Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co., 305 U.S. 177 (1938)
U.S. Supreme Court, (October 19, 1938)
Docket number: 28
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U.S. Supreme Court SHIELDS v. UTAH IDAHO CENT. R. CO., 305 U.S. 177 (1938)
[Page 305 U.S. 177, 179] Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court. This case presents the questions of the effect of a determination by the Interstate Commerce Commission, for the purposes of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. 151 et seq., that the respondent is not an interurban electric railway, and of the scope of judicial review of that determination. The Railway Labor Act, which applies to railroads engaged in interstate commerce, excepts any 'interurban' electric railway unless it is operating as a part of a general steam-railroad system of transportation. [Footnote 1] The Interstate Commerce Commission is 'authorized and directed upon request of the Mediation Board or upon complaint of any party interested to determine after hearing whether any line operated by electric power' falls within the exception. At the request of the Mediation Board, the Interstate Commerce Commission after hearing determined that the lines of respondent, the Utah Idaho Central Railroad Company, do not constitute an interurban electric railway. 214 I.C.C. 707. The Mediation Board ordered respondent to post the formal notice prescribed by Section 2, Eighth, of the Railway Labor Act. [Footnote 2] Respondent did not comply. Failure to publish the notice subjects 'the carrier, officer, or agent offending' to criminal penalties. [Footnote 3] Respondent, insisting that its line is an interurban electric railway and thus excepted from the Railway Labor Act, and alleging the invalidity of the Act, brought this suit against the United States Attorney for the District of [Page 305 U.S. 177, 183] ficiencies Act of October 22, 1913.6 Shannahan v. United States, supra. But we have not held that the determination of the Commission was not subject to judicial review by other procedure, a question which, as we said in the Shannahan Case, we had no occasion there to consider. Id., at page 603, 58 S.Ct. 735. The nature of the determination points to the propriety of judicial review. For, while the determination is made by the Interstate Commerce Commission for the purposes of the Railway Labor Act and not for further proceedings by the Commission itself, it is none the less a part of a regulatory scheme. It has the effect, if validly made, of subjecting the respondent to the requirements of the Railway Labor Act which was enacted to regulate the activities of transportation companies engaged in interstate commerce. [Footnote 7] The Mediation Board has ordered the posting of the prescribed notice that disputes between the carrier and its employees will be handled under the Railway Labor Act. Disobedience is immediately punishable and it is made the duty of the United States Attorney to institute proceedings against violators. Respondent has invoked the equity jurisdiction to restrain such prosecution and the Government does not challenge the propriety of that procedure. Equity jurisdiction may be invoked when it is essential to the protection of the rights asserted, even though the complainant seeks to enjoin the bringing of criminal actions. Philadelphia Company v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 621, 622 S., 32 S.Ct. 340, 345. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 37, 38 S., 36 S.Ct. 7, 8, 9, L.R.A.1916D, 545, Ann.Cas.1917B, 283. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214, 44 S.Ct. 15, 17. To support its contention that equitable relief is appropriate, respondent points to the peculiar difficulties which confront it [Page 305 U.S. 177, 187] carrier handled 6,354 carloads of freight of which 2,226 were local and 4, 017 were interchanged with other carriers. The traffic originating on its line moved to points in 31 States and that delivered by it was from points in 26 States. Respondent is a party to practically all the tariffs publishing through rates to or from this territory and its interchange traffic generally moves on joint rates. It does not perform intermediate service between other lines. Practically all the interchange traffic is handled in standard equipment furnished by connecting railroads. It cannot be said upon this evidence, and the related facts summarized in the Commission's report, that the Commission's determination lacked support or was arbitrary or capricious. Nor is there ground for holding that the Commission in reaching its determination departed from applicable principles of law. There is no principle of law which required such a carrier to be classified as an interurban railway. Failing in its effort to obtain a clarifying definition from Congress, the Commission performed its duty in weighing the evidence and reaching its conclusion in the light of the dominant characteristics of respondent's operations which were fairly comparable to those of standard steam railroads. Compare Piedmont & Northern Railway Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, supra, pages 308-310, 52 S.Ct. page 544; United States v. Chicago North Shore & Milwaukee R.R. Co., supra, page 10, 53 S.Ct. page 247. We conclude that the District Court erred in permitting a trial de novo of that issue and that the determination of the Commission was within its authority validly exercised. The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to the District Court with direction to dismiss the bill of complaint. It is so ordered. Reversed and remanded with directions. Mr. Justice BLACK concurs in the result. Footnotes Footnote 1 48 Stat. 1185, 45 U.S.C. 151, 45 U.S.C.A. 151. Footnote 2 45 U.S.C. 152, Eighth, 45 U.S.C.A. 152(8). Footnote 3 45 U.S.C. 152, Tenth, 45 U.S.C.A. 152(10). Footnote 4 Annual Reports of Interstate Commerce Commission, 1921, p. 21; 1923, p. 70; 1924, p. 78; 1925, p. 72; 1928, p. 83; 1929, p. 80; to which reference is made in United States v. Chicago North Shore & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 288 U.S. 1, 11, 12 S., 53 S.Ct. 245, 247, 248. Footnote 5 See Texas Electric Railway, 208 I.C.C. 193; Chicago South Shore & South Bend Railroad, 214 I.C.C. 167; Utah Idaho Central Railroad Company, 214 I.C.C. 707. Footnote 6 38 Stat. 208, 219, 220, 28 U.S.C. 41, 46, 47, 28 U.S.C.A. 41( 28), 46, 47. Footnote 7 Compare Great Northern Railway Company v. United States, 277 U.S. 172, 180, 48 S.Ct. 466, 467; Butte, Anaconda & Pacific Rwy. Co. v. United States, , 54 S.Ct. 108. Footnote 8 49 Stat. 449, Sec. 2(2), 29 U.S.C.A. 152(2). Footnote 9 50 Stat. 307, 45 U.S.C.A. 228a et seq. Footnote 10 50 Stat. 435, 45 U.S.C.A. 261 et seq. Footnote 11 Public No. 722, 75th Cong., 3d sess., 52 Stat. 1094, 45 U.S.C.A. 351 et seq. See, also, the provision of Section 9(a) of the Carriers Taxing Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 439, 45 U.S.C.A. 269(a), with respect to the application of the term 'employment' as defined in Title VIII of the Social Security Act, Section 811(b), 42 U.S.C.A. 1011(b). Footnote 12 Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 50 S. Ct. 427; Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 57 S.Ct. 592. Footnote 13 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287, 289, 40 S. Ct. 527, 528; Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U.S. 43, 50, 43 S.Ct. 466, 469; Bluefield Water Works & Imp. Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679, 689, 43 S.Ct. 675, 677; 67 L. Ed. 1176; Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 443, 444 S., 50 S.Ct. 220, 226; Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 600, 51 S.Ct. 608, 612; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60, 52 S.Ct. 285, 296; State Corporation Commission v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561, 569, 54 S.Ct. 321, 324. Footnote 14 See United States v. Chicago North Shore & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 288 U.S. 1, 13, 14 S., 53 S.Ct. 245.