U.S. Supreme Court SCHNEIDER v. NEW JERSEY, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)

[Page 308 U.S. 147, 154]

abridge the freedom of speech and of the press secured against state invasion by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, U.S.C.A. [Footnote 1]

No. 13.

The Municipal Code of the City of Los Angeles, 1936, provides: 'Sec. 28.00. 'Hand-Bill' shall mean any hand-bill, dodger, commercial advertising circular, folder, booklet, letter, card, pamphlet, sheet, poster, sticker, banner, notice or other written, printed or painted matter calculated to attract attention of the public.' 'Sec. 2801. No person shall distribute any hand-bill to or among pedestrians along or upon any street, sidewalk or park, or to passengers on any street car, or throw, place or attach any hand-bill in, to or upon any automobile or other vehicle.'

The appellant was charged in the Municipal Court with a violation of Sec. 28.01. Upon his trial it ws proved that he distributed handbills to pedestrians on a public sidewalk and had more than three hundred in his possession for that purpose. Judgment of conviction was entered and sentence imposed. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County affirmed the judgment. [Footnote 2] That court being the highest court in the State authorized to pass upon such a case, an appeal to this court was allowed.

[Page 308 U.S. 147, 155]

streets results from the indiscriminate distribution of handbills. [Footnote 3] It held that the right of free expression is not absolute but subject to reasonable regulation and that the ordinance does not transgress the bounds of reasonableness. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, was distinguished on the ground that the ordinance there in question prohibited distribution anywhere within the city while the one involved forbids distribution in a very limited number of places.

[Page 308 U.S. 147, 156]

of the ordinance did not arrest any of those who received the bills and threw them away. The testimony was that the action of the officers accorded with a policy of the police department in enforcement of the ordinance to the effect that, when such distribution resulted in littering of the streets, the one who was the cause of the littering, that is, he who passed out the bills, was arrested rather than those who received them and afterwards threw them away. The Milwaukee County court found the petitioner guilty and fined him. On appeal the judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court. [Footnote 4]

[Page 308 U.S. 147, 157]

Some of those to whom the leaflets were handed threw them on the sidewalk and the street, with the result that some thirty were lying about.

The appellants were arrested and charged with a violation of the ordinance. The Superior Court of Worcester County rendered a judgment of conviction and imposed sentence. The Supreme Judicial Court overruled exceptions. [Footnote 5] That court held the ordinance a valid regulation of the use of the streets and sought thus to distinguish it from the one involved in Lovell v. City of Griffin, supra, which the court said was not such a regulation. Referring to the ordinance the court said: 'It interferes in no way with the publication of anything in the city of Worcester, except only that it excludes the public streets and ways from the places available for free distribution. It leaves open for such distribution all other places in the city, public and private.'

[Page 308 U.S. 147, 159]

offered to leave, the books or booklets with the occupants of the houses visited. She did not apply for, or obtain, a permit pursuant to the ordinance because she conscientiously believed that so to do would be an act of disobedience to the command of Almighty God.

The petitioner was convicted in the Recorder's Court. The Court of Common Pleas affirmed the judgment. On a further appeal the Supreme Court affirmed. 6 The Court of Errors and Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court. [Footnote 7]

[Page 308 U.S. 147, 160]

The freedom of speech and of the press secured by the First Amendment, U.S.C.A.Const., against abridgment by the United States is similarly secured to all persons by the Fourteenth against abridgment by a state. [Footnote 8]

[Page 308 U.S. 147, 161]

throwing literature broadcast in the streets. Prohibition of such conduct would not abridge the constitutional liberty since such activity bears no necessary relationship to the freedom to speak, write, print or distribute information or opinion.

This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as fundamental personal rights and liberties. [Footnote 9] The phrase is not an empty one and was not lightly used. It reflects the belief of the framers of the Constitution that exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free government by free men. It stresses, as do many opinions of this court, the importance of preventing the restriction of enjoyment of these liberties.

[Page 308 U.S. 147, 165]

We are not to be taken as holding that commercial soliciting and canvassing may not be subjected to such regulation as the ordinance requires. Nor do we hold that the town may not fix reasonable hours when canvassing may be done by persons having such objects as the petitioner. Doubtless there are other features of such activities which may be regulated in the public interest without prior licensing or other invasion of constitutional liberty. We do hold, however, that the ordinance in question, as applied to the petitioner's conduct, is void, and she cannot be punished for acting without a permit.

The judgment in each case is reversed and the causes are remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. So ordered.

Reversed and remanded.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS is of opinion that the judgment in each case should be affirmed. Footnotes

Footnote 1 On account of the importance of the question we granted certiorari in two of the cases, and noted jurisdiction in the others. Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 306 U.S. 628, 59 S.Ct. 774; Young v. People of State of California, 59 S.Ct. 775; Snyder v. City of Milwaukee, 306 U.S. 629, 59 S.Ct. 789; Nichols v. Commionwealth, 59 S.Ct. 828.

Footnote 2 People v. Young, Cal.Super., 85 P.2d 231, 235.

Footnote 3 On the hand-bill were the words 'Admission 25› and 50›'. The Superior Court adverted to these and said: 'Whatever traffic in ideas the Friends Lincoln Brigade may have planned for the meeting, the cards themselves seem to fall within the classification of commercial advertising rather than the expression of one's views. But if this be so, our conclusion is not thereby changed.'

Footnote 4 City of Milwaukee v. Snyder, 230 Wis. 131, 283 N.W. 301, 303.

Footnote 5 Commonwealth v. Nichols, Mass., 18 N.E.2d 166, 168.

Footnote 6 Town of Irvington v. Schneider, 120 N.J.L. 460, 200 A. 799.

Footnote 7 121 N.J.L. 542, 3 A.2d 609, 610.

Footnote 8 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625; Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 47 S.Ct. 641; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 73 A.L. R. 1484; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444; De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S.Ct. 255; Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. U.S.C.A.Const. Cf. New York ex v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666. There is no averment or proof in any of the cases that the appellants or petitioners are citizens of the United States, and in the Young case, No. 13, the applicable provisions of the municipal code were challenged on the sole ground that they infringed the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, U.S.C.A.Const. Cf. New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 317, 57 S.Ct. 466, 469; Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Nebraska State Ry. Comm., , at page 473, 56 S.Ct. 536.

Footnote 9 Grosjean v. American Press Co., supra, 297 U.S. at page 244, 56 S. Ct. at page 446; De Jonge v. Oregon, supra, 299 U.S. at page 364, 57 S.Ct. at page 259; Lovell v. City of Griffin, supra, 303 U.S. at page 450, 58 S.Ct. at page 668.