Cardozo Public Law, Policy and Ethics Journal - Nbr. III-1, December 2004
Robert Berman - Professor of Philosophy, Xavier University, New Orleans
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Introduction. I. The Set-Theoretical Interpretation of Individuality. A. Three Models of the Distinction. i. The Virtuosity Model. ii. The Inclusivist Model. iii. The Exclusivist Model. B. Three Questions and Answers. i. Plausible Account of the Distinction?. ii. Illustrative of Hegel's Account?. iii. Does Any Model Stand Out?. II. Objections and Replies. A. Classes and Sets. B. Dialectical Development. C. Exclusivity and Novelty.
Ways of Being Singular: The Logic of Individuality
Introduction Ordinary thought has always operated with four distinct conceptions of individuality. The first, a minimal conception, which is ingredient in all the others, is the notion of an individual as merely the countable referent of a singular term, more precisely of a proper name. In this minimal sense of individuality, an individual is whatever is one, or single and namable, as a target for speech and thought. Thus, on the minimal conception, individuality pertains to virtually anything to which singular reference can be made. The three additional ideas of individuality presuppose, but go beyond, this minimal conception. Individuality as exclusivity is the idea of the sole or exclusive one -one of a kind. The God of monotheism is a paradigm of this conception of individuality. Individuality as virtuosity is that of a one singled out because it is the best of the bunch, the virtuoso. Finally, individuality as novelty is the idea of a one that, due to its uniqueness, escapes virtually all classification, for it is like nothing else. It is so radically different that it is literally sui generis and, for that reason, in a class by itself. An exemplary case of individuality embodying virtuosity and novelty is suggested by Hegel's understanding of Socrates' singularity as the philosopher of world-historical significance. While many thinkers have talked about individuality in one or another of these ways, only Hegel offers an account of the logic of individuality that provides what is conceptually needed to reconstruct the pre-theoretical fourfold distinction in a systematic way. The point of this paper is to offer a set-theoretical interpretation of Hegel's systematic logical account of individuality and, in doing so, to suggest how to understand the systematic basis for the pre-theoretical conception of individuality.1 As is well-known, Hegel's account of individuality in the Science of Logic ("Logic") is introduced early on in th...
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