Brown vs. MS Coop Extension (5th Cir. 2004)

Federal Circuits, 5th Cir. (January 23, 2004)

Docket number: 03-60280


Permanent Link: http://vlex.com/vid/brown-vs-coop-extension-18404675
Id. vLex: VLEX-18404675

Click here to download this article in graphic format (Acrobat Reader)

Document language

Search in this document

Sponsored Ads:


Citations:

Text:

* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED January 23, 2004 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-60280 Summary Calendar DEDRIC BROWN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus MISSISSIPPI COOPERATIVE EXTENSION SERVICE, ET AL., Defendants, MISSISSIPPI COOPERATIVE EXTENSION SERVICE, ET AL., Defendants-Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi (USDC No. 3:01-CV-972BN) Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * Plaintiff-Appellant, Dedric Brown (“Brown”) appeals the decision of the district court which all of whom had been ineffectively served because the summons and copies of the complaint had been mailed to Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore rather than hand-delivered as required by Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure (“MRCP”) 4(c)(3)(A). 3 The district court also ext ended the time during which Brown could effectuate proper service on these defendants until July 8, 2002. On October 29, 2002, the district court granted MCES’ renewed dismissal motion because Brown had not effectuated proper service of process by the July 8, 2002 deadline. On February 10, 2003, the district court denied Brown’s reconsideration motion. Brown appeals both of these orders.

MCES asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear Brown’s appeal because his March 13, 2003, Notice of Appeal failed to mention the October 22, 2002 Order, violating Fede ral Rule of Appellate Procedure (“FRAP”), 3(c)(1)(B). While MCES is correct that Brown only mentioned the February 10, 2003 d enial o f his reconsideration motion, we exercise our broad discretion to hear Brown’s appeal on the merits as to both orders because we find that he intended to appeal both. S ee C.A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp. , 649 F.2d 1049, 1056 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 454 U.S. 1125 (1981). The October 29, 2002 Order We review a distr ict court’s grant of dismissal for improper service of process pursuant to FRCP 4(m), as well as its finding of a lack of good faith for failing to make t imely service, for abuse of discretion. See M arshall v. Warwick , 155 F.3d 102 7, 1030 (5th Cir. 1998) and McGinnis v. Shalala , 2 F.3d 548, 550 (5th Cir. 1993). In its June 5, 2002 Order the district court, citing George v. United States Dept. of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Admin. , 788 F.2d 1115, 1116 (5th Cir. 1986), exercised its discretion to quash Brown’s original service of process on MCES and gave him until July 8, 2002, to effectuate proper service of process. When Brown failed to make proper service of process by the July 8, 2002 deadline, the district court granted MCES’ Renewed Motion to Dismiss.

We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that his proffered excuse for missing the July 8, 2002 deadline. The medical problems of his attorney Becky Allen Farrell (“Farrell”), and her resignation on July 22, 2002, did not constitute good cause. The record clearly shows that Brown failed to meet the July 8, 2002 deadline. Furthermore, F arrell’s resign ation occurred two weeks after the deadline, and the firm had approximately one month from June 5, 2002, to make proper and t imely service. Additionally, her resignation from the firm did not require Brown to search for a new attorney because another attorney at the firm, Carol Henderson, was named on Brown’s original complaint and had been involved with his case. We also find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision not to grant Brown a discretionary extension. We agree with the district court’s reasoning that such was not warranted because Brown failed to serve t imely the defendants even though they all are citizens of Mississippi and could have been served by simply making hand-delivery to the Attorney General as the June 5, 2002 Order clearly instructed. The February 10, 2003 Order We review a district court’s denial of an FRCP 59(e) motion t o reco nsider its denial of an extension to make proper service of process for abuse of discretion. S chiller v. Physicians Resource Group, Inc. , 342 F.3d 563, 566 (5th Cir. 2003). A FRCP 59(e) motion to reconsider should not be granted unless there is: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence not previously available; and (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact or to prevent a manifest injustice. See e.g. , Schiller , 342 F.3d at 567; Atkins v. Marathon Le Torneau Co. , 130 F.R.D. 625, 626 (S.D. Miss. 1990) ; Russ v. International Paper Co. , 943 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied , 503 U.S. 987 (1992). The district court, in denying Brown’s reconsideration motion, did not abuse i t s discretion because there has been no intervening change of law, Brown has not produced any evidence that was not previously available to him but simply restates his “good cause” argument. He has not shown that the district court made a clear error of law that would result in a manifest injustice because the record shows that he failed to meet the July 8, 2002 deadline.

CONCLUSION Because we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting MCESÂ’ motion to dismiss in its October 29, 2002 Order, nor in its denial of BrownÂ’s reconsideration motion in its February 10, 2003 Order, we affirm the district courtÂ’s dismissal of BrownÂ’s claim.

AFFIRMED.

1 Mississippi State Un iversity Extension Service (§ 2000e, et seq on December 14, 2001. In a June 5, 2002 Order, the district court granted MCESÂ’ motion to dismiss for untimely service as to the defendants who had not been served, while quashing the service of process on the remaining defendants,

Sponsored Ads:




Activate your free trial now

Make your order

Need help? Contact us

Try vLex for FREE for 3 days

Access legal information from United States including:

  • Constitutions
  • Forms and Contracts
  • Legal Books and Journals
  • Case Law
  • News and Business
  • Regulations
  • U.S. Code

Try vLex without any commitment for 3 days and see why you need it.

3

days of Free Access