U.S. Supreme Court HENNEFORD V. SILAS MASON CO. , 300 U.S. 577 (1937)

300 U.S. 577

HENNEFORD et al.v. SILAS MASON CO., Inc. Et al.No. 418.

Reargued March 1, 2, 1937.Decided March 29, 1937.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Washington. [ Henneford v. Silas Mason Co. 300 U.S. 577 (1937) ]

[Page 300 U.S. 577 , 580]

the selling price. Title 4, with the heading 'compensating tax,' provides ( sections 31, 35) that there shall be collected from every person in the state 'a tax or excise for the privilege of using within this state any article of tangible personal property purchased subsequent to April 30, 1935,' at the rate of 2 per cent. of the purchase price, including in such price the cost of transportation from the place where the article was purchased. If those provisions stood alone, they would mean that retail buyers within the state would have to pay a double tax, 2 per cent. upon the sale and 2 per cent. upon the use. Relief from such a burden is provided in another section (section 32) which qualifies the use tax by allowing four exceptions. Only two of these exceptions (b and c) call for mention at this time. [Footnote 2] Subdivision (b) provides that the use tax shall not be laid unless the property has been bought at retail. Subdivision (c) provides that the tax shall nto

[Page 300 U.S. 577 , 588]

Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 159, 313. The choice is as broad where the tax is laid upon one or a few of the attributes of ownership as when laid upon them all. Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 158, 159, Ann.Cas.1912B, 1312. True, collections might be larger if the use were not dependent upon a prior purchase by the user. On the other hand, economy in administration or a fairer distribution of social benefits and burdens may have been promoted when the lines were drawn as they were. Such questions of fiscal policy will not be answered by a court. The Legislature might make the tax base as broad or as narrow as it pleased.

The interlocutory injunction was erroneously granted, and the decree must be

Reversed.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS and Mr. Justice BUTLER dissent. Footnotes

Footnote 1 'Sec. 19. The tax hereby levied shall not apply to the following sales:'(a) Casual and isolated sales by a person who is not engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail;'(b) Sales made by persons in the course of business activities with respect to which tax liability is specifically imposed under title V of this act, when the gross proceeds from such sales must be included in the measure of the tax imposed under said title V;'(c) The distribution and news stand sale of newspapers;'(d) Sales which the State of Washington is prohibited from taxing under the constitution of this state or the constitution or laws of the United States;'(e) Sales of motor vehicle fuel taxable under chapter 58 of the Laws of 1933 section 5 (being Rem.Rev.Stat., section 8327-5);'(f) Sales made on relief vouchers issued by the department of public welfare or by any county or city or other welfare agency;'(g) Sales of fresh sweet milk, raw unprocessed fruits and vegetables, butter, eggs, cheese, canned milk and unsweetened bread in loaf form ( including rolls and buns), sold for consumption off the premises.'

Footnote 2 For greater certainty exceptions (a) and (d) are stated in this note:'The provisions of this title shall not apply:'(a) In respect to the use of any article of tangible personal property brought into the State of Washington by a nonresident thereof for his or her use or enjoyment while within the state; * * *'(d) In respect to the use of tangible personal property purchased during any calendar month, the total purchase price of which is less than twenty ($20.00) dollars.'