Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928)

U.S. Supreme Court, (January 03, 1928)

Docket number: 38
Permanent Link: http://vlex.com/vid/20025829
Id. vLex: VLEX-20025829

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U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Cir. - United States of America, Appellant, v. Tacoma Gravel and Supply Co., Inc., Et Al., Appellees., 376 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1967)

Constitution of the United States (Annotated) - Section 1: Full Faith and Credit

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Cir. - William A. Porter Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. W. Francis Wilson Et Al., Defendants-Appellees., 419 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1970)

Text:

U.S. Supreme Court ROCHE v. MCDONALD, 275 U.S. 449 (1928)

[Page 275 U.S. 449, 451]

against him in default of answer for the amount of the original judgment, with interest.

Shortly thereafter Roche brought this suit against McDonald, upon the Oregon judgment, in the superior court of Washington. McDonald answered, denying the validity of the Oregon judgment under a Washington statute which provided that after six years from the rendition of any judgment it should cease to be a charge against the judgment debtor, and no suit should be had extending its duration or continuing it in force beyond such six years. [Footnote 3] Roche replied, setting up and relying upon the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.

[Page 275 U.S. 449, 455]

ment of that judgment in Washington is, in substance, that it must there be denied validity because it contravenes the Washington statute and would have been void if rendered in a court of Washington; that is, in effect, that it was based upon an error of law. It cannot be impeached upon that ground. If McDonald desired to rely upon the Washington statute as a protection from any judgment that would extend the force of the Washington judgment beyond six years from its rendition, he should have set up that statute in the court of Oregon and submitted to that court the question of its construction and effect. And even if this had been done, he could not thereafter have impeached the validity of the judgment because of a misapprehension of the Washington law. In short, the Oregon judgment, being valid and conclusive between the parties in that State, was equally conclusive in the courts of Washington, and under the full faith and credit clause should have been enforced by them.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Washington is reversed; and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Writ of error dismissed; certiorari granted; reversed. Footnotes

Footnote 1 43 Stat. 936, c. 229 (28 USCA 344); printed as an Appendix to the Revised Rules of this Court, 266 U.S. 687.

Footnote 2 Section 237(c) of the Judicial Code, as amended.

Footnote 3 Laws 1897, c. 39; Remington's Compiled Statutes, 459, 160.

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