PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

T HE C HRISTIAN S CIENCE B OARD OF

D IRECTORS OF THE F IRST C HURCH OF

C HRIST , S CIENTIST ; T HE C HRISTIAN

S CIENCE P UBLISHING S OCIETY , Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v. D AVID J. N OLAN ; U NIVERSITY OF No. 00-2270 C HRISTIAN S CIENCE , Defendants-Appellants,

and D AVID E. R OBINSON ; T HE R OAN

M OUNTAIN I NSTITUTE OF C HRISTIAN

S CIENCE AND H EALTH , Defendants.

T HE C HRISTIAN S CIENCE B OARD OF

D IRECTORS OF THE F IRST C HURCH OF

C HRIST , S CIENTIST ; T HE C HRISTIAN

S CIENCE P UBLISHING S OCIETY , Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v. D AVID J. N OLAN ; U NIVERSITY OF No. 00-2321 C HRISTIAN S CIENCE , Defendants-Appellants,

and D AVID E. R OBINSON ; T HE R OAN

M OUNTAIN I NSTITUTE OF C HRISTIAN

S CIENCE AND H EALTH , Defendants.

T HE C HRISTIAN S CIENCE B OARD OF

D IRECTORS OF THE F IRST C HURCH OF

C HRIST , S CIENTIST ; T HE C HRISTIAN

S CIENCE P UBLISHING S OCIETY , Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v. D AVID J. N OLAN ; U NIVERSITY OF No. 00-2322 C HRISTIAN S CIENCE , Defendants-Appellants,

and D AVID E. R OBINSON ; T HE R OAN

M OUNTAIN I NSTITUTE OF C HRISTIAN

S CIENCE AND H EALTH , Defendants.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville. Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge. (CA-99-148-1)

Argued: April 6, 2001

Decided: July 26, 2001 Before WILLIAMS, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in

which Judge Williams and Judge Traxler joined. COUNSEL ARGUED: Brenda Ann Buan, MAHONEY, HAWKES & GOL-

DINGS, L.L.P., Boston, Massachusetts, for Appellants. Joseph H. Lessem, COWAN, LIEBOWITZ & LATMAN, P.C., New York, New

York, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Morris M. Goldings, MAHONEY,

HAWKES & GOLDINGS, L.L.P., Boston, Massachusetts, for Appel-

lants. OPINION KING, Circuit Judge:

In these appeals, we are asked to evaluate the validity of the exer-

cise of jurisdiction by the district court in the Western District of

North Carolina over an Arizona defendant, based on that defendant's

contributions to a website created and maintained by a North Carolina

co-defendant. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that jurisdic-

tion was proper and we affirm the district court. I. A. Founded by Mary Baker Eddy in 1872, The First Church of Christ,

Scientist ("TFCCS"), is a Boston-based religious organization with

branches located throughout the world. TFCCS is governed by its

Board of Directors (the "Board"), whose broad functions include ulti-

mate supervision and control over the church's prolific publishing

enterprise, The Christian Science Publishing Society. In furtherance

of its religious mission, TFCCS provides a variety of products and

publications, many of which bear federally registered and common

law trademarks owned by the Board.

Defendants David Nolan and David Robinson are active Christian

Scientists whose beliefs diverge in significant respects from those

espoused and advanced by TFCCS. 1 In February 1999, Nolan, a resi-

dent of Arizona, founded the University of Christian Science ("UCS")

as an "electronic campus on the world wide web" which would allow

present and potential Christian Scientists to "study the teachings of

Mary Baker Eddy and to exchange ideas about Christian Science."

J.A. 448. At that time, Nolan began developing the content of his

intended online university. Lacking the technical expertise necessary

to create and maintain a website, however, Nolan obtained the assis-

tance of David Robinson of Bakersville, North Carolina, in the spring

of 1999. Robinson secured a domain name for UCS and posted the

files provided to him by Nolan on the newly created site. 2 Following

the website's creation, Nolan maintained close contact with Robinson

Nolan is the president of United Christian Scientists, Inc., an organi-

zation that has challenged the legitimacy of the Board's authority to act

under the will and trusts of Mary Baker Eddy. See, e.g. , United Christian

Scientists v. First Church of Christ, Scientist , 829 F.2d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 7) (holding that a private law granting to TFCCS an exclusive copy-

right to Mary Baker Eddy's work, Science and Health, A Key to the

Scriptures , contravened the Establishment Clause of the First Amend-

ment).

The university's website was originally located at the address

< http://www.trmi.com/1866.htm> and could be accessed through the site

Robinson maintained for The Roan Mountain Institute.

and periodically sent revisions to the site's content, which Robinson

posted to the UCS site. Thus, while Nolan apparently was solely

responsible for drafting and making judgments regarding the content

of the UCS website, it was Robinson who physically created and

maintained the site from his North Carolina residence. B. On July 23, 1999, the Board filed a trademark infringement suit in

the Western District of North Carolina against Robinson and Nolan

and the two entities with which they were associated, The Roan

Mountain Institute of Christian Science ("TRMI") and UCS, respec-

tively. More specifically, the Board alleged, inter alia, that Nolan and

UCS (collectively, the "Nolan Defendants"), without the Board's per-

mission, used certain marks belonging to the Board, or marks "con-

fusingly similar thereto," in printed materials and on the UCS

website. The Board also alleged that the Nolan Defendants "have held

themselves out as being affiliated with or sponsored by `The Official

Academic Auxiliary of the Board of Education of the Church of

Christ, Scientist.'" J.A. 30. In the Board's view, the Nolan Defendants

included the terms "Church of Christ, Scientist" and "Board of Educa-

tion of the Church of Christ, Scientist" in the content of the website

and printed materials, knowing and intending that the use of such

terms would likely cause confusion, and would mislead the public

into believing that their products and services "emanate from, are

approved, authorized or sponsored by, or are in some way associated

with the Board and/or TFCCS." J.A. 31.

Although the Board's complaint and summons were promptly

served on Robinson and TRMI, service of process on Nolan proved

more difficult. After an unsuccessful attempt to effect service by cer-

tified mail, pursuant to Rule 4(j)(1)(c) of the North Carolina Rules of

Civil Procedure, the Board retained the services of a private investiga-

tor to locate Nolan. The investigator determined that Nolan was resid-

ing in Modesto, California, and a process server was employed to

serve Nolan at that location. The process server, however, was also

unable to serve Nolan, and the Board, attesting that Nolan was

actively evading service of process, sought leave to serve Nolan by

publication, pursuant to Rule 4(j1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The Magistrate Judge for the Western District of

North Carolina granted such leave to the Board by order dated Octo-

ber 20, 1999, and notice was published in the November 16, Novem-

ber 23, and November 30, 1999 editions of The Modesto Bee (a

newspaper of general circulation in Modesto, California).

As the Nolan Defendants failed to answer or otherwise respond to

the Board's complaint, the Board moved the district court for entry

of default judgment against them. 3 By its Judgment ("Default Judg-

ment") and accompanying Memorandum and Order entered on July

, 2001, the district court determined that the Nolan Defendants had

infringed certain of the Board's registered trademarks, in violation of

the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114, and it permanently enjoined the

Nolan Defendants from using those contested marks. The Board

thereafter moved to have the Nolan Defendants held in contempt by

the district court, maintaining that the Nolan Defendants had failed to

comply with the injunction order. On September 6, 2000, the district

court entered an order finding that, although the Nolan Defendants

had received notice of the Default Judgment, they had violated and

continued to violate its terms and provisions. Accordingly, the Nolan

Defendants were ordered to appear on September 25, 2000, and to

show cause, if they could, why they should not be adjudged in civil

contempt of court.

Nolan at last mobilized to oppose the Board's motion for an order

of contempt, asserting that the Default Judgment was void for lack of

personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, for invalid service of process.

Robinson, appearing pro se, filed an answer on behalf of himself and

TRMI (collectively, the "Robinson Defendants"), and an injunction was

issued by the district court for the Western District of North Carolina

against the Robinson Defendants on July 5, 2000, followed, on October

, 2000, by an order holding them in civil contempt. See Christian Sci-

ence Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Robinson , 123

F. Supp. 2d 965 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (cited infra at 9). Although the Robin-

son Defendants and the Nolan Defendants were co-defendants in this liti-

gation Ð and indeed were held in civil contempt by the same October

, 2000 order Ð the Robinson Defendants unsuccessfully challenged the

district court's injunction in a separate appeal resolved by this Court ear-

lier this year. See Christian Science Bd. of Dirs. of the First Church of

Christ, Scientist v. Robinson , 243 F.3d 536 (4th Cir. 2001) (unpublished

table decision).

The district court rejected both of these assertions by order entered on

September 20, 2000; two days later, the court addressed the balance

of Nolan's arguments for Rule 60 relief, concluding that no "excep-

tional circumstances" were present to justify setting aside the Default

Judgment. 4 Nolan immediately noticed an appeal to this Court from

the September 20, 2000 order, and concurrently moved in the district

court to stay enforcement of the injunction pending appeal.

Accordingly, at its September 25, 2000 contempt hearing, the dis-

trict court considered the Nolan Defendants' motion for a stay, along

with the Board's motion to find them in contempt of the Default Judg-

ment. On October 4, 2000, the district court ruled in favor of the

Board as to both motions. See Christian Science Bd. of Dirs. of the

First Church of Christ, Scientist v. Robinson , 123 F.Supp.2d 965

(W.D.N.C. 2000). The district court held, more particularly, that its

exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Nolan Defendants offended

neither the North Carolina long-arm statute nor constitutional due

process concerns. See id. at 971-76. Moreover, the district court ruled

that the Nolan Defendants were unlikely to prevail on the merits of

their Lanham Act challenge, i.e., their objections that the offending

website did not satisfy the Act's requirement that the protected mark

be used "in connection with the sale . . . distribution or advertising of

any goods or services," and that, in any case, the website involved

protected speech exempt from the Lanham Act's proscriptions. See id. at 969-71. Having affirmed the validity of the underlying Default

Judgment, the district court then found the Nolan Defendants in con-

tinuing defiance thereof and held them both in civil contempt. See id. at 978. The Nolan Defendants timely appealed the district court's

contempt order of October 4, 2000. We possess jurisdiction over these

appeals Ð encompassing both the September 22, 2000 and October

, 2000 orders Ð pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1291.

Rule 60(b) provides, in relevant part, that the district court

may relieve a party or party's legal representative from a final

judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (4) the

judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released,

or discharged . . .; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from

the operation of the judgment[.]

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). II. A. The fundamental question on appeal Ð whether the Nolan Defen-

dants' contacts with North Carolina were sufficient to support the dis-

trict court's exercise of personal jurisdiction Ð is a question of law

which we review de novo. See Koehler v. Dodwell , 152 F.3d 304, 307

(4th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). It is axiomatic that, in order for a

district court to validly assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident

defendant, two conditions must be satisfied. First, the exercise of

jurisdiction must be authorized by the long-arm statute of the forum

state, and, second, the exercise of personal jurisdiction must also

comport with Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements. See,

e.g. , Stover v. O'Connell Assocs. Inc. , 84 F.3d 132, 134 (4th Cir. 4).

The North Carolina long-arm statute provides, inter alia, for juris-

diction over any validly-served defendant who "is engaged in substan-

tial activity within [North Carolina]," see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-

.4(1)d, or whose act or omission gave rise to an action claiming

injury to person or property in North Carolina, see N.C. Gen. Stat.

§ 1-75.4(3). Like those of many other states, North Carolina's long-

arm statute is construed to extend jurisdiction over nonresident defen-

dants to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause. See Cen-

tury Data Systems, Inc. v. McDonald , 428 S.E.2d 190, 191 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993). Thus, the dual jurisdictional requirements collapse into

a single inquiry as to whether the defendant has such "minimal con-

tacts" with the forum state that "maintenance of the suit does not

offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" See

Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington , 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citations

omitted).

Here, as the district court duly observed, the Nolan Defendants

clearly were not engaged in such "substantial" or "continuous and sys-

tematic" activities in North Carolina to subject themselves to the dis-

trict court's general jurisdiction. See Christian Science Bd. , 123 F. Supp. 2d at 974 (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall , 466 U.S. 408, 414-16 (1984)). 5 Our analysis must focus, then,

In contrast to "specific" jurisdiction, a court exercises "general" juris-

diction over a defendant "in a suit not arising out of or related to the

on whether the Board's trademark infringement suit sufficiently arises

from, or relates to, the Nolan Defendants' contacts with North Caro-

lina to support an exercise of specific jurisdiction. See id. Like the

district court before us, we must examine three factors to determine

whether specific jurisdiction was appropriate: First, to what extent did

the Nolan Defendants "purposefully avail" themselves of the privi-

leges of conducting activities in North Carolina and thus invoke the

benefits and protections of its laws; second, did the Board's claims

arise out of those North Carolina-related activities; and, finally, was

the exercise of jurisdiction constitutionally "reasonable." See id. ; Bur-

ger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 471 U.S. 462, 472, 476-77 (1985).

Applying these factors, the district court concluded that the Nolan

Defendants had indeed taken "direct actions to create a connection

with North Carolina by enlisting Robinson to download their web

page design onto his domain, located and maintained in North Caro-

lina," and then consistently sending information, including solicita-

tions for contributions and sales of merchandise, to Robinson for use

on the UCS website. See id. As to the second requirement, there is no

dispute that the material drafted and transmitted by Nolan formed the

basis for the alleged infringement. Arriving at the third, "reasonable-

ness" inquiry, the district court restated its finding that the Nolan

Defendants, through Robinson, had targeted their activities toward

North Carolina. The district court characterized the website as an "in-

teractive" one, 6 engaged in the transaction of business within North

Carolina, and thus concluded that it was proper to subject the Nolan

Defendants to the forum's jurisdiction.

We agree with the district court that the conditions set forth by the

Supreme Court in Burger King regarding the permissible exercise of

specific personal jurisdiction are fully satisfied in this case. In chal-

lenging the district court's decision, the Nolan Defendants strain to

argue that the "purposeful availment" condition was absent here,

because Nolan neither actively solicited Robinson's services nor com-

pensated them. Instead, the Nolan Defendants insist, Robinson volun-

defendant's contacts with the forum." See Helicopteros Nacionales , 466

U.S. at 414, nn. 8-9.

See discussion of website interactivity in Part II.B, infra .

teered to develop and maintain the offending website Ð an offer

which Nolan "passively" accepted. See Appellants' Br., at 21. We are

unconvinced by the distinction advanced by the Nolan Defendants. A

prospective defendant need not initiate the relevant "minimum con-

tacts" to be regarded as purposefully availing himself of the privileges

of conducting activity in the forum state. But see Burger King , 471

U.S. at 475 (nonresident defendant may not be "haled into a jurisdic-

tion solely as a result of `random,' `fortuitous,' or `attenuated' con-

tacts, or the `unilateral activity of another party or a third person'")

(citations omitted). Here, it is evident that Robinson's invitation was

extended within the context of his friendship and ongoing correspon-

dence with Nolan, and that Robinson hoped to assist a fellow Chris-

tian Science practitioner disseminate information and, at least

prospectively, sell religious products and services. 7 Although Nolan

was solely responsible for preparing Ð and, periodically, altering Ð

the content of the UCS website, he depended on Robinson to establish

and maintain the actual site. 8 Nolan's connection to North Carolina

was by no means fortuitous or unwitting. Rather, Nolan deliberately

entered a collaborative enterprise with Robinson, well aware that any

potentially tortious content he created would be physically uploaded

by a North Carolina resident working on a computer in North Caro-

lina. See id. (jurisdiction is proper "where the defendant `deliberately'

The original UCS website, as posted on June 21, 1999, represented

that the online university would eventually include such features as "a

weekly live Lecture Series utilizing Real Audio," "a University Press

which [would] produce an electronic quarterly publication titled, The

Christian Science Digest," and "a well stocked Campus Book Store for

the purchase of anything and everything that pertains to Christian Sci-

ence and Mary Baker Eddy[.]" See J.A. 69.

The Board would have us characterize Robinson as Nolan's agent;

assuming that such an agency relationship existed, Robinson's activities

in North Carolina would be attributable to Nolan as principal. See Appel-

lee's Br., at 21-22. We are reluctant, however, to conclude that Nolan

possessed the requisite degree of control to establish an agency relation-

ship. See, e.g. , Peace River Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Ward Transformer Co.,

Inc. , 449 S.E.2d 202, 210-11 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) ("Our cases empha-

size that the element of `control' is the primary indicator of an agency

relationship."). Even in the absence of a formal principal/agent relation-

ship, Nolan's coordination with, and reliance upon, Robinson nonethe-

less constituted substantial contacts with North Carolina.

has engaged in significant activities within a State, or has created

`continuing obligations' between himself and residents of the

forum'") (citations omitted). 9

Having contented ourselves that the Nolan Defendants "purpose-

fully availed" themselves of the privileges of conducting activity in

North Carolina, and that the Board's claims arise from that activity,

we arrive at the third Burger King factor. Although constitutional rea-

sonableness is a somewhat nebulous concept, we are confident that

the district court's assertion of jurisdiction over the Nolan Defendants

comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."

See Int'l Shoe , 326 U.S. at 320. In determining whether jurisdiction

is constitutionally reasonable, we may evaluate "the burden on the

defendant, the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the

plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the

interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient res-

olution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States

in furthering fundamental substantive social policies." See Burger

King , 471 U.S. at 477 (internal quotation marks omitted). More gener-

ally, our reasonableness analysis is designed to ensure that jurisdic-

tional rules are not exploited "in such a way as to make litigation `so

gravely difficult and inconvenient' that a party unfairly is at a `severe

disadvantage' in comparison to his opponent.'" Id. at 478.

Citing Amberson Holdings LLC v. Westside Story Newspaper , 110 F. Supp. 2d 332 (D.N.J. 2000), the Nolan Defendants assert that the mere

transmission of content to a server located in the forum state cannot sup-

port the exercise of personal jurisdiction. While that may be true, it is not

the situation presented here. As the de facto webmaster, Robinson took

an active role in creating and updating the UCS website Ð a site which,

incidentally, was operated on a California server. Nolan's ongoing com-

munications with Robinson quite clearly transcended the de minimis con-

tacts contemplated in Amberson Holdings . See id. at 336 (analogizing

access to a website, through a server physically located in the forum

state, to "forwarding calls to a desired number through a switchboard").

Indeed, in denying jurisdiction, the Amberson Holdings court specifically

pointed out that the "administration, maintenance, and upkeep of defen-

dants' website" had occurred in a state other than the forum. See id. at

.

Although defending a lawsuit in North Carolina was, without

doubt, inconvenient for Nolan, the inconvenience was not so grave as

to offend constitutional due process principles. The Board's decision

to bring suit in North Carolina, rather than in its home state of Massa-

chusetts, imposed no additional burden on Nolan, while reducing the

burden on his co-defendant Robinson. Thus, North Carolina was a rel-

atively sensible choice in terms of promoting judicial efficiency.

Moreover, we must reject the suggestion that North Carolina had no

interest in the suit. Surely, North Carolina's interest in deterring trade-

mark infringement is implicated by the postings of allegedly infring-

ing materials by a North Carolina resident to a website accessible

through a North Carolina-based domain. 10 In short, the district court's

exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over the Nolan Defendants

is consistent with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-

tice." B. In their effort to resist the district court's jurisdiction, the Nolan

Defendants direct our attention to an emerging series of court deci-

sions addressing the extent to which a nonresident defendant's web-

site may constitute the sole basis for a court's exercise of jurisdiction.

Invoking the now-familiar "sliding scale" of interactivity set forth in

Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc. , 952 F. Supp. 1119,

3 (W.D. Pa. 1997) Ð under which the validity of jurisdiction

depends on the "level of interactivity and commercial nature of the

exchange of information" of the defendant's website Ð the Nolan

Defendants maintain that the UCS website was essentially "passive"

and therefore should not expose them to the district court's jurisdic-

tion. See Appellant's Br., at 23-28. This Court has not addressed the

propriety of exercising jurisdiction over a defendant whose only con-

tact with the forum state consists of a website accessible by residents

We note, though, that North Carolina residents were not necessarily

injured to a greater extent than residents of other states. Although the dis-

trict court suggested that the Nolan defendants "targeted" North Carolina

by using a website accessible through a North Carolina domain, see

Christian Science Bd. , 123 F. Supp. 2d at 974-75, it is not clear to what

extent, if any, Robinson's TRMI domain was actually directed at North

Carolina residents, or accessed disproportionately by them.

of the forum. While this is an important question Ð and one which

has garnered considerable attention Ð we need not resolve it in this

case, because the Nolan Defendants had specific contacts with North

Carolina providing an independent and valid basis for personal jurisdic-

tion. 11 III. Although the Nolan Defendants' appeals focus primarily on their

personal jurisdiction challenge, several other issues have been

presented for our review.

First, the Nolan Defendants assign error to the district court's

refusal to set aside the Default Judgment on the grounds that Nolan

was never properly served. Unable to serve Nolan personally, the

Board sought and received leave of court to serve by publication.

Nolan concedes that he received actual notice of the litigation prior

to the entry of the Default Judgment, but maintains that the Default

Judgment should nevertheless be set aside because service was

effected by publication in California, rather than in Arizona. Under

Rule 4(j1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, notice by

We note in passing that the offending website was not entirely pas-

sive, insofar as it invited visitors to the site to e-mail questions and infor-

mation requests to Nolan. Although the site anticipated future

interactivity, e.g., "chat rooms" and book sales, the site was only mini-

mally interactive when the Board filed its complaint. Had the Board

brought suit in another, unrelated forum Ð South Carolina, for instance

Ð we would be more hesitant to allow the exercise of personal jurisdic-

tion over the Nolan Defendants. See, e.g. , Mink v. AAAA Dev. LLC , 190

F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 1999) (refusing to allow personal jurisdiction

over defendant whose only connection with forum was a website provid-

ing users with a printable mail-in order form, a toll-free telephone num-

ber, and defendant's mailing address). We are convinced, though, that

Nolan's relationship with Robinson Ð specifically, the benefit Nolan

derived from Robinson's North Carolina-based activities Ð was a rea-

sonable basis for the district court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. Cf. Designs88 Ltd. v. Power Uptik Prods., LLC , 133 F. Supp. 2d 873, 877

(W.D.Va. 2001) (allowing Virginia court to exercise jurisdiction over

nonresident defendants in partnership dispute involving a website

designed, implemented, and maintained by plaintiffs in Virginia).

publication may be effected "in the area where the party to be served

is believed by the serving party to be located." The Board ran its

notice in The Modesto Bee , based on its reasonable belief that Nolan

was in Modesto, California; moreover, Nolan admits receiving the

copy of the notice that was mailed to him. Nolan's argument that he

was never properly served is therefore without merit.

We are similarly unpersuaded by the Nolan Defendants' contention

that they were entitled to Rule 60(b) relief from the Default Judgment

entered against them. Given that Nolan was concededly aware of the

Board's suit, and yet failed to respond or appear prior to the entry of

the Default Judgment, we will not disturb the district court's denial

of Rule 60(b) relief upon its finding that the Nolan Defendants'

neglect was inexcusable.

More substantively, the Nolan Defendants insist that the UCS web-

site did not violate the Lanham Act, and that the district court abused

its discretion in denying their motion to stay the injunction pending

appeal. After careful consideration, we see no error in the district

court's conclusion that the Nolan Defendants were unlikely to suc-

ceed on the merits "on the issue of whether their conduct falls within

that proscribed by the Lanham Act." See 123 F. Supp. 2d at 971. In

the circumstances presented, there was no abuse of discretion in the

district court's ruling.

Finally, the Nolan Defendants challenge the district court's entry

of the civil contempt order, based on its finding that the Nolan Defen-

dants continued to display infringing marks on the UCS website, in

knowing violation of a valid injunction. As we have already con-

cluded, see supra Part II, the Default Judgment was not void for lack

of jurisdiction. The Nolan Defendants maintain, however, that modifi-

cations to the UCS website, along with the inclusion of a disclaimer

disavowing any affiliation with the Board, rendered their conduct

noncontemptuous. We must conclude that the district court acted well

within its discretion in determining that the website, even as modified,

still did not comply with the terms of the Default Judgment, and thus

holding the Nolan Defendants in civil contempt. IV. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the district court's order

of September 22, 2000, denying the Nolan Defendants' Motion for

Relief from Judgment, and we also affirm its order of October 4,

0, holding the Nolan Defendants in civil contempt and denying their Motion for a Stay of the Injunction. AFFIRMED