* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limit ed circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 98-11239 Summary Calendar TINA ANTOINE-TUBBS, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus LOCAL 513, AIR TRANSPORT DIVISION, TRANSPORT WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO; AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC; AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas (3:96-CV-572-P) July 19, 1999 Before EMILIO M. GARZA, BENAVIDES and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * Plain t iff-Appellant, Tina Antoine-Tubbs (“Tubbs”), appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant-Ap pel lee, American Airlines, Inc. (“American”). We affirm.

I Tubbs worked as a building cleaner and then as a fleet service clerk for American. Tubbs brought suit claiming that American intentionally inflict ed emotional distress upon her, that American discriminated against her on the basis of her sex and race, and that American vio lat ed t he Family Medical Leave Act. The district court granted American summary judgment on each of TubbsÂ’ claims. Tubbs timely appealed. On appeal, Tubbs argues that the district court erred for three reasons.

First, Tubbs claims that the district court erred in gra nt ing summary judgment on her intentional inflict i o n o f emotional distress claim. Tubbs specifically argues that the district court erroneously excl uded the testimony of her expert witness, Dr. Rhodesia LaStrap. Dr. LaStrap te s t ified that AmericanÂ’s conduct resulted in work-related stress that caused Tubbs to develop preeclampsia and miscarry her child. The district court found Dr. LaStrapÂ’s testimony inadmissable under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Chemical Co. , 509 U.S. 5 79, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), and concluded that, withou t Dr. LaStrapÂ’s testimony, Tubbs presented no evidence that AmericanÂ’s conduct caused Tubbs emotional distress.

We review the district court’s decision to exclude Dr. La St rap’s testimony for abuse of discretion. S ee Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc. , 151 F.3d 269, 274 (5 th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Under Daubert , the district court must perform a gatekeepin g ro le and “ensure that any and all scientific testimony . . . is not only relevant, but reliable.” D aubert , 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S. Ct. at 2795, 125 L. Ed. 2d at. The record shows that Dr. LaStrap did not possess specialized knowledge of preeclampsia, and did not rely on medical studies or literature in support of her expert opi nio n t hat American’s conduct caused the severe preeclampsia that led to the death of Tubbs’ baby. Thus, Dr. LaStrap’s testimony was unreliable, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding her testimony.

See Ta n ner v. Westbrook, M.D. , No. 97-60416, 1999 WL 246712 at *6 (5 th Cir. Apr. 27, 1999) (concluding that district court abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony where the expert “did not have the kind of specialized knowledge required to testify regarding causation . . . [and did not] rely upon medical literature directly addressing the causation issue.”). We agree with the district court that, exce pt fo r the testimony of Dr. LaStrap, Tubbs presented no evidence that American caused her emotional distress. Accordingly, Tubbs’ claim o f intentional infliction of emotional distress fails. S ee Twyman v. Twyman , 855 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Tex.1993) (noting that to establish an intentional inflict ion of emotional distress claim, a plaint iff must show th at the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff emotional distress).

Second, Tubbs ar gues t hat the district court erred in denying her motion for leave to file affidavits from additional witnesses with her response to AmericanÂ’s motion for summary judgment.

The district court denied the motion because it concluded that Tubbs failed to show “good cause or substantial justification for her failure to disclose the[] witnesses prior to the close of discovery,” as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1). Tubbs contends, however, that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) entitles her to supplement her summary ju dgment response wi th the affidavits.

We review a district courtÂ’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. S ee General Electric Co. v. Joiner , 522 U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512, 517, 139 L.Ed.2d 508, (1997). In this case, the record shows that Tubbs did not identify her additional witnesses pr ior t o t he close of discovery .

Tubbs has offered no persu asive explanation for her failure to comply with the district court’s discovery deadline. See Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , 95 F.3d 375, 380 (5 th Cir. 1996) (noting that a party’s ex planat ion for its failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order is one factor that informs our determination as to whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding expert testimony). Accordingly, we hold that the district court acted within its discretion in refusing to grant Tubbs’ motion for leave to file affidavits from additional witnesses. S ee Reliance Ins. Co. v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. , 110 F.3d 253, 257 (5 th Cir. 1997)(“District judges have the power to control their dockets by refusing to give ineffective litigants a second chance to develop their case.”).

Finally, Tubbs argues that the district court erroneously granted summary judgment because, according to Tubbs, she established a m at erial fact as to her hostile work environment sexual harassment claim. Tubbs alleged sexual harassment based upon § 2000e-5(e)(1); W ebb v. Cardiothoracic Surgery Assoc. , 139 F.3d 532, 537 (5 th Cir. 1998). It is undisputed that, with one possible exception, 1 all of the incidents of improper comments or touching about which Tubbs complains occurred more than 300 days before Tubbs filed her EEO complaint. Moreover, even if one incident did occur within the applicable limitations period, we hold that the conduct about which Tubbs complains is insufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute actionable harassment. See Shepherd v. Comptroller of Pub. Accounts , 168 F.3d 871, 874 (5 th Cir. 1999) (ho lding that co-worker's sexual harassment did not render empl oy ee's work environment objectively hostile, where co-worker made comment about the color of plaint iffÂ’s nipples and the size of her thighs, attempted to look down her shirt, touched plaint iffÂ’s arm several times and rubbed his hand from her shoulder to her waist, and on two occasions told her too sit on his lap). With respect to the drawings, pictures and graffiti, we agree with the district court that the summary judgment evidence properly before it showed that American took prompt remedial action. S ee Jones v. Flagship IntÂ’l , 793 F.2d 714, 719- 20 (5 th Cir. 198 6) (list ing the five elements necessary to make out a hostile environment claim, including “that the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action”).

II For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district courtÂ’s summary judgment.

1 Tubbs identified one comment that might have been made in either 1994 or 1989