U.S. Supreme Court COLLINS v. YOSEMITE PARK & CURRY CO., 304 U.S. 518 (1938)

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The District Court, after noting that Yosemite National Park consists of Yosemite Valley and considerable surrounding territory, first discussed what it conceived to be the situation in the Valley. [Footnote 2] It reviewed the history of the land; the United States acquired it in 1848 under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,3 reserved proprietary rights when California became a State in 1850, Act Sept. 9,4 and on June 30, 1864, gave the Valley to California in trust for public park and recreational purposes. [Footnote 5]

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whereby Congress accepted the regrant and constituted the Valley a part of the Yosemite National Park. [Footnote 8] It further held, over appellants' objection, that there was no constitution obstacle to the acquisition by the United States of exclusive jurisdiction over land ceded to it for national park purposes. Jurisdiction over the

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rest of the Park, it concluded, was in the State until April 15, 1919, when it was offered to the national government (which had always retained the proprietary interest) in a statute saving to the State, inter alia, 'the right to tax persons and corporations, their franchises and property on the lands included in said parks.' [Footnote 9] Ju-

[Page 304 U.S. 518, 526]

risdiction of the Park was assumed by the United States by Act of June 2, 1920, which referred to the state act, including its reservation of a power to tax. [Footnote 10] The District Court held this reservation inapplicable, on the ground that the Alcoholic Beverage Act is chiefly regulatory in nature rather than a revenue measure. Concluding that the United States had exclusive jurisdiction over the land in question, the District Court enjoined the enforcement of the state Act.

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Whatever the existing status of jurisdiction at the time of their enactment, the Acts of cession and acceptance of 1919 and 1920 are to be taken as declarations of the agreements, reached by the respective sovereignties, State and Nation, as to the future jurisdiction and rights of each in the entire area of Yosemite National Park. As jurisdiction over the Gorge was created by one set of statutes and that over the rest of the Park by different legislation, this adjustment was desirable. The States of the Union and the National Government may make mutually satisfactory arrangements as to jurisdiction of territory within their borders and thus in a most effective way, cooperatively adjust problems flowing from our dual system of government. [Footnote 11] Jurisdiction obtained by consent or cession may be qualified by agreement or through offer and acceptance or ratification. [Footnote 12] It is a matter of arrangement. These arrangements the courts wil recog nize and respect.

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the United States to acquire land under Clause 17 without taking exclusive jurisdiction. [Footnote 14] In that case, it was said: 'Clause 17 contains no express stipulation that the consent of the state must be without reservations. We think that such a stipulation should not be implied. We are unable to reconcile such an implication with the freedom of the state and its admitted authority to refuse or qualify cessions of jurisdiction when purchases have been made without consent, or property has been acquired by condemnation.' The clause is not the sole authority for the acquisition of jurisdiction. There is no question about the power of the United States to exercise jurisdiction secured by cession, though this is not provided for by clause 17.15 And it has been held that such a cession may be qualified. 16 It has never been necessary, heretofore, for this Court to determine whether or not the United States has the constitutional right to exercise jurisdiction over territory, within the geographical limits of a State, acquired for purposes other than those specified in Clause 17. It was raised but not decided in Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439, 454, 49 S.Ct. 277, 230. It was assumed without discussion in Yellowstone Park Transportation Co. v. Gallatin County, 9 Cir., 31 F.2d 644.17

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provided for by this Act. The fact that the 'right to fix and collect license fees for fishing in said parts' was reserved, is not decisive. It may well be that the negotiators of the agreement considered such licenses regulatory in nature and therefore requiring express exception from the agreement for exclusive jurisdiction, in addition to the tax exception.

(a) Licenses. As the State of California has in the area of the Yosemite National Park only the jurisdiction saved under the cession and acceptance acts of 1919 and 1920, it does not have the power to regulate the liquor traffic in the Park. Except as to this reserved jurisdiction, California 'put that area beyond the field of operation of her laws.' [Footnote 21] While the State has, under its reservation, the right to use means to force collection of the taxes saved, 22 it seems clear that the licenses required by section 5 go beyond aids to the collection of taxes and are truly regulatory in character. This is not a case where provisions requiring a license may be treated as separable from regulations applicable to those licensed. [Footnote 23] Here the regulatory provisions appear in the form of conditions to be satisfied before a license may be granted. [Footnote 24] The pro-

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Neither party cites any pertinent state court decision. There is nothing in the statute itself compelling the conclusion that the excise tax and regularly provisions are inseparble, or requiring the Court to overturn the presumptively correct determination of the administrative officers that the sales within the Park are subject to the excise tax. Section 23 provides that an excise tax is imposed upon beer and wine sold 'in this State by (an) ... importer.' Reference to provisions of the Act defining the terms used in this section26 makes it plain that although appellee Company does not import beverages into California within the meaning of the Twenty-First Amendment, U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 21, it is an importer for purposes of the Act, and, as such, is subject to the tax. The Act is restricted to sales 'in his State,' but that term embraces all territory within the geographical limits of the State. [Footnote 27] There is nothing in the Act restricting this taxing provision to sales made by or to persons licensed under the Act. Section 23 clearly applies to beer and wine sold by appellee Company in the Park, and it applies to such sales regardless of the applicability vel non of the regulatory or licensing provisions of the Act.

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definition of either of these groups,28 but Sec. 24 must be read in conjunction with section 33, St.1937, p. 2153. Section 33 provides that the 'tax imposed by section 24 of this act upon the sale of distilled spirits shall be collected from rectifiers and wholesalers of distilled spirits and payment of the tax shall be evidenced by stamps issued by the board to such rectifiers and wholesalers,' and continues with the provision that 'in exceptional instances the board may sell such stamps to on- and off-sale distilled spirits licensees and other persons.' (Italics added.) In view of the atypical circumstances of the present case, we cannot consider erroneous an interpretation by the board that stamps, to be affixed to the liquor containers, might be issued and sold to appellee Company. These provisions, like sec. 23, are independent of any licensing or regulatory provisions of the Act, and may be enforced independently, as a purely tax or revenue measure.

The objection that collection of the taxes may not only interfere with an agency of the United States but may be actually partly collected from the National Government because of its interest in the profits under the contract is fully answered by the fact that the United States, by its acceptance of qualified jurisdiction, has consented to such a tax. [Footnote 29]

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the importation of intoxicating liquors. Reliance for enforcement is placed upon secions 49 and 49.2 of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. [Footnote 31] The argument for this claim is bottomed upon our decision in State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 57 S.Ct. 77, where we held that a statute imposing a $500 license fee for importing and a $750 license fee for brewing beer did not violate

[Page 304 U.S. 518, 538]

the commerce clause or the equal protection clause, because the words of the XXI Amendment 'are apt to confer upon the state the power to forbid all importations' and 'the State may adopt a lesser degree of regulation than total prohibition' (pages 62, 63, 57 S.Ct. page 78).32 The lower court was of the opinion that though the Amendment may have increased 'the state's power to deal with the problem; ... it did not increase its jurisdiction.' (page 1013 of 20 F.Supp.) With this conclusion, we agree. As territorial jurisdiction over the Park was in the United States, the State could not legislate for the area merely on account of the XXI Amendment. [Footnote 33] There was no transportation into California 'for delivery or use therein.' The delivery and use is in the Park, and under a distinct sovereignty. Where exclusive jurisdiction is in the United States, without power in the State to regulate alcoholic beverages, the XXI Amendment is not applicable. [Footnote 34]

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The final decree forbids entering upon the premises of complainant; seizing, impeding or interfering with any shipments to complainant in Yosemite National Park; from instituting any actions or proceedings in any court of law or equity for violations or alleged violations of said Alcoholic Beverage Control Act in respect of the importation, possession or sale in the Park; from requiring or demanding reports on the importation, possession or sale of said beverages; from enforcing in any manner within the limits of Yosemite National Park, or in respect of transactions within said Park, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act of the State of California.

From the pleadings and decree it is clear that until now the controversy has trned not upon special provisions of the Act in question but upon its applicability as a whole. As in our judgment, as heretofore pointed out, the tax provisions are enforceable and the regulatory provisions unenforceable, it is necessary to reverse the decree and remand the cause to the District Court for a determination by the Court in accordance with this opinion of the applicability of such sections of the Act as the State may threaten to enforce.

It is so ordered.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS is of opinion that the decree below should be reversed because as stated by counsel for appellants, 'The acts of cession and acceptance reserved to the state the right to levy upon and collect from the appellee company the type of tax imposed by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act.' Also, that discussion should be confined to that point.

Mr. Justice CARDOZO took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Footnotes

Footnote 1 Cal.Stat.1935, c. 330, p. 1123, as amended, Cal.Stat.1937, c. 681, 758, pp. 1934, 2126

Footnote 2 The discussion applies equally to the Mariposa Big Tree Grove.

Footnote 3 9 Stat. 922.

Footnote 4 9 Stat. 452.

Footnote 5 13 Stat. 3 25.

Footnote 6 'Section 1. The State of California hereby cedes to the United States of America exclusive jurisdiction over such piece or parcel of land as may have been or may be hereafter ceded or conveyed to the United States, during the time the United States shall be or remain the owner thereof, for all purposes except the administration of the criminal laws of this State and the service of civil process therein.' Cal.Stat.1891, c. 181, p. 262.

Footnote 7 'An act to re-cede and re-grant unto the United States of America, the 'Yosemite Valley,' and the land embracing the 'Mariposa Big Tree Grove.''Section 1. The State of California does hereby re-cede and re-grant unto the United States of America, the 'Cleft' or 'Gorge' in the granite peak of the Sierra Nevada mountains, situated in the county of Mariposa, State of California, and the headwaters of the Merced river, and known as the Yosemite Valley, with its branches or spurs, granted unto the State of California in trust for public use, resort and recreation by the act of congress entitled 'An act authorizing a grant to the State of California of the Yosemite Valley and of the land embracing the 'Mariposa Big Tree Grove,' approved June 30th, 1864; and the State of California does hereby relinquish unto the United States of America and resign the trusts created and granted by the said act of congress.'Sec. 3. This act shall take effect from and after acceptance by the United States of America of the re-cessions and regrants herein made, thereby forever releasing the State of California from further cost of maintaining the said premises, the same to be held for all time by the United States of America for public use, resort and recreation, and imposing on the United States of America the cost of maintaining the same as a national park. Provided, however, that the re-cession and re-grant hereby made shall not affect vested rights and interests of third persons.' Cal.Stat.1905, c. 60, p. 54.

Footnote 8 'Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the recession and regranting unto the United States by the State of California of the cleft or gorge in the granite peak of the Sierra Nevada Mountains, situated in the county of Mariposa, State of California, and the headwaters of the Merced River, and known as the Yosemite Valley, with its branches or spurs, granted unto the State of California in trust for public use, resort, and recreation by the Act of Congress entitled 'An Act authorizing a grant to the State of California of the Yosemite Valley and of the land embracing the Mariposa Big Tree Grove,' approved June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-four ( Thirteenth Statutes, page three hundred and twenty-five), as well as the tracts embracing what is known as the 'Mariposa Big Tree Grove,' likewise granted unto the State of California by the aforesaid Act of Congress, is hereby ratified and accepted, and the tracts of lands embracing the Yosemite Valley and the Mariposa Big Tree Grove, as described in the Act of Congress approved June thirtieth, eighteen hundred and sixty-four, together with that part of fractional sections five and six, township five south, range twenty-two east, Mount Diablo meridian, California, lying south of the South Fork of Merced River and almost wholly between the Mariposa Big Tree Grove and the present south boundary of the Yosemite National Park, be, and the same are hereby, reserved and withdrawn from settlement, occupancy, or sale under the laws of the United States and set apart as reserved forest lands, subject to all the limitations, conditions, and provisions of the Act of Congress approved October first, eighteen hundred and ninety, entitled 'An Act to set apart certain tracts of land in the State of California as forest reservations,' as well as the limitations, conditions, and provisions of the Act of Congress approved February seventh, nineteen hundred and five, entitled 'An Act to exclude from the Yosemite National Park, California, certain lands therein described, and to attach and include the said lands in the Sierra Forest Reserve,' and shall hereafter form a part of the Yosemite National Park.' 34 Stat. 831, 16 U.S.C.A. 48.

Footnote 9 'An act to cede to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over Yosemite national park, Sequoia national park, and General Grant national park in the State of California.'Section 1. Exclusive jurisdiction shall be and the same is hereby ceded to the United States over and within all of the territory which is now or may hereafter be included in those several tracts of land in the State of California set aside and dedicated for park purposes by the United States as 'Yosemite national park,' 'Sequoia national park,' and 'General Grant national park' respectively; saving, however, to the State of California the right to serve civil or criminal process within the limits of the aforesaid parks in suits or prosecutions for or on account of rights acquired, obligations incurred or crimes committed in said state outside of said parks; and saving further, to the said state the right to tax persons and corporations, their franchises and property on the lands included in said parks, and the right to fix and collect license fees for fishing in said parks; and saving also to the persons residing in any of said parks now or hereafter the right to vote at all elections held within the county or counties in which said parks are situate; provided, however, that jurisdiction shall not vest until the United States through the proper officer notifies the State of California that they assume police jurisdiction over said parks.' Cal.Stat.1919, c. 51, p. 74.

Footnote 10 41 Stat. 731, 16 U.S.C.A. 57.'Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the provisions of the act of the Legislature of the State of California (approved April 15, 1919 ), ceding to the United States exclusive jurisdiction over the territory embraced and included within the Yosemite National Park, Sequoia National Park, and General Grant National Park, respectively, are hereby accepted and sole and exclusive jurisdiction is hereby assumed by the United States over such territory, saving, however, to the said State of California the right to serve civil or criminal process within the limits of the aforesaid parks or either of them in suits or prosecutions for or on account of rights acquire, oblig ations incurred, or crimes committed in said State outside of said parks; and saving further to the said State the right to tax persons and corporations, their franchises and property on the lands included in said parks, and the right to fix and collect license fees for fishing in said parks; and saving also to the persons residing in any of said parks now or hereafter the right to vote at all elections held within the county or counties in which said parks are situated. All the laws applicable to places under sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall have force and effect in said parks or either of them. All fugitives from justice taking refuge in said parks, or either of them, shall be subject to the same laws as refugees from justice found in the State of California.'

Footnote 11 Cf. Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 541, 5 S.Ct. 995; Hinderlider v. LaPlata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., , 58 S.Ct. 803, 82 L.Ed. --.

Footnote 12 James v. Dravo Contracting Company, 302 U.S. 134, 146, 58 S.Ct. 208, 214, 114 A.L.R. 318; Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Commission of Washington, 302 U.S. 186, 203, 58 S.Ct. 233, 242; Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, supra; Surplus Trading Company v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 651, 50 S.Ct. 455, 456.

Footnote 13 'To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock- Yards, and other needful Buildings.'

Footnote 14 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 148, 58 S.Ct. 208, 216, 114 A.L.R. 318.

Footnote 15 Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, supra; Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. McGlinn, , 5 S.Ct. 1005; Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 13 S.Ct. 60; Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439, 49 S.Ct. 227; United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138, 50 S.Ct. 284; Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 50 S.Ct. 455; Standard Oil Co. v. People of State of California, 291 U.S. 242, 54 S.Ct. 381; Yellowstone Park Transportation Co. v. Gallatin County, 9 Cir., 31 F.2d 644.

Footnote 16 Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, supra.

Footnote 17 Cf. Rainier Nat. Park Co. v. Martin, D.C., 18 F.Supp. 481, 482.

Footnote 18 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., supra, 147, 58 S.Ct. 215; Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371, 372 S..

Footnote 19 'Sec. 5. The following are the types of licenses to be issued under this act and the annual fees to be charged therefor."1. Beer manufacturer's license $750.00 per year "2. Wine manufacturer's license (to be computed only on the gallonage manufactured) five thousand gallons or less 20.00 per year Over five thousand gallons to twenty thousand gallons per year 40.00 per year Over twenty thousand to one hundred thousand gallons per year 75.00 per year Over one hundred thousand to two hundred thousand gallons per year 100.00 per year Over two hundred thousand gallons to one million gallons a year 150.00 per year For each million gallons or fraction thereof over a million gallons an additional 100.00 per year "3. Distilled spirits manufacturer's license 250.00 per year "4. Still license 10.00 per year per still "5. Rectifier's license 250.00 per year "6. Brandy manufacturer's license 150.00 per year "7. Distilled spirits importer's license no fee "8. Wine importer's license no fee "9. Beer importer's license no fee "10. Public warehouse license 10.00 per year "11. Wine bottling or packaging license 10.00 per year "12. Beer bottling or packaging license 500.00 per year "13. Distilled spirits wholesaler's license 250.00 per year "14. Beer and wine wholesaler's license 50.00 per year "15. Broker's license 250.00 per year "16. Retail package off-sale beer and wine license 10.00 per year "17. Retail package off-sale distilled spirits license for the first $10,000 retail sales per year 100.00 per year For each $1,000 retail sales or fraction thereof over $10,000 per year 10.00 per year "18. Industrial alcohol dealer's license 50.00 per year "19. On-sale beer license 25.00 per year "20. On-sale beer and wine license 75.00 per year "21. On-sale beer and wine license for trains (per train) 15.00 per year "22. On-sale beer and wine license for boats (per boat) 50.00 per year "23. On-sale distilled spirits license As set by the board "24. Distilled spirits manufacturer's agents license 250.00 per year."

(Statutes 1937, ch. 758, p. 2130).'Sec. 23. An excise tax is hereby imposed upon all beer and wine sold in this State by a manufacturer or importer, except as otherwise in this act provided, at the following rates:'(a) On all beer, sixty-two cents for every barrel containing thirty- one gallons, and at a proportionate rate for any other quantity;'(b) On all natural dry wines one cent per wine gallon and at a proportionate rate for any other quantity; (c) on all other still wines two cents per wine gallon and at a proportionate rate for any other

quantity; (d) on champagne, sparkling wine, except sparkling hard cider, whether naturally or artifically carbonated one and one-half cents per half pint or fraction thereof, three cents per pint or fraction thereof greater than one-half pint, six cents per quart or fraction thereof greater than one pint; (e) on sparkling hard cider two cents per wine gallon and at a proportionate rate for any other quantity.' (Statutes 1937, ch. 758, p. 2143, operative July 1, 1937).'Sec. 24. An excise tax is hereby imposed upon all distilled spirits sold in this State by rectifiers or wholesalers thereof, at the following rates:'On all distilled spirits of proof strength or less, two cents on each bottle containing two ounces or fraction thereof; five cents on each bottle containing eight ounces or fraction thereof greater than two ounces; ten cents on each bottle containing one pint or fraction thereof greater than a half-pint; sixteen cents on each bottle containing one-fifth gallon or fraction thereof greater than one pint; twenty cents on each bottle containing one quart or fraction thereof greater than one-fifth gallon; forty cents on each bottle containing one-half gallon or fraction thereof, greater than one quart; eighty cents on each bottle containing one gallon or fraction thereof greater than one-half gallon, and at a proportionate rate for any quantity.'All distilled spirits in exess of proof strength shall be taxed at double the above rate.' Statutes 1937, ch. 758, p. 2144, operative July 1, 1937.

Footnote 20 Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, Treas., 268 U.S. 45, 49, 45 S.Ct. 440; Rainier Nat. Park Co. v. Martin, D.C., 18 F.Supp. 481, 486, affirmed, 302 U.S. 661, 58 S.Ct. 478, 82 L.Ed. --, on the authority of the Walker Case.

In this view we need not consider appellants' argument that the Constitution of California forbids the release of the taxing power.

Footnote 21 Standard Oil Co. v. People of State of California, , 54 S.Ct. 381, 382.

Footnote 22 Rainier National Park v. Martin, D.C., 18 F.Supp. 481, 488.

Footnote 23 Cf. Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm., 303 U.S. 419, 58 S.Ct. 678, decided March 28, 1938.

Footnote 24 Art. 20, sec. 22, of the California Constitution provides that the State Board of Equalization 'shall have the power, in its discretion, to deny or revoke any specific liquor license if it shall determine for good cause that the granting or continuance of such license would be contrary to public welfare or morals.'

The Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, Cal.Stat.1935, c. 330, p. 1123, as amended Stat.1937, c. 681, p. 1934, c. 758, p. 2126, contains, inter alia, provisions that no person may perform acts authorized by a license, unless licensed (sec. 3, St.1937, p. 2130); that an importer's license may be issued only to the holder of a manufacturer's, rectifier's, or wholesaler's license, sec, 6(d), p. 2133; that application of a required type be filed for a license (sec. 10, p. 2139); that no on-sale distilled spirits license shall be issued to any applicant who is not a citizen of the United States (sec. 12, St. 1935, p. 1130); that no distilled spirits license may be issued to any person or agent of any person who manufactures distilled spirits within or without the State (sec. 20 1/2, St.1937, p. 2141); that retail licenses may not be granted for premises in certain locations (secs. 13-17, St.1935, p. 1130, St.1937, p. 2140); that no retail on-sale or off-sale licensee shall purchase alcoholic beverages for resale from any person except a person holding a beer, or wine, manufacturer's, a rectifier's or a wholesaler's license issued under this act (sec. 6.6, p. 2136).

Footnote 25 'Sec. 70. If any section, subsection, clause, sentence or phrase of this act which is reasonably separable from the remaining portion of this act is for any reason held to be unconstitutional, such decision shall not affect the remaining portions of this act. The Legislature hereby declares that it would have passed the remaining portions of this act irrespective of the fact that any such section, subsection, clause, sentence or phrase of this act be declared unconstitutional.' St.Cal.1935, p. 1153.

Footnote 26 Sec. 2(k), St.1937, p. 2128: "Importer' means any consignee of alcoholic beverages brought into this State from without this State when such alcoholic beverages are for delivery or use within this State ....' Sec. 2(w), p. 2130: "Within this State' means all territory within the boundaries of this State.' Sec. 2(wl), p. 2130: "Without the State' means all territory without the boundaries of this State.'

Footnote 27 See supra, note 26. See boundary of State of California as defined in Cal.Const. Art. 21, 1.

Compare Rainier Nat. Park Co. v. Martin, D.C.W.D.Wash., 18 F.Supp. 481, 486, affirmed 302 U.S. 661, 58 S.Ct. 478, 82 L.Ed. --.

Footnote 28 Sec. 2(j) "Rectifier' means every person who colors, flavors, or otherwise processes distilled spirits by distillation, blending, percolating or other processes.' St.1937, p. 2128.

(s) "Wholesaler' means and includes every person other than a manufacturer or rectifier who is engaged in business as a jobber or wholesale merchant, dealing in alcoholic beverages.' St.1937, p. 2129.

Footnote 29 Rainier Nat. Park Co. v. Martin, 302 U.S. 661, 58 S.Ct. 478, 82 L. Ed. --; cf. Baltimore Nat. Bank v. State Tax Commission, 297 U.S. 209, 56 S.Ct. 417.

Footnote 30 'Sec. 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.'

Footnote 31 'Sec. 49. Alcoholic beverages shall be brought into ths State from without this State for delivery or use within the State only when such alcoholic beverages are consigned to a licensed importer and only when consigned to the premises of such licensed importer or to the premises of a public warehouse licensed under this act. Alcoholic beverages which are consigned to a destination within this State shall be presumed to be for delivery or use within this State. Alcoholic beverages imported into this State contrary to the provisions hereof shall be seized by the board. Every person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.' Statutes 1937, ch. 758, p. 2164, operative July 1, 1937.'Sec. 49.2. Common or private carriers transporting alcoholic beverages into this State from without the State for delivery or use within this State must obtain the receipt of the licensed importer, distilled spirits manufacturer or distilled spirits manufacturer's agent for the alcoholic beverages so transported and delivered and, if the consignee refuses to give such receipt and show his license to the carrier, the carrier shall be relieved of all responsibility for delivering said alcoholic beverages. Where the consignee is not a licensed importer, distilled spirits manufacturer or distilled spirits manufacturer's agent or where the consignee refuses to give his receipt and show his license the carrier shall immediately notify the board at Sacramento giving full details as to the character of shipment, point of origin, destination and address of the consignor and consignee, and within ten days such alcoholic beverages shall be delivered to the board and shall be forfeited to the State of California. If any alcoholic beverages seized under the preceding section or forfeited under this section are sold by or under the direction of the board the common carrier's unpaid freight and storage charges accruing on the shipments of such alcoholic beverages shall be satisfied out of the proceeds of any sale made by the State after deducting the cost of such sale and any excise taxes accruing thereon. Every person violating the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.' Statutes 1937, ch. 758, p. 2165, operative July 1, 1937.

Footnote 32 The conclusions have been reiterated in Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corporation, 304 U.S. 401, 58 S.Ct. 952, 82 L.Ed. --, decided May 23, 1938.

Footnote 33 Standard Oil Co. v. People of State of California, 291 U.S. 242, 54 S.Ct. 381.

Footnote 34 Compa re Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274, 29 S. Ct. 613; Yellowstone Park Transportation Co. v. Gallatin County, 9 Cir., 31 F.2d 644.