U.S. Supreme Court TREINIES v. SUNSHINE MINING CO., 308 U.S. 66 (1939)

[Page 308 U.S. 66, 70]

of lack of jurisdiction in that court to determine the controversy over the stock. The writ was refused. On May 31, 1935, a judgment was entered in the Superior Court upholding in full the ownership of Pelkes.

After the Supreme Court of Idaho had decided the Idaho suit against Pelkes and Miss Treinies, they filed in August, 1936, a suit in the Superior Court of Washington against Katherine Mason and others alleging that they were the owners of the stock, further alleging that the Idaho decree was invalid for lack of jurisdiction, and asking that their title to the stock be quieted and the Sunshine Mining Company, a party to this and the Idaho suit, be compelled to recognize their ownership. It was at this point in the litigation that the Sunshine Company filed the bill of interpleader now under consideration. Further proceedings in the suit to quiet title were enjoined by the District Court in this action.

Jurisdiction.-Before considering the questions raised by the petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the federal court under the Act of January 20, 1936,5 must be determined. As this issue affects the jurisdiction of this Court, it is raised on its own motion. [Footnote 6] By the Act of January 20, 1936, the district courts have jurisdiction of suits in equity, interpleading two or more adverse claimants, instituted by complainants who have property of the requisite value claimed by citizens of different states. The suit may be maintained 'although the titles or claims of the conflicting claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical, but are adverse to and independent of one another.' Process may run at least throughout all the states.

[Page 308 U.S. 66, 71]

pleading one group of claimants who are citizens of that same state and another, the adverse group, who are citizens of Idaho. Under the interpleader act, this identity of citizenship is permissible since diversity only between claimants is required. The Interpleader Act is based upon the clause of Section Two, Article III, of the Constitution, U. S.C.A., which extends the judicial power of the United States to controversies 'between citizens of different States.' Is this grant of jurisdiction broad enough to cover the present situation?

The Judicial Code, Section 24, 28 U.S.C.A. 41, provides for original jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature between citizens of different states in precisely the language of the Constitution. The present wording is practically the same as that of the Act of March 3, 1875,7 'the circuit courts ... shall have original cognizance ... of all suits ... in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States,' and that of the original Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789,8 'the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.' Without ruling as to possible limitations of the constitutional grant, it is held by this Court that the statutory language of the respective judiciary acts forbids suits in the federal courts unless all the parties on one side are of citizenship diverse to those on the other side. [Footnote 9] For the determination of the validity of the Interpleader Act we need not decide whether the words of the Constitution, 'Controversies ... between citizens of different States,' have a different meaning from that given by judicial construction to similar words in the Judiciary Act. Even though the constitutional language limits the

[Page 308 U.S. 66, 72]

judicial power to controversies wholly between citizens of different states, that requirement is satisfied here. [Footnote 10]

This is for the reason that there is a real controversy between the adverse claimants. They are brought into the court by the complainant stakeholder who simultaneously deposits the money or property, due and involved in the dispute into the registry of the court. This was done in this case. The act provides that the 'court shall hear and determine the cause and shall discharge the complainant from further liability.' Such deposit and discharge effectually demonstrates the applicant's disinterestedness as between the claimants and as to the property in dispute,11 an essential in interpleaders. [Footnote 12] The complainant is a proper party for the determination of the controversy between the adverse claimants, citizens of different states. Their controversy could have been settled by litigation between them in the federal courts. Under similar circumstances as to parties, this Court ruled that a removal of separable controversies to the federal court was permissible even though a proper defendant was a citizen of the same state as the plaintiff. [Footnote 13] We so held as to a stakeholder in Salem Trust Co. v. Manufacturers' Co.14 There a suit was brought in a state court against the Manufacturers' Company, a Delaware cor-

[Page 308 U.S. 66, 73]

poration, and against a cocitizen of plaintiff, a Massachusetts corporation, the International Trust Company. The Manufacturers' Company removed and plaintiff sought a remand alleging its cocitizen was a necessary party. The suit was to determine rights to a fund in the cocitizen's hands 'and to have the same paid to' the plaintiff. The right of removal was upheld on the ground that the only obligation of the stakeholder was to pay over the money deposited with it. In Cramer v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.15 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, considering that the claimants were the real contestants, construed the Interpleader Act of May 8th, 1926, 16 to give jurisdiction to the federal court although the interpleader and certain claimants were citizens of the same state. The language as to citizenship is the same as that of the act here involved. [Footnote 17]

[Page 308 U.S. 66, 74]

rule against a citizen suing a state embodied in the Eleventh Amendment. [Footnote 18]

Without analyzing all the pleadings, a short answer against the petitioner's contention is the fact that neither the receiver nor the judge is enjoined by the final decree. Pelkes' administrator and Miss Treinies are enjoined from further prosecution of the Washington action to quiet title. They are the parties whose individual rights to the stock are settled in this action. The State of Washington has no interest and no infringement of the Eleventh Amendment occurs.

Neither are the provisions of Section 265 of the Judicial Code, 28 U. S.C.A. 379, applicable. That section forbids a United States court from staying proceedings in any state court. The Interpleader Act, passed subsequently, however, authorizes the enjoining of parties to the interpleader from further prosecuting any suit in any state or United States court on account of the property involved. Such authority is essential to the protection of the interpleader jurisdiction and is a valid exercise of the judicial power. Section 265 is a mere limitation upon the general equity powers of the United States courts and may be varied by Congress to meet the requirements of federal litigation. [Footnote 19]

[Page 308 U.S. 66, 76]

covery for prior dividends against Pelkes and petitioner. The Idaho court was a court of general jurisdiction. [Footnote 20]

[Page 308 U.S. 66, 78]

The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the issue of jurisdiction vel non of the Washington court could not be relitigated in this interpleader. As the Idaho District Court was a court of general jurisdiction, its conclusions are unassailable collaterally except for fraud or lack of jurisdiction. The holding by the Idaho court of no jurisdiction in Washington necessarily determined the question raised here as to the Idaho jurisdiction against Miss Treinies' contention. She is bound by that judgment.

The power of the Idaho court to examine into the jurisdiction of the Washington court is beyond question. [Footnote 22] Even where the decision against validity of the original judgment is erroneous, it is a valid exercise of judicial power by the second court. [Footnote 23]

One trial of an issue is enough. [Footnote 24] 'The principles of res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues,'25 as well to jurisdiction of the subject matter as of the parties. [Footnote 26]

Decree affirmed.

Mr. Justice BUTLER took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Footnotes

Footnote 1 99 F.2d 651.

Footnote 2 D.C., 19 F.Supp. 587.

Footnote 3 Mason v. Pelkes, 57 Idaho 10, 59 P.2d 1087.

Footnote 4 Pelkes v. Mason, 299 U.S. 615, 57 S.Ct. 319.

Footnote 5 49 Stat. 1096, 28 U.S.C. 41(26), 28 U.S.C.A. 41(26).

Footnote 6 Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 384, 4 S.Ct. 510, 512.

Footnote 7 18 Stat. 470, 1.

Footnote 8 1 Stat. 78, 11.

Footnote 9 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267; Camp v. Gress, 250 U.S. 308, 312, 39 S.Ct. 478, 480.

Footnote 10 Cf. Chafee, Interpleader in the United States Courts, 41 Yale L.J. 1134, 1141, 1165; and Chafee, The Federal Interpleader Act of 1936, 45 Yale L.J. 963, 973.

Footnote 11 Diversity requirements for federal equity jurisdiction to avoid a multiplicity of suits from diverse claimants with claims contested by the debtor is not involved. Cf. Di Giovanni v. Camden Ins. Ass'n, 296 U.S. 64, 70, 56 S.Ct. 1, 4.

Footnote 12 Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190, 200, 54 S.Ct. 677, 680, 91 A.L.R. 950; Killian v. Ebbinghaus, 110 U.S. 568, 571, 4 S.Ct. 232, 233.

Footnote 13 Barney v. Latham, , 213; cf. Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 538, 59 S.Ct. 347, 349.

Footnote 14 264 U.S. 182, 189, 44 S.Ct. 266, 267, 31 A.L.R. 867.

Footnote 15 91 F.2d 141, 146. See, also, Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lott, D.C., 275 F. 365, 372; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cross, D.C., 7 F.Supp. 130; cf. Eagle, Star & British Dominions v. Tadlock, D.C., 14 F.Supp. 933, reversed, Security Trust & Savings Bank v. Walsh, 9 Cir., 91 F.2d 481; Ackerman v. Tobin, 8 Cir., 22 F.2d 541.

Footnote 16 44 Stat. 416.

Footnote 17 We do not determine whether the ruling here is inconsistent with the conclusion in those cases where jurisdiction was rested on diversity of citizenship between the applicant and cocitizens who are claimants. ( Mallers v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 7 Cir., 87 F.2d 233, certiorari denied, 301 U.S. 685, 57 S.Ct. 786 (New York corporation impleads Illinois claimants); Security Trust & Savings Bank of San Diego v. Walsh, 9 Cir., 91 F.2d 481 (English corporation impleads California claimants); Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Meguire, D.C., 13 F.Supp. 967, 971 ( Pennsylvania corporation impleads Kentucky claimants); Turman Oil Co. v. Lathrop, D.C., 8 F.Supp. 870, 872 (Delaware corporation impleads Oklahoma claimants).

Footnote 18 Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 296, 58 S.Ct. 185, 186, is relied upon.

Footnote 19 Smith v. Apple, 264 U.S. 274, 278, 44 S.Ct. 311, 312; Dugas v. American Surety Co., 300 U.S. 414, 428, 57 S.Ct. 515, 521.

Footnote 20 Constitution of Idaho, Art. 5, 20; Idaho Code, 1932, 1-705.

Footnote 21 It is unnecessary to consider whether the Idaho determination as to the jurisdiction of the Washington court was properly made. As the procedure by which a state court examines into the question of the jurisdiction of the court of a sister state is a matter within the control of the respective states (Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 63, 58 S.Ct. 454, 456), it need only be added that such procedure is subject to question only on direct appeal.

It was stipulated by all parties to the Idaho cause that the Idaho courts might take judicial notice of the statutes and decisions of Washington. Some constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the jurisdiction of the Superior Court were pleaded and admitted. It has long been the rule in Idaho that its courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of another state and that without allegation and evidence it will be assumed the laws are the same as those of Idaho. Maloney v. Winston Bros., 18 Idaho 740, 757, 762, 111 P. 1080, 1086, 47 L.R.A.,N.S., 634; Douglas v. Douglas, 22 Idaho 336, 343, 125 P. 796; Mechanics & Metals Nat. Bk. v. Pingree, 40 Idaho 118, 129, 232 P. 5; State v. Martinez, 43 Idaho 180, 192, 250 P. 239; Kleinschmidt v. Scribner, 54 Idaho 185, 189, 30 P.2d 362. While none of these cases involved a stipulation, the decision of the Supreme Court of Idaho (Mason v. Pelkes, 57 Idaho 10, 59 P.2d 1087) declares the law of that jurisdiction. It follows from the Idaho court's refusal to look into the statutes of Washington that the jurisdiction of the Washington court was presumed to be governed by Idaho law. Under proper proof, the Idaho court would have been compelled to examine the jurisdiction of the Washington court under Washington law.

Footnote 22 Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 15, 27 S.Ct. 236, 238; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 468; Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 62, 58 S.Ct. 454, 456.

Footnote 23 Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Cherry, 244 U.S. 25, 30, 37 S.Ct. 492, 493; Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 172, 59 S.Ct. 134, 137; Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449, 454, 48 S.Ct. 142, 144, 53 A.L.R. 1141.

Footnote 24 Baldwin v. Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525, 51 S.Ct. 517.

Footnote 25 American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166, 53 S.Ct. 98, 101, 86 A.L.R. 298.

Footnote 26 Stoll v. Gottlieb, supra, Note 23, 305 U.S. 165, 172, 59 S.Ct. 134, 137.

No decision or statute relative to the reexamination of the decree or judgment of an Idaho court on a contested issue of jurisdiction has been found or called to our attention. It is concluded that the rule here expressed states too the law of Idaho.