NOT PRECEDENTIAL

U N IT E D STATES COURT OF APPEALS

F O R THE THIRD CIRCUIT

N O . 05-1116

TERRANCE ROSS WILLAMAN,

Appellant

v. MAURICE J. FERENTINO; MARSHALL J. PICCININI, ASST. D.A.;

JOHN ASHCROFT; OTHERS KNOWN AT THIS TIME

O n Appeal From the United States District Court

F o r the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D .C . Civ. No. 04-cv-00132E)

D istrict Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.

S u b m itte d Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

M a y 27, 2005

B E F O R E : ROTH, McKEE and ALDISERT, CIRCUIT JUDGES

(F ile d April 5, 2006

O P IN IO N

P E R CURIAM

T e rra n c e Ross Willaman appeals the District Court's order dismissing his petition fo r declaratory and injunctive relief and denying his motion to convene a grand jury. In h is petition, Willaman sought declaratory and injunctive relief including that the g o v e rn m e n t be enjoined from prosecuting him.1 He argued that he had a right to p o s s e ss an unregistered machine gun under the First Amendment, the Religious F r e e d o m Restoration Act, and the Second Amendment. He further asserted that the g o v e rn m e n t violated his rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The appellees f iled a motion to dismiss. On December 20, 2004, the District Court dismissed his p e titio n for relief for failure to state a claim and denied his motion to convene a grand ju ry as moot. Willaman filed a timely notice of appeal, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U .S .C . § 1291. The government has filed a motion for summary affirmance.

W e exercise plenary review over the District Court's order granting appellees' m o tio n to dismiss. Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998).

When reviewing a complaint for failure to state a claim, the Court must accept the a lle g a tio n s in the complaint as true. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).

The Court should not dismiss a complaint unless it is clear that no relief could be granted u n d e r any set of facts that could be proved. Id.

On appeal, Willaman raises only his Second Amendment argument and argues that the District Court decided the case based on bias in favor of the government. Declaratory 1 In October 2004, Willaman was convicted by a jury of unlawful possession of a m a c h in e gun. re lief is not available to attack a criminal conviction. Johnson v. Onion, 761 F.2d 224 (5th C ir. 1985); Shannon v. Sequeechi, 365 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1966) ("The [Declaratory J u d g m e n t] Act does not provide a means whereby previous judgments by state or federal co u rts may be reexamined, nor is it a substitute for appeal or post conviction remedies.").

W illa m a n has the opportunity to raise his Second Amendment argument in his direct a p p e al from his criminal conviction, and we note that he has done so. See United States v . Willaman, C.A. No. 05-1336. Moreover, Willaman's claims are not cognizable to the e x te n t that a favorable resolution of his claims would imply that his conviction is invalid.

E d w a rd s v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1 9 9 4 ). With respect to Willaman's assertion that the District Court was biased in favor o f the government, we note that he argues that the District Court Judge's bias "should be s e lf -e v id e n t from his ruling in this action." Brief at 9. A litigant's displeasure with the D is tric t Court's legal rulings is not an adequate basis for recusal. Securacomm C o n s u ltin g , Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000).

For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by the District Court, we will a f f irm the District Court's judgment.