Cardozo Public Law, Policy and Ethics Journal - Nbr. V-2, April 2007
Diane Lourdes Dick - J.D., 2005, University of Florida Levin College of Law
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Introduction I. Long-Term Care Financial Planning Through A Consumer Choice Lens A. The Traditional Model Of Rational Consumer Choice B. The Behavioral Economics Model Of Consumer Choice C. Long-Term Care Planning Under The Behavioral Economics Model 1. Unique Preferences in Long-Term Care Planning i Preference 1: Diminished Utility at the Mere Thought of Long-Term Care Needs ii. Preference 2: Maximized Utility by Underestimating One`s Future Need for Long-term Care iii. Preference 3: Diminished Utility at the Thought of Institutional Care; Maximized Utility at the Thought of Informal Care from Loved Ones 2. Unique Time Functions in Long-Term Care Planning i. Time Function 1: Long-term Care Planning as an Initial Proxy for Financial Interests, and as an Evolving Proxy for Emotional Interests ii. Time Function 2: The Tendency to Disproportionately Value Current Costs and Benefits Over Future Costs and Benefits iii. Time Function 3: The Problem of the "Future Incapacitated Self" as a "Non-Self" or an "Impossible Self" II. Tax And Economic Policy Responses To The Medicaid Crisis A. Government Initiatives to Discourage Reliance on Public Assistance for Long-Term Care: Medicaid Estate Recovery Programs B. Government Initiatives to Encourage Reliance on Private Payer Sources for Long-Term Care 1. Additional Personal Exemption for Caregivers 2. Long-Term Care Insurance Partnership Programs 3. Federal Income Tax Deductions for the Costs of Long-Term Care Insurance i. The Business Deduction for the Cost of Employer-Sponsored Long- Term Care Insurance Policies ii. The Current Individual Deduction iii. The Proposed Above-the-Line Deduction 4. State-Level Income Tax Incentives for the Purchase of Long-Term Care Insurance III. An Analysis Of Legislative Intent: The Perceived Benefit Of Long-Term Care Insurance IV. A Dynamic Model Of Long-Term Care Planning A. Choice 1: To Plan or Not to Plan B. Choice 2: Develop a Financial Plan, or Rely on Informal Care at Home C. Choice 3: Assuming the Consumer Does Not Prefer Informal, In- Home Care, How Costs and Benefits Should be Weighed When Developing a Financial Plan D. Choice 4: Once Costs and Benefits are Weighed, Assuming the Consumer Wishes to Provide for the Future Incapacitated Self, What to Include in the Long-Term Care Plan E. Choice 5: Whether to Maintain the Initial Plan V. Discussion: Tax And Economic Policy Implications Conclusion

US Code - Title 26: Internal Revenue Code - 26 USC 7702 - Sec. 7702. Life insurance contract defined
US Code - Title 26: Internal Revenue Code - 26 USC 213 - Sec. 213. Medical, dental, etc., expenses
US Code - Title 26: Internal Revenue Code - 26 USC 162 - Sec. 162. Trade or business expenses
US Code - Title 42: The Public Health and Welfare - 42 USC 213 - Sec. 213. Military benefits
US Code - Title 42: The Public Health and Welfare - 42 USC 1396 - Sec. 1396. Appropriations
Code of Federal Regulations - Title 42: Public Health - 42 CFR 435.120 - Individuals receiving SSI.
Tax And Economic Policy Responses To The Medicaid Long-Term Care Financing Crisis: A Behavioral Economics Approach
J.D., 2005, University of Florida Levin College of Law; M.A. in Political Science, 1999, Florida International University. I owe a debt of gratitude to Patricia Dilley, Jeffrey Harrison, David Richardson and Danaya Wright for their attentive assistance and detailed comments on earlier drafts, and to Suzanne Hutton for mentoring me through complex legal questions in the area of assisted living. I am also grateful for the comments and guidance of Professor Barak Richman of Duke Law School. His recent article Behavioral Economics and Health Policy: Understanding Medicaid`s Failure, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 705 (2005), served as both an inspiration and an example for my work. Perhaps more fundamentally, however, I thank the residents, families, and healthcare professionals I came to know when I worked in long-term care social services prior to law school. Their stories, insights, and thoughtful reflections motivated my research and enabled me to synthesize a wide range of interdisciplinary findings. I dedicate this Article to the memory of Mack Lomrance, whose dignity and grace continue to inspire me. Introduction The United States faces an unparalleled healthcare financing crisis.1 In 2006, more than fifty-five million individuals in need of healthcare coverage turned to the federal and state governments for assistance through the Medicaid program.2 Among those seeking coverage are low-income pregnant women and families with dependent children; the aged, blind, and disabled; the mentally ill; and acutely or chronically ill persons who lack private insurance coverage.3 Meeting the health insurance needs of these categorically4 and medically5 needy Americans through a public welfare program is no easy task. Healthcare costs steadily rise,6 and income tax revenues have only recently begun to recover from the post-September 11 recession.7 In 2003, the total federal and state outlay for Medicaid was $273 billion;8 this figure is expected to have exceeded $300 billion in 2006.9 On average, Medicaid expenditures already consume approximately 20 percent of state general funds,10 while the federal share of costs will rise to approximately $199 billion in 2007.11 Although these amounts may seem miniscule compared to other government expenditures, some analysts predict that the combined costs of Medicaid, Medicare, and Social Security could consume more than a quarter of the gross domestic product by the year 2050.12 Pressing against this broader budgetary quagmire, the nation`s persistent reliance on Medicaid to finance long-term care for the elderly has become one of the most imperative dilemmas facing policy-makers today.13 Medicaid was created in 1965 under Title XIX of the Social Security Act14 as a federal and state partnership.15 The program was originally designed to provide healthcare coverage for low-income families who meet eligibility requirements for the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.16 More recently, the Medicaid program has been expanded to include a wider range of families;17 pregnant women;18 the aged, blind, and disabled;19 and acutely or chronically ill individuals who lack private healthcare insurance.20 Medicaid has also become the nation`s primary payer source for long-term care.21 Since long-term care services are beyond the scope of Medicare and most private healthcare insurance programs,22 Americans in need of long-term care come within the "medically needy" classification: they are entitled to receive Medicaid benefits if they cannot pay privately. To be sure, most Americans are unable to finance long-term care without governmental assistance and must turn to Medicaid when the need arises.23 A number of trends converge to create this heavy reliance on public assistance. Many seniors do not have private long-term care insurance24 and most lack sufficient financial resources to pay the high cost of long-term care.25 Meanwhile, many others simply ignore the need to plan for long-term care expenses, and enroll in Medicaid once the need arises.26 Since Medicaid is a means-tested program, beneficiaries must meet specific asset and income criteria.27 Applicants with some savings will be required to "spend down" assets on long-term care services.28 Medicaid will assume the cost of long-term care only after the applicant has exhausted most personal sources of funding.29 Applicants are permitted to retain the principal residence and other exempted assets; however, these assets can be seized by the state upon the beneficiary`s death, up to the value of benefits received.30 To avoid the consequences of these provisions, many Americans engage in "voluntary impov...
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