Acting Public Prosecutor v Andrew Lalaiva and Angelo Ume [1981] PNGLR 148

JurisdictionPapua New Guinea
JudgePratt J:
Judgment Date26 May 1981
CourtSupreme Court
Citation[1981] PNGLR 148
Docket NumberTenge Kai Ulo and Joe Kovea Malai v Acting Public Prosecutor
Year1981
Judgement NumberSC199

Full Title: Tenge Kai Ulo and Joe Kovea Malai v Acting Public Prosecutor; Acting Public Prosecutor v Andrew Lalaiva and Angelo Ume [1981] PNGLR 148

Supreme Court: Kidu CJ, Kapi J, Pratt J

Judgment Delivered: 26 May 1981

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

[SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]

TENGE KAI ULO

V

ACTING PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AND JOE KOVEA MALAI

V

ACTING PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

AND

ACTING PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

V

ANDREW LALAIVA AND ANGELO UME

Waigani

Kidu CJ Kapi J Pratt J

26 May 1981

APPEAL — Practice — Striking out for want of prosecution — No cross appeal — Inherent jurisdiction to strike out where undue delay — Undue delay depends on circumstances — Onus on applicant — Appellant to give satisfactory explanation — Relevant considerations.

The Supreme Court has an inherent jurisdiction to dismiss appeals for want of prosecution where there is undue delay. What constitutes undue delay depends on the circumstances of each case.

The onus is on the applicant to dismiss to establish a prima facie case of delay and the onus then shifts to the respondent to the application to give a satisfactory explanation for the delay.

Appeals.

These were appeals against sentence on the ground of inadequacy in which applications were made to strike out the appeals for want of prosecution.

Counsel:

C. Bruce, for the applicants.

J. Byrne, for the respondent to each application, the Public Prosecutor.

26 May 1981

KIDU CJ: I agree with what my brother Kapi is about to say.

KAPI J: In these matters the Public Prosecutor appealed against sentence on the ground that the sentence imposed is inadequate. The respondents in each case are represented by the Public Solicitor. The Public Solicitor in each case made applications to strike out appeals for want of prosecution. By consent these applications were heard together as they raised the same points of law.

A preliminary issue was raised as to the jurisdiction of this Court. I do not think that counsel for the State seriously questioned the jurisdiction of the court. Counsel for the applicant stated that r. 25 (3) of the Supreme Court Rules 1977 does not apply here because there is no cross-appeal. I do not intend to consider this provision in detail because I consider this Court has inherent jurisdiction to dismiss appeals for want of prosecution. This Court has power not only to dismiss where there is breach of rules of court but it has inherent jurisdiction apart from the rules to control its proceedings such as abuse of process. Apart from any statutory basis this Court has power to dismiss appeals...

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