Why are There Four Hegelian Judgments?

Hegel is the philosopher of threes. In the Encyclopedia system, there is logic-nature-spirit. Within logic, there is being-essence-notion. Within notion, there is subject-object-idea. Within subjectivity, there is notion-judgment-syllogism. Yet, as everyone notices, when it comes to judgment, the structure is tetrachotomous. Here we find existence-reflection-necessity-notion. Why should there be four judgments when there are only three of everything else? Why must Shemp intrude upon the sublime perfection of Moe, Larry, and Curly? What need we d'Artagnan when Porthos, Athos, and Aramis seem the perfect threesome? Three's company. Four's a crowd!

In the Science of Logic,1 Hegel does not allude very directly to the change, but in the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel explains:

[T]he different species of judgement derive their features from the universal forms of the logical idea itself. If we follow this clue, it will supply us with three chief kinds of judgement parallel to the stages of Being, Essence, and Notion. The second of these kinds, as required by the character of Essence, which is the stage of differentiation, must be doubled . . . [W]hen the Notion, which is the unity of Being and Essence in a comprehensive thought, unfolds ... it must reproduce these two stages in a transformation proper to the notion.2

In this passage, Hegel suggests that it is the function of j...

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