[D O NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED

U .S . COURT OF APPEALS

E L E V E N T H CIRCUIT

J u ly 18, 2006

N o . 06-11923 T H O M A S K. KAHN

N o n - A r g u m e n t Calendar CLERK

D . C. Docket No. 06-80131-CV-KLR

A N N A DINARDO,

AUGUSTA DINARDO,

VICTORIA DINARDO,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

versus

PALM BEACH COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE,

David F. Crow,

Defendant-Appellee.

A p p e al from the United States District Court

fo r the Southern District of Florida

(J u ly 18, 2006)

B efo re ANDERSON, BIRCH and FAY, Circuit Judges.

P E R CURIAM:

A n n a, Augusta, and Victoria Dinardo appeal pro se the district court's sua sp o n te dismissal with prejudice of their pro se civil complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U .S .C . § 1983, alleging that a Florida state judge violated their Fourteenth A m en d m en t due process rights, as well as the district court's denial of their F e d .R .C iv .P . 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. For the reasons set fo rth more fully below, we affirm.

O n February 7, 2006, the Dinardos filed pro se the instant § 1983 complaint, assertin g that they were denied their Fourteenth Amendment right to be tried by a co u rt with jurisdiction. The Dinardos alleged that Judge David F. Crow, Palm B each County Circuit Court Judge, improperly presided over multiple civil actions r ela tin g to a property-foreclosure judgment where the amount in controversy was b e lo w the jurisdictional amount of $15,000. The Dinardos also contended that Ju d g e Crow acted with malice and willful intent and that, as a result of his conduct, th ey were ordered to pay unlawful attorney fees, suffered an equitable conversion o f the deed to their home, and were evicted from their home under an illegal writ o f possession. As relief, they sought $370,000 in damages, a writ of possession fo r their property, and $20,000,000 in punitive damages.

O n February 14, 2006, the district court, without citing to authority, sua s p o n te dismissed the Dinardos' complaint without prejudice. The court explained th at, on June 9, 2003, in Dinardo v. Butterworth, Case. No. 03-80159-CIV, a d if fe re n t judge in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida had entered an "Order Restricting Future Filings by Plaintiffs" ("injunctive order"), whereby th at judge had "permanently enjoined [the Dinardos] from filing or attempting to in itiate any further pro se lawsuits in any federal court without first obtaining a w r itte n order from a judge of this court confirming that the action is not frivolous." The court in the instant case discussed that, in issuing this injunctive order, the p rio r judge had found that the Dinardos had filed several frivolous, facially d eficien t pro se lawsuits in the district court against various public officials and ju d icial officers. The court also determined that the Dinardos, before filing the in stan t complaint, had not attached a written order confirming that the complaint w a s not frivolous. The court concluded that this complaint was not in compliance w ith the injunctive order and directed the Dinardos to refile their complaint, with th e requisite attached court order, if at all, within 20 days of the entry of the instant o rd er.

On February 21, 2006, the Dinardos filed their Rule 59(e) motion, asserting th at the court had erroneously dismissed their instant complaint because the in ju n ctiv e order on which it relied was "a void judgment issued from a proceeding co ram non judice."1 The Dinardos explained that, because § 1983 "is not a statute p ro v id in g for protection of civil rights within the meaning of 28U.S.C.

§ 1343(a)(4)," the prior court lacked jurisdiction, and the court's injunctive order, th u s , was void and should not be enforced.. The Dinardos, thus, contended that th eir filing of the instant complaint was proper under Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, and that the clerk who initially accepted the instant pleading acted properly.

In addition to this motion, the Dinardos filed a supporting memorandum, in w h ich they, without citing to binding authority, again contended that, although th ey had attempted to invoke jurisdiction in their prior action asserting a § 1983 claim , the court that issued the injunctive order lacked subject-matter jurisdiction u n d e r § 1343 to decide their § 1983 claim, the proceeding was coram non judice, an d the order was void.2 The Dinardos attached to this supporting memorandum a c o p y of the prior court's sua sponte injunctive order. This injunctive order in clu d ed that dismissal of the Dinardos' § 1983 action was warranted, pursuant to F ed .R .C iv .P . 12(b)(6), because, in asserting violations of their constitutional rights a ris in g out of the alleged failure by the State of Florida and the Attorney General o f Florida to discharge their duties of office by not revoking the charter of the Boca C h ica Homeowners Association, the Dinardos had failed to alleged a cognizable fed eral constitutional claim.

F u rth erm o re, this injunctive order included that the Dinardos, appearing in d iv id u ally or in combination, had filed seven different pro se lawsuits in the D istrict Court for the Southern District of Florida against various public officials an d judicial officers over the preceding year, including a suit arising out of their d isag reem en t with a property-foreclosure judgment entered by Judge Crow, acting in his capacity as a state judicial officer. This injunctive order also discussed that o n e of these suits, which was filed against Judge Crow, was dismissed for lack of su b ject-m atter jurisdiction on November 26, 2002. Based on the court's review of "th e history of facially deficient complaints filed by the pro se plaintiffs in the fed eral district court for the Southern District of Florida," and based on its inherent p o w er and obligation to protect its dockets from abuse by frequent litigants, it sua s p o n te entered restrictions upon any future pro se filings by any of the plaintiffs n a m e d in the action, or by persons acting on their behalf. The court, therefore, d ir ec te d the clerk of the court not to accept a complaint from any of these plaintiffs u n le ss (1) it involved claims not arising from the same nucleus of operative fact as th o se alleged in the underlying § 1983 action or previous actions filed by the D in a r d o s , and (2) had attached a written order from a judge of the district court co n firm in g that the action is not frivolous.

After the defendant in the instant case failed to respond to the Dinardos' R u le 59(e) motion, the court denied this motion.3 The court explained that, co n trary to the Dinardos' argument, the prior court had jurisdiction over the action p r e cip ita tin g the injunctive order, pursuant to 28U.S.C. §§ 1131 and 1343(a)(3), r es p e ctiv e ly , because (1) it was a civil action arising under the United States C o n s titu tio n , and (2) it was an action to redress the alleged deprivation of federal co n stitu tio n al rights under color of state law. The court concluded that the in ju n ctiv e order was not void and that the court, therefore, had insufficient cause to reco n sid er its dismissal of the action.

I n addition to determining that the injunctive order was not void, the court fo u n d that the instant action was substantially similar to the previously filed action ag ain st Judge Crow, as both actions (1) were brought by the same plaintiffs against th e same defendant, (2) challenged the propriety of Judge Crow's entry of a final ju d g m e n t in the same state case, and (3) alleged violations of the Dinardos' duep ro cess rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The court determined that, because the previously filed action was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, the Dinardos' duplicate filing of the same case b e f o r e a different judge of the same court violated "the universally condemned p r a ctic e of `judge shopping'" and local rules of procedure. The court, therefore, co n clu d ed that the Dinardos' "attempt to manipulate judicial assignment p ro cesses" of the court "threaten[ed] the orderly administration of justice" and m an d ated the conversion of the dismissal of the action without prejudice to a d ism issal with prejudice.

Construing the Dinardos' brief liberally, they assert that the district court erred in sua sponte dismissing the instant § 1983 complaint and denying their Rule 5 9 ( e) motion. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1 9 9 8 ) (explaining that "[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than p lead in g s drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed"). The D in ar d o s contend that, as a result of the combination of (1) the injunctive order's req u irem en t that they first obtain an order authorizing them to file a complaint, and ( 2 ) the court's general practice of only allowing plaintiffs to file motions in open cases, they have been deprived of their First Amendment right to access the courts. T h e Dinardos also argue that the court that issued the injunctive order lacked su b ject-m atter jurisdiction and the order, thus, was void. In support of this second arg u m en t, the Dinardos contend that § 1983--the only statute on which the D in ard o s relied in bringing their previous civil action--is not a statute providing fo r the protection of civil rights within the meaning of the jurisdictional provisions in § 1343(a)(3).

The district court did not identify the authority on which it was relying in su a sponte dismissing the instant action. We, however, generally "review for a b u s e of discretion a district court's dismissal for failure to comply with the rules o f court." Betty K. Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th C ir. 2005). "Discretion means the district court has a `range of choice, and that its d ecisio n will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not in f lu e n c e d by any mistake of law.'" Id. (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, w e may affirm a decision of the district court based "on any adequate ground, even if it is other than the one on which the court actually relied." Fisherman Against D estru ctio n of Env't, Inc. v. Closter Farms, Inc., 300 F.3d 1294, 1296-97 (11th C ir. 2002).

A court may dismiss a case with prejudice based on either Fed.R.Civ.P.

4 1 (b ), or the court's inherent power to manage its docket. Betty K. Agencies, 432 F .3 d at 1337. Rule 41(b) allows for dismissal of an action if the plaintiff fails to p ro secu te or to comply with procedural rules or an order of the court. Fed.R.Civ.P.

4 1 (b ) (providing that, "[f]or failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with th ese rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action o r of any claim against the defendant"); see also Lopez v. Aransas County Indep.

S c h . Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 544 (5th Cir. 1978) (affirming a sua sponte dismissal u n d er Rule 41(b) and explaining that, "[a]lthough the rule is phrased in terms of d ism issal on the motion of the defendant, it is clear that the power is inherent in the c o u r t and may be exercised sua sponte . . ."). Additionally, we have explained that "[t]h e court's power to dismiss is an inherent aspect of its authority to enforce its o rd er and insure prompt disposition of lawsuits." Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1 5 3 3 , 1535 (11th Cir. 1985).

Under both of these authorities, a dismissal with prejudice "is an extreme s an c tio n that may be properly imposed only when: `(1) a party engages in a clear p a tte rn of delay or willful contempt (contumacious conduct); and (2) the district co u rt specifically finds that lesser sanctions would not suffice.'" Betty K.

A g en cies, 432 F.3d at 1337-38 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis in original).

"[T]he harsh sanction of dismissal with prejudice is thought to be more appropriate in a case [such as here,] where a party, as distinct from counsel, is culpable." See id . at 1338 (quotation omitted).

We readily conclude that an abuse of discretion did not occur in the instant c as e. The district court explained, in its original sua sponte dismissal order, that d is m is sa l without prejudice was warranted because a prior court, in issuing an in ju n ctiv e order, had "permanently enjoined [the Dinardos] from filing or attem p tin g to initiate any further pro se lawsuits in any federal court without first o b tain in g a written order from a judge of this court confirming that the action is not friv o lo u s," and that the Dinardos, before filing the instant complaint, had not a tta ch e d a written order confirming that the complaint was not frivolous. In s u b s e q u e n tly converting this dismissal to one with prejudice, the district court d iscu ssed that (1) the Dinardos' duplicate filing of the same case before a different ju d g e of the same court violated "the universally condemned practice of `judge sh o p p in g '" and the court's local procedural rules, and (2) the Dinardos' "attempt to m an ip u late judicial assignment processes" of the court "theaten[ed] the orderly ad m in istratio n of justice." Indeed, although the Dinardos contest the court's d ism issal of the instant action, they have not challenged the court's findings relatin g to the number and nature of their previous court filings and their intent b eh in d those filings.

To the extent the Dinardos are contending that the dismissal was erroneous b y contesting the validity of the injunctive order, under the All Writs Act, "[t]he S u p rem e Court and all courts established by an Act of Congress may issue all writs n ecessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the u sag es and principles of law." 28U.S.C. § 1651(a). A court's power to protect its ju risd ictio n under this Act includes: th e power to enjoin a dissatisfied party bent on re-litigating claims th a t were (or could have been) previously litigated before the court fro m filing in both judicial and non-judicial forums, as long as the in ju n ctio n does not completely foreclose a litigant from any access to th e courts.

R iccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1295 n.15 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing P ro cu p v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1079 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc)); see also K lay v. United Healthgroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 1092, 1099-1102 (11th Cir. 2004) (d iscu ssin g in detail the All Writs Act).

In issuing the instant injunctive order, the prior federal court explained that th e order was in response to "the history of facially deficient complaints filed by th e pro se plaintiffs in the federal district court for the Southern District of F lo rid a." The Dinardos have not challenged the court's finding in the injunctive o r d e r that the Dinardos, appearing individually or in combination, had filed seven d ifferen t pro se lawsuits in the District Court for the Southern District of Florida a g a in s t various public officials and judicial officers over the preceding year, in c lu d in g a suit arising out of their disagreement with a property-foreclosure ju d g m en t entered by the defendant in the instant case.

Furthermore, although the Dinardos are asserting that this injunctive order ex ceed ed the issuing court's powers under the All Writs Act by depriving them of th eir First Amendment right to access the courts, and they are contending that their access is blocked because the district court generally does not review pleadings in u n o p en ed cases, they have failed to cite to supporting authority for this argument.

To the contrary, in Prokup, we explained, in an en banc decision, that, although the d istrict court's injunction at issue in that case was overbroad, district courts g en erally have "[c]onsiderable discretion" in designing these injunctions, including au th o rity to impose serious restrictions on a defendant bringing matters before the c o u r t without an attorney, as long as the defendant is not completely foreclosed fro m "any access to the courts." See Prokup, 792 F.2d at 1073-74. Thus, we have u p h eld dismissals of pro se actions where the plaintiffs, who were frequent litig ato rs, violated injunctions prohibiting them from filing or attempting to initiate an y new lawsuits in any federal court without first obtaining leave of the court.

See Martin-Trigona v. Shaw, 986 F.2d 1384, 1387-88 (11th Cir. 1993) (listing cases where this Court has upheld pre-filing restrictions on litigious plaintiffs).

Because the injunctive order the Dinardos are challenging similarly did not c o m p le te ly foreclose them from "any access to the courts," the prior court had au th o rity under the All Writs Act to issue it and the district court did not err in relyin g on this order in dismissing the instant act.

Similarly, the Dinardos' argument that this injunctive order was void and u n e n f o r c ea b le because the issuing court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over th eir underlying § 1983 complaint is without merit. We review questions of su b ject-m atter jurisdiction de novo. Brown v. Snow, 440 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th C ir . 2006). Under § 1331, federal courts have federal-question jurisdiction over s u its "in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates th e cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on r es o lu tio n of a substantial question of federal law." Newton v. Capital Assurance C o ., 245 F.3d 1306, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted).

In the instant case, the prior federal court that issued the injunctive order had s u b je ct- m a tte r jurisdiction because the Dinardos, relying on § 1983, had asserted v io latio n s of their constitutional rights arising out of the alleged failure by the State o f Florida and the Attorney General of Florida to discharge their duties of office by n o t revoking the charter of the Boca Chica Homeowners Association. Section 1 9 8 3 provides a federal cause of action for a plaintiff alleging that: (1) an act or o m issio n deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the C o n s titu tio n or laws of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was co m m itted by a person acting under color of state law. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U .S . 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), overruled in part on o th er grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665, 88 L .E d .2 d 662 (1986); see also Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295, 1303 ( 1 1 th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a successful plaintiff in a civil rights action under § 1983 must show that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of a f ed e r al right). Thus, the injunctive order was issued by a court with subject-matter ju risd ictio n , and the district court in the instant case did not err in relying on it in en terin g its dismissal order.

Finally, to the extent the Dinardos also are challenging the district court's d en ial of their Rule 59(e) motion, we review the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for a b u s e of discretion. Lambert v. Fulton County, Ga., 253 F.3d 588, 598 (11th Cir. 2 0 0 1 ) . "The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59(e)] motion are newly-discovered ev id en ce or manifest errors of law or fact." In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 ( 1 1 th Cir. 1999). Additionally, "[m]otions for reconsideration should not be used to raise legal arguments which could and should have been made before the ju d g m en t was issued." Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of Florida, 243 F.3d 1282, 1 2 9 2 (11th Cir. 2001). As discussed above, the Dinardos' Rule 59(e) motion did n o t identify any meritorious errors of law or fact. The Dinardos also did not p resen t any newly discovered or previously unavailable evidence. Accordingly, th e district court also did not abuse its discretion in denying the Dinardos' Rule 5 9 (e) motion. We, therefore, affirm.

AFFIRMED.

1 As the district court noted in its order denying the Dinardos' Rule 59(e) motion, the phrase coram non judice, that, "before a person not a judge," means that the proceeding was not a judicial proceeding because lawful judicial authority was not present and could not, therefore, yield a result. See Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 608-09, 110 S.Ct. 2105, 2109, 109 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990).

2 The Dinardos also filed an affidavit in support of their Rule 59(e) motion, which contained the same assertions as in their motion and supporting memorandum.

3 Before the court entered its order denying the Dinardos' Rule 59(e) motion, it ordered the Dinardos' to serve a copy of this order on the defendant, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 5. The Dinardos, thereafter, filed a certificate of service, reflecting that such service had been completed. In addition to not responding to the Dinardos' motion, the defendant also has not filed a response brief on appeal.