S. to Use of Peeler, 240 U.S. 214, 225.

Footnote 7 Story's Equity Pleading (9th Ed.) 338; Root v. Woolworth, 150 U.S. 401, 410Ä412; Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 239, 696, 93 A.L.R. 195.

Footnote 8 Root v. Woolworth, supra, , at page 413; Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, supra.

Footnote 9 French v. Hay, 22 Wall. 238, 250; Root v. Woolworth, supra, 150 U.S. 401, at page 411; Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93, 112; Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239, 245; Looney v. Eastern Texas R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 214, 221; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor, 254 U.S. 175, 183, 96.