UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

Rulings by summary order do not have precedential effect. Citation to summary

orders filed after January 1, 2007, is permitted and is governed by this court's Local Rule

0.23 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. In a brief or other paper in which a

litigant cites a summary order, in each paragraph in which a citation appears, at least one

citation must either be to the Federal Appendix or be accompanied by the notation:

"(summary order)." Unless the summary order is available in an electronic database which

is publicly accessible without payment of fee (such as the database available at

http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/), the party citing the summary order must file and serve a

copy of that summary order together with the paper in which the summary order is cited.

If no copy is served by reason of the availability of the order on such a database, the citation

must include reference to that database and the docket number of the case in which the

order was entered.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held

at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of

New York, on the 18th day of January, Two thousand seven.

PRESENT:

GU I D O CALABRESI

JOS É A. CABRANES

Circuit Judges,

ED W A R D R. KORMAN

District Judge.*

x

LOU IS VUITTON MALLETIER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

-v.- No. 06-2540-cv

AMENDED

BU R L IN G T O N COAT FACTORY WAREHOUSE, CORP.,

Defendant-Appellee,

FO U R SEASONS HANDBAG COMPANY, AND JOHN DOES 1-10, Defenda nts.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x FOR APPELLANT: TH E O D O RE C. MAX, Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky, and Popco, P.C. (Charles A. LeGrand, on the brief), New York, NY.

FOR APPELLEE: RO B E R T S. WEISBEIN, Darby & Darby, P.C. (Atul R.

Singh, on the brief), New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Richard M. Berman, Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the cause is AFFIRMED and REMANDED for further proceedings.

Plaintiff- appellant Louis Vuitton Malletier appeals from a May 23, 2006 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denying appellant's motion for preliminary injunction against defendant-appellee Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corporation. We assume the parties' familiarity with the facts and the procedural history of the case.

Upon a review of the record and of the District Court's opinion, we are uncertain whether the District Court conducted a fully exhaustive analysis of the likelihood of consumer confusion when it applied the criteria set forth in Polaroid Corp. v. Polorad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961). Nevertheless, because we find it was not error to deny the preliminary injunction on the record before the Court, we do not vacate the denial of that injunction but remand the cause to the District Court so that a trial on the merits can proceed. In applying the Polaroid factors during resolution of the parties' claims at a trial on the merits, the District Court should consider not only the potential for consumer confusion as to the source of the marks in question, but should also consider the potential for confusion as to the "sponsorship, affiliation, connection, or identification" of those marks.

Star Indus. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 383 (2d Cir. 2005). The District Court should give particular attention to the Polaroid factors in light of the potential for types of confusion other than source confusion, focusing perhaps especially on (1) the proximity of the products and their competitiveness with one another, (2) evidence that the imitative mark was adopted in bad faith, and (3) sophistication of consumers. See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 874-75 (2d Cir. 1986); Sports Auth. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 964 (2d Cir. 1996). In considering both source and non-source confusion, the distri ct court should ensure it gives adequate weight to the strength of the Louis Vuitton trademark when weighing the various Polaroid factors. See Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 454 F.3d 108, 116 (2d Cir. 2006). Finally, we note that the potential for non source confusion and its applicability to the Polaroid factors may be relevant to Louis Vuitton's claims under New York's anti-dilution statute, New York General Business Law § 360-l (McKinney Cum. Supp. 2007). See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497, 506-08 (2d Cir. 1996).

In sum, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the district court and REMAND the cause to that court for further proceedings consistent with this order.

FOR THE COURT, Thomas Asreen, Acting Clerk By

* The Hon o r a b l e Edward R. Korman , Chief Judge of the United States D i s t r i c t Court for the Eastern D istric t of N ew Yo rk, sitting by design atio n.