[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

DECEMBER 13, 2006

THOMAS K. KAHN

N o . 05-15376

CLERK

D . C. Docket No. 05-00008-CR-WTM-4

U N IT E D STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

CARL BENNETT,

Defendant-Appellant.

A p p e al from the United States District Court

fo r the Southern District of Georgia

(December 13, 2006)

B efo re BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges, and CONWAY,* District Judge.

P E R CURIAM: D e fe n d a n t- A p p e lla n t Carl Bennett appeals his 220-month sentence imposed f o llo w in g his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and armed c ar ee r criminal, 18U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e). On appeal, Bennett contends that th e district court erred in classifying him as an armed career criminal under 18 U .S .C . § 924(e), the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), based on information co n tain ed in his Presentence Investigation Report (PSI). Bennett also maintains th at the district court erred in sentencing him based on a total offense level of 32 u n d er the United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.). We determine that the d istrict court did not err in classifying Bennett as an armed career criminal, but did err in calculating a total offense level of 32.

I. BACKGROUND A c co r d in g to Bennett's PSI, on June 7 2004, Bennett was stopped by police officers while he was driving a car that belonged to another individual. The police o fficers found a shotgun in the trunk of the car. The car also contained household g o o d s and electronic equipment that had been burgled from a residence. Steven W o rriels, a passenger in the car, implicated Bennett in the burglary, but Bennett d en ied his involvement.

A . Indictment O n February 5, 2005, Bennett was indicted for possession of a firearm by a c o n v ic te d felon and armed career criminal, in violation of 18U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e). The indictment charged that Bennett had been convicted of several felo n ies: two counts of burglary, both occuring on June 2, 1984, for which Bennett w as sentenced to ten years; burglary, occurring on September 18, 1983, and b u r g la ry , occurring on February 15, 1984, for which Bennett was sentenced to ten y ea rs ; burglary, occurring on October 28, 1988, for which he was sentenced to ten years; and burglary, possession of tools for the commission of a crime, and o b s tr u c tio n of justice, occurring on November 12, 1991, for which he was sen ten ced to fifteen years, five years, and five years, all concurrent.

B. Plea Colloquy A t the plea colloquy before the district judge, Bennett had an opportunity to ch allen g e his prior convictions as set forth in the indictment. Not only did Bennett fail to object to the convictions, but he expressly admitted them, as the following co llo q u y demonstrates: Q H av e you read the indictment and gone over the charges in the in d ic tm e n t with your lawyer? A Y e s, sir.

Q In this case, Mr. Bennett, you are charged in this one-count in d ictm en t, and the indictment charges that on or about June 7, 2004, in Chatham County within the Southern District of Georgia, that you, w h o before that time had been convicted of felonies, offenses p u n ish ab le by imprisonment for more than one year; and that is, the felo n y offense of burglary, two counts, both offenses occurring June 2 , 1984, for which you were sentenced to ten years with four years su sp en d ed in the Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia on A u g u st 27, 1984; also, the felony offense of burglary occurring S ep tem b er 18, 1983, and burglary occurring February 15, 1984, for w h ich you were sentenced to ten years with four years suspended in th e Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia October 19, 1984; also , the felony offense of burglary occurring October 28, 1988 for w h ich you were sentenced to ten years in the Superior Court of C h ath am County, Georgia on May 30, 1989; and the offense of b u rg lary, possession of tools for the commission of a crime and o b stru ctio n of justice occurring November 12, 1991, for which you w ere sentenced to 15 years and five years, all concurrent, in the S u p erio r Court of Chatham County, Georgia on May 8, 1992, that you d id knowingly possess in and affecting interstate commerce a firearm; th at is, a Stevens Model 6712 .12 gauge shotgun, and it gives the serial number, which before that time had been transported in in te rs ta te or foreign commerce, in violation of 18 United States Code, S ectio n s 922(g)(1) and 924(e)[.] A n d that is what you are charged with in the indictment that yo u are pleading guilty to today, Mr. Bennett. Do you understand th a t? A Yes.

B en n ett's attorney, Christian Steinmetz, stated that Bennett would stipulate th a t he was a convicted felon who knowingly possessed a firearm. However, B en n ett's attorney stated that he and his client wished to preserve an objection to th e classification of Bennett's prior convictions as violent felonies for the sen ten cin g hearing. The district judge initially explained that Bennett could ch allen g e a host of issues at sentencing, including whether Bennett's prior c o n v ic tio n s were violent felonies. However, the district judge then made it clear th at by pleading guilty, Bennett was admitting that he had three prior violent f elo n ie s. The district court stated: "But what he's pleading guilty to today is that h e is a convicted felon; that he knowingly possessed a firearm that had been used in foreign or interstate commerce; and that he had three­at least three prior felony c o n v ic tio n s ." Mr. Steinmetz then replied: "As listed in 924(e)." The district court r es p o n d e d : "Which says that he had three previous felony convictions of violence an d drug distribution. And those are the elements that the government had to p ro v e. And if the government cannot prove those elements, then he would not be a u th o r iz ed to be found guilty in this case." The court further asked if Bennett was p rep ared to admit that he had committed three prior violent felony convictions, and B en n ett admitted that he had at least three violent felonies, as follows: Q Now, if [Bennett]'s not prepared this morning to admit that he h ad three prior felony convictions that constituted violent convictions, a n d the law is clear, in my opinion, that a burglary, whether it be a resid en tial burglary or a commercial burglary, but particularly r es id e n tia l burglary, is a violent felony under federal law and under th e sentencing guidelines. And if Mr. Bennett is not prepared to admit th at on the record at sentencing (sic) today, then we're wasting our tim e here and we'll come back on Monday.

M R . STEINMETZ: Your Honor, I think Mr. Bennett is and I'll ask him­ THE COURT: ­ Well, I don't want you to tell me. I want Mr.

B e n n e tt to tell me that. Now, if you and Mr. Bennett need some more tim e to talk, I'll be glad to give you that time. But unless he is p rep ared to admit the elements of the crime that he is charged with an d that he is pleading guilty to today, then I am not going to go fo rw ard with this guilty plea, and I'm not going to play ring around th e rosy here or split hairs.

M R . STEINMETZ: I believe Mr. Bennett is ready to go fo rw ard .

[N o te: Counsel and defendant confer off the record.] Q A ll right, Mr. Bennett, do you understand the charges against yo u that I have explained to you, and understand the charges against yo u in the indictment, and do you understand the elements of the o ffen se that I've described to you and that you're pleading guilty to to d a y ? A Y e s, sir.

Q A n d do you understand that part of those elements of the o ffen se is that you are pleading guilty to having been previously c o n v ic te d ­ as one of those elements that you previously committed at least three violent felonies? A Y es, Your Honor. (emphasis added).

After Bennett's admission to having at least three prior violent felony convictions, th e district judge informed Bennett of the maximum penalties Bennett would face if he pled guilty. Bennett acknowledged that he understood the penalties and e n te re d his guilty plea.

C . Presentence Investigation Report F o llo w in g Bennett's conviction, the United Stated Probation Office prepared B en n ett's PSI, which listed his prior convictions for burglaries of commercial or r es id e n tia l buildings and classified Bennett as an armed career criminal under § 924(e). As to the two June 2, 1984 burglaries listed in the indictment, the PSI s ta te d that police records revealed these were "two commercial burglaries in v o lv [in g ] the theft of change from a Car Park and food items from Stand N 'S n ack , both of which were Savannah businesses." As to the September 18, 1983 b u rg lary in the indictment, the PSI stated that police records showed Bennett "e n te re d a closed Radio Shack store and stole an electric typewriter and a computer h av in g a combined value of approximately $1400." As to the February 15, 1984 b u rg lary in the indictment, the PSI stated that police records showed Bennett b u rg larized two Savannah businesses, Ocean Chemical and Metal Crafts, Inc. As to the October 28, 1988 burglary in the indictment, the PSI stated that "court d o cu m en ts reveal that the defendant forcefully entered the residence of Cynthia C o o p e r , Savannah, on October 28, 1988." As to the November 12, 1991 burglary in the indictment, the PSI stated that "court records reveal that the offense involved th e defendant's burglary of the residence of Glendora Baldwin, Savannah, on N o v e m b e r 12, 1991." In the PSI, the probation officer recommended enhancing the base offense lev el to 34 because of Bennett's status as an armed career criminal and because the firearm found by the police officers was possessed by Bennett in connection with a c rim e of violence (burglary of the residence).

Bennett filed written objections to the PSI. Specifically, Bennett objected to being characterized as an armed career criminal. Bennett contended that, even th o u g h he pled guilty to several charges of burglary, his prior crimes did not q u alify as predicate offenses under § 924(e) of the ACCA. In making this o b je ctio n , Bennett did not object to the underlying facts of his prior convictions as set forth in the court documents referred to in the PSI.

However, Bennett objected to all references to police reports in the d e s cr ip tio n s of his prior burglary convictions. Bennett contended that, under S h ep ard , the sentencing court is precluded from considering such material in d eterm in in g whether Bennett's prior offenses are within the scope of the ACCA.

Further, Bennett objected to the PSI's proposed offense level, arguing that h is possession of the firearm was not "in connection with" another felony. Bennett co n ten d ed that because he had neither pled guilty nor been adjudicated guilty of th e burglary in question, the sentencing court could not enhance his offense level o n this basis.

In the addendum to the PSI, the probation officer responded to Bennett's o b jectio n s. The officer first noted that Bennett knowingly pled guilty to both p o s se ss io n of a firearm by a convicted felon under § 922(g) and to being an armed career criminal under § 924(e). The probation officer then stated that the ACCA req u ires that a defendant have three prior convictions for a violent felony or serious d ru g offense. The probation officer explained that burglary is a violent felony u n d er § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) and concluded that, since Bennett had five previous co n v ictio n s for burglary, the ACCA's requirement of three violent felony co n v ictio n s was amply satisfied.

R e g a rd in g the references to police reports in the PSI and Bennett's Shepard o b je ctio n , the probation officer stated that information from police reports was in clu d ed to assist the sentencing court in understanding the details of the prior co n v ictio n s. The probation officer clarified that the facts of Bennett's prior co n v ictio n s cited in the PSI were derived from court documents and were only ech o ed by the police reports.

Lastly, in response to Bennett's objection to the proposed base offense level, th e probation officer stated that the firearm recovered from Bennett was stolen f ro m the burglarized residence earlier that day and there was ample evidence that B en n ett was involved in the burglary. D . Sentencing Memorandum B e n n e tt's counsel also filed a Sentencing Memorandum, in which he argued th at Bennett should not be sentenced as an armed career criminal because his b u rg laries did not involve violence to people. In the Sentencing Memorandum, B en n ett's counsel acknowledged that Bennett had "3 to 4 burglaries on record," b u t stated that Bennett "is not the guy that Congress had in mind when it enacted th e Armed Career Criminal Act." Again, Bennett did not contest that his prior b u rg lary convictions were for burglaries of commercial or residential buildings.

E . Sentencing Hearing A t the sentencing hearing, the district court asked Bennett whether he had an y objections to the factual accuracy of the PSI. Bennett's counsel did not raise an y objections in response. The district court acknowledged the objection B e n n e tt's counsel raised to the PSI regarding Bennett's classification as an armed career criminal. However, the district court stated that it did not understand co u n sel's argument given Bennett's documented criminal history of numerous p r io r burglaries. In responding to the district court, Bennett's counsel admitted th at Bennett had prior burglary convictions, but he argued that because no persons h ad been in the buildings Bennett burglarized, Bennett's burglaries did not involve an y violence to human beings, stating: W e ll, Your Honor, I will acknowledge that the statute, 924(e), ex p licitly provides burglary, absolutely, and Mr. Bennett has at least th ree, if not four, burglary convictions on his record. The reason that I p u t that in there is, first of all, Your Honor, if I don't put it in there, I d o n 't preserve the right to argue it on appeal. The second reason that I p u t it in there is that what we would submit is, while the statute does classify burglary as a crime of violence, or as a violent crime ­ there is a distinction under the guidelines - none of Mr. Bennett's burglaries in v o lv ed any violence as to human beings, other than to the property o f human beings. They did not involve busting in while somebody w a s in their house. I mean, he went into houses when people weren't th ere, took their stuff, you know, and left. And yes, Your Honor, I m ean , they're burglaries, clearly, but in that ­ the scope of a lot of our arg u m en t has been that the guidelines, if applied as the probation o f f ic er said, are more than ­ they're an extreme. This was part of that arg u m en t showing that he is not your typical armed career criminal in th e sense that he does not have a violent history.

B en n ett's counsel also admitted that burglary is a crime under the ACCA: "[b]ut w h at I'm saying is, you've got all these crimes under the ACCA, all these crimes, an d I think that the spectrum, if you look at the spectrum of crimes, I do not b e lie v e that burglary is nearly as serious as a lot of the others." After rejecting Bennett's argument, the court stated: "[t]he Court adopts the f ac tu a l statements contained in the presentence investigation report as to which th ere are no objections. As to the controverted factual statements regarding the id en tifyin g data,1 the Court adopts the position of the probation office as stated in th e addendum to the presentence investigation report." In determining Bennett's sentence, the district court disagreed with the p ro b atio n officer's recommended base level enhancement. The district court found b y a preponderance of the evidence that Bennett's possession of the firearm was n o t in connection with a violent felony. After some confusion about the correct b ase offense level, the district court arrived at a total offense level of 32 (a base o ffen se level of 34 with a two-level acceptance of responsibility reduction) with a r an g e of 210 to 263 months' imprisonment. The district court then sentenced B en n ett to 220 months, stating that "a sentence not at the low end, but toward the lo w end of the Guidelines appears to be appropriate."2 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW A ssu m in g that Bennett properly preserved his objection regarding his clas sifica tio n as an armed career criminal, we review de novo the district court's d eterm in atio n , based on information in Bennett's PSI, that Bennett's prior co n v ictio n s were "violent felonies" under the ACCA. United States v. Day, 465 F.3 d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2006).

With respect to Bennett's argument about his total offense level being 31 rath er than 32, we review objections to sentencing calculation issues raised for the first time on appeal for plain error. United States v. Harness, 180 F.3d 1232, 1234 (11 th Cir. 1999). This standard requires that there be error, that the error be plain, an d that the error affect a substantial right. Id. A substantial right is affected if the ap p ealin g party can show that there is a reasonable probability that there would h a v e been a different result had there been no error. United States v. Rodriguez, 3 9 8 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1127 , 125 S. Ct. 2935, 162 L .E d .2 d 866 (2005). If these three conditions are met, then we may exercise our d iscretio n to notice the forfeited error if the error seriously affects the fairness, in teg rity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id.

III. DISCUSSION A . Classification as an Armed Career Criminal B en n ett first argues the district court erred in determining, based on facts c o n ta in e d in his PSI, that his prior burglary convictions were violent felonies under th e ACCA. Bennett contends that, because Georgia's burglary statute is nong en eric, the district court was required under Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 1 3 , 125 S. Ct. 1254, 161 L.E.2d 205 (2005) to find that his prior convictions c o n ta in e d all of the elements of generic burglary using only appropriate court reco rd s from those prior convictions and that the district court failed to do so.

Bennett asserts that the district court relied only on his PSI in making the d eterm in atio n and that the PSI is not a permissible source under Shepard unless the d efen d an t has admitted the facts therein, which Bennett asserts on appeal he did n o t do.

T h e ACCA provides for an increased sentence for a defendant who is co n v icted under 18U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and has three prior violent felony co n v ictio n s. See 18U.S.C. § 924(e). Section 924(e) identifies burglary as a v io len t felony, but only in its generic sense: an unlawful entry into a building or o th er structure with the intent to commit a crime. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.

5 7 5 , 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2158, 109 L.Ed. 607 (1990). A conviction constitutes "b u rg lary" for purposes of § 924(e) if either the statutory definition of the offense su b stan tially corresponds to generic burglary or there is a finding of fact that a p articu lar crime contained all the elements of generic burglary. Id. at 602, 110 S .C t. at 2160. For a guilty plea under a non-generic burglary statute, this d e te rm in a tio n is generally limited to the terms of the charging document, jury in stru ctio n s, a bench-trial judge's findings of fact, plea agreement, transcript of the p lea colloquy, or other comparable judicial records. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 20-21, 1 2 5 S.Ct. at 1259­60; United States v. Greer, 440 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 2 0 0 6 ). Georgia's burglary statute is non-generic because it encompasses unlawful en try not just into buildings, but also into vehicles, railroad cars, and watercraft.

See United States v. Adams, 91 F.3d 114, 115 (11th Cir. 1996).

A sentencing court's findings of fact may be based on undisputed statem en ts in the PSI. United States v. Wilson, 884 F.2d 1355, 1356 (11th Cir. 1 9 8 9 ). Where a defendant objects to the factual basis of his sentence, the g o v ern m en t has the burden of establishing the disputed fact. United States v. S ep u lv ed a, 115 F.3d 882, 890 (11th Cir. 1997). However, challenges to the facts c o n ta in e d in the PSI must be asserted with specificity and clarity. See United S tates v. Aleman, 832 F.2d 142, 145 (11th Cir. 1987). Otherwise, the objection is w a iv e d . See United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005); U n ite d States v. Norris, 50 F.3d 959, 962 (11th Cir. 1995).

B en n ett's argument about his classification as an armed career criminal is m e ritle ss for two reasons. First, Bennett's indictment charged him with having at least three prior felony burglaries and with being an armed career criminal in v io latio n of § 924(e). At Bennett's plea colloquy, the district judge thoroughly ex p lain ed to Bennett the consequences of entering a guilty plea, particularly that a g u ilty plea included an admission to his having three prior violent felony c o n v ic tio n s . The district judge also apprised Bennett of the maximum penalties th at could result from his guilty plea. After the district judge's thorough in stru ctio n s, Bennett admitted that he had been convicted of three prior violent f elo n ie s. This alone authorized the district court to sentence Bennett as an armed c ar ee r criminal under § 924(e).

S e co n d , the PSI, together with the addendum to the PSI, indicated that court d o c u m e n ts of Bennett's prior burglaries showed that his burglaries were of either r es id e n tia l or commercial buildings. In response to the PSI, Bennett never d isp u ted that the court documents showed these facts. While Bennett objected to th e probation officer's use of police reports, as non-Shepard materials, in p rep aratio n of the PSI, Bennett did not object to the underlying facts of his prior co n v ictio n s as set forth in the court documents referenced in the PSI.

In fact, the government had provided certified copies of the relevant court d o cu m en ts­ n am ely, four burglary indictments describing the offense conduct and th e corresponding convictions­to Bennett during discovery.3 The government had also provided the four burglary indictments and corresponding convictions to the p ro b atio n officer for his use in preparing Bennett's PSI. These court documents in d icated , consistent with the descriptions in the PSI, that at least four of Bennett's p r io r burglary convictions were for burglaries of either residential or commercial b u ild in g s. Bennett never disputed that he had been convicted of these four b u rg laries. Additionally, at no point did Bennett object to the court documents b ein g referenced in the PSI, nor did he object to the factual representations in the P S I and addendum to the PSI as to what the court documents showed about his b u r g la r ie s .

For the first time on appeal, Bennett argues that the district court should not h av e accepted the probation officer's statement that he derived the information ab o u t Bennett's prior convictions from court documents. Bennett contends that the p ro b atio n officer should have referred to the specific court documents (such as the ch arg in g documents, written plea agreements, or transcripts of plea colloquy) on w h ic h he relied in concluding that Bennett's prior burglary convictions constituted v io len t felonies under the ACCA. Bennett had an opportunity to make this o b jectio n to the sentencing court, and he failed to do so. Therefore, Bennett w aiv ed this argument. In stead , at the sentencing hearing, Bennett's counsel clarified that the basis f o r Bennett's objection to the classification of his prior burglary convictions as v io len t felonies rested not on a dispute regarding the facts of those convictions, but in stead on the argument that Bennett's burglaries were not serious enough to w arran t the classification. Bennett's counsel even admitted: "[Bennett] went into h o u s e s when people weren't there, took their stuff, you know, and left." Bennett failed to object to the facts of his prior convictions as contained in h is PSI and addendum to the PSI despite several opportunities to do so; thus, he is d eem ed to have admitted those facts. See United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273, 1 2 7 7 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating "[i]t is the law of this circuit that a failure to object to allegations of fact in a PSI admits those facts for sentencing purposes"); United S tates v. Williams, 438 F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006) (stating that the d e f en d a n t's "failure to contest the 37 grams imputed in the PSI constituted an ad m issio n of that quantity"); United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1191 (11th C ir . 2005) (stating that the defendant "waived his objections to the factual s ta te m e n ts about his relevant conduct in the presentence report and, therefore, ad m itted the facts in that report"); United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d at 1328-30.

For either of these reasons, the district court did not err in relying on the u n d is p u te d facts in Bennett's PSI to determine that his prior convictions were v io le n t felonies under the ACCA and, therefore, that he was an armed career c r im in a l.

B. Sentencing Offense Level T h e base offense level for an armed career criminal sentenced pursuant to U .S .S .G . § 4B1.4(b)(3) is 34 if the defendant used or possessed the firearm in q u estio n in connection with, inter alia, a crime of violence. U.S.S.G.

§ 4B1.4(b)(3)(A). Otherwise, the appropriate base offense level for an armed career criminal is 33. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(B). Acceptance of responsibility r ed u c tio n s are then applied to these offense levels. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3).

A t sentencing, the district court found by a preponderance of the evidence th at Bennett's possession of the firearm was not in connection with a violent felo n y. The government did not cross-appeal that finding. Thus, Bennett's base o ffen se level should have been 33, and his total offense level should have been 31 after his assigned two-level acceptance of responsibility reduction. However, the d istrict court miscalculated Bennett's total offense level as 32. This miscalculation o f the offense level was plain error.

A total offense level of 32 produced a Guidelines range of 210 to 262 m o n th s. Had Bennett been sentenced at the correct total offense level of 31, the G u id elin es range would have been 188 to 235 months. More importantly, the d istrict judge expressly indicated a desire to impose a sentence near the low end of th e sentencing Guidelines range. Bennett's sentence of 220 months' imprisonment is near the low end of the Guidelines range for a total offense level of 32, but is not n ear the low end of the Guidelines range for a total offense level of 31. Because of th e district court's express comments, there is a reasonable probability that the d is tr ic t court would have sentenced Bennett differently had it used the correct total o ff en se level of 31. The offense level miscalculation therefore affected Bennett's su b stan tial rights. Under these circumstances, Bennett has shown that the plain erro r that substantially affected his rights also seriously affected the fairness, in te g r ity , or public reputation of the judicial proceedings in this case. See United S tates v. Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. H en d erso n , 409 F.3d 1293, 1308 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dacus, 408 F .3 d 686, 689 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Martinez, 407 F.3d 1170, 1174 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2005); United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1333­34 (11th Cir. 2 0 0 5 ). Therefore, the district court plainly erred in using a total offense level of 32 in stead of a total offense level of 31.

IV . CONCLUSION T h e district court did not err in determining that Bennett was an armed career criminal, and we affirm that determination. However, the district court did p la in ly err in using a total offense level of 32 to calculate the applicable Guidelines r an g e . Therefore, we vacate and remand for the limited purpose of resentencing at th e correct total offense level of 31 and the corresponding advisory Guidelines ra n g e of 188 to 235 months. On remand, the district court shall consider Bennett's c o r re ct advisory Guidelines range of 188 to 235 months' imprisonment and the 8 U .S .C . § 3553(a) factors in determining a reasonable sentence.4 A F F IR M E D IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.

* The Honorable Anne C. Conway, U.S. District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.

1 The court's reference to "identifying data" relates to Bennett's first two objections to the PSI which concerned the inclusion in the PSI of certain aliases and alias social security numbers. In the addendum to the PSI, the probation officer conceded that he found no evidence of Bennett using any of these aliases in connection with criminal activity.

2 The district court also stated that the 220 months' imprisonment was to be served concurrently with the revoked state parole term that the defendant is currently serving.

3 The court documents provided to Bennett included the indictments and convictions for the June 2, 1984 burglaries of Car Park and Stand N' Snack, two Savannah businesses; the February 15, 1983 burglaries of Ocean Chemical Co., Inc. and Metal Crafts, Inc., two Savannah businesses; the October 28, 1988 burglary of Cynthia Cooper's residence; and the November 12, 1991 burglary of Glendora Baldwin's residence.

4 As this is a limited remand, the parties may not reargue issues already or necessarily decided during the first sentencing that either have been affirmed in this appeal or could have been but were not raised during this appeal. See United States v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250, 1252 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that when the appellate court issues a limited mandate, "the trial court is restricted in the range of issues it may consider on remand").