[D O NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

MARCH 6, 2006

THOMAS K. KAHN

N o . 05-15086

CLERK

N o n - A r g u m e n t Calendar

D . C. Docket No. 04-01563-CV-T-30-TGW

C O N S T A N T IN E VLAMAKIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

A p p e al from the United States District Court

fo r the Middle District of Florida

(M a rch 6, 2006)

B efo re ANDERSON, BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges.

P E R CURIAM:

C o n stan tin e Vlamakis, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's

d ecisio n , affirming the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of disability in su ran ce benefits. We affirm.

On April 29, 2004, the Administrative Law Judge issued a decision, co n clu d in g that Vlamakis did not suffer from a disability for purposes of receiving b e n e f its for the time period of 1993 to 1997. The ALJ found that Vlamakis had s ev e r al impairments, including gastro esophageal reflux disease, anxiety disorder w ith panic attacks, and hypertension. However, he found that these impairments w ere not "`severe' enough to meet or medically equal, either singly or in co m b in atio n " an impairment listed in the regulations. The ALJ found that during th e relevant time period, Vlamakis could work in a reduced stress environment and th at his need for such a work environment did not significantly erode his o ccu p atio n al base for light work. Accordingly, the ALJ denied Vlamakis benefits.

The Appeals Council denied his request for review, making the ALJ's decision the fin al decision of the Commissioner. See Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (1 1 th Cir. 2001).

In July of 2004, Vlamakis sought review in the district court, requesting that th e court set aside the Commissioner's decision or remand the case to the C o m m issio n er for consideration of a letter which Vlamakis received after the A L J 's decision. The July 13, 2004 letter, written by Vlamakis' general p ractitio n er, Dr. Lawrence Gaulkin, stated that "Vlamakis was under my care from A u g u st 19, 1994 through November 17, 1998 during which time I treated him for c h r o n ic generalized anxiety, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia." The magistrate judge recommended that the district court affirm the C o m m is sio n e r's decision because there was insufficient evidence to support V lam ak is' claim. The magistrate found that Dr. Gaulkin's letter did not warrant a r em a n d because it was not new, noncumulative, or material evidence, and there w as no reason it could not have been submitted prior to the ALJ's decision. The d istrict court adopted the magistrate's recommendation and affirmed the denial of b e n e f its .

Vlamakis contends that the Commissioner erred in finding that he was not d isab led due to his anxiety disorder. First, he argues that the evidence proves he w as disabled. Second, he argues that the ALJ should never have used a grid system to determine whether he was disabled because it has no bearing in a case in v o lv in g mental disability. Third, Vlamakis argues that the ALJ's findings were flaw ed because: (1) the ALJ said that he was not treated by Dr. Gaulkin for an x iety but later states that he prescribed him anti-anxiety drugs; (2) the ALJ m in im ized the severity of his anxiety and hypertension; (3) the ALJ incorrectly stated that he "gave up" his business in 1993, when he was forced to stop working b ecau se of his anxiety; and (5) the ALJ incorrectly stated the name of the drug he to o k to attend the hearing.

We review the Commissioner's decision to determine if it is supported by su b stan tial evidence and based upon correct legal standards. Lewis v. Callahan, 1 2 5 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is "such relevant ev id en ce as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," a n d "more than a mere scintilla." Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1 9 9 8 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). "We do not re-weigh the evidence or su b stitu te our judgment for that of the [Commissioner]; instead, we review the en tire record to determine if the decision reached is reasonable and supported by su b stan tial evidence." Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991) (in tern al quotation marks omitted). Vlamakis bears the burden of proving that his an x iety disorder was a severe impairment. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278. To be se v er e, an impairment must be great enough to "significantly [limit a] claimant's p h ysical or mental ability to do basic work activities." Crayton v. Callahan, 120 F .3 d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997).

As evidence of the severity of his anxiety disorder, Vlamakis introduced Dr.

G au lk in 's handwritten notes. A note from Vlamakis' August 19, 1994 a p p o in tm e n t mentions that Vlamakis had a history of anxiety, but does not report an y specific complaints. The note from July 16, 1996 mentions that Vlamakis co m p lain ed of anxiety and that he was prescribed an anti-anxiety drug. The note fro m July 30, 1996 describes Vlamakis as cheerful and does not further discuss an x iety. Vlamakis also submitted notes from Dr. Joel Esptein, his psychologist sin ce 2003. Dr. Epstein's notes do not discuss Vlamakis' condition during the relev an t time period.

First, based on this evidence, the ALJ reasonably concluded that although V lam ak is had an anxiety impairment, it was not so severe that he could not p e r fo r m light work between 1993 and 1997. The evidence Vlamakis points to does n o t prove that his anxiety was so severe that it limited his physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. See Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278; Crayton, 120 F.3d at 1 2 1 9 . The ALJ therefore properly determined that Vlamakis was not disabled for th e purposes of receiving benefits.

Second, Vlamakis does not show that he had a non-exertional impairment th at was severe enough to foreclose the ALJ's use of the grids. See Wolfe v. C h a te r, 86 F.3d 1072, 1078 (11th Cir. 1996). Third, of all the other errors alleg ed ly made by the ALJ, the only error demonstrated in the record is that the A L J misnamed the drug Vlamakis took in order to attend the hearing. This m istak e did not harm Vlamakis in any way, particularly since we are only co n cern ed with his condition from 1993 to 1997. For all of these reasons, s u b s ta n tia l evidence supports the ALJ's conclusion that Vlamakis was not disabled fo r the purposes of receiving disability insurance benefits.

Additionally, Vlamakis contends that the district court erred in declining to r em a n d his case to the ALJ on the basis of Dr. Gaulkin's July 13, 2004 letter b ec au se it proves he suffered from anxiety. We review de novo the district court's d eterm in atio n whether to remand the case based on new evidence. Vega v. C o m m 'r of Soc. Sec., 265 F.3d 1214, 1218 (11th Cir. 2001). A court "may at any tim e order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of Social S ecu rity, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is material and th a t there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into the record in a prior proceeding." 42U.S.C. § 405(g). A case should be remanded based on n ew evidence if the applicant shows that: "(1) there is new, noncumulative ev id en ce; (2) the evidence is material, that is, relevant and probative so there is a r ea so n a b le probability that it would change the administrative result; and (3) there is good cause for the failure to submit the evidence at the administrative level." Id.

(in tern al quotation marks omitted). The non-cumulative requirement is satisfied by th e production of new evidence not contained in the administrative record. See C an n o n v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 1541, 1546 (11th Cir. 1988). Such evidence must relate to the time period on or before the date of the ALJ's decision. 20 C.F.R. § 4 0 4 .9 7 0 (b ). The materiality requirement is satisfied if "a reasonable possibility ex ists that the new evidence would change the administrative result." Falge, 150 F .3 d at 1323.

The evidence in this case, which consists of a short statement that Dr.

G au lk in treated Vlamakis for anxiety, is neither new, nor material. Dr. Gaulkin's n o tes already contained statements regarding his treatment of Vlamakis for an x iety. Those same notes provide a better description of Vlamakis' condition th an the letter does. The letter adds nothing new to the record and there is no reaso n ab le possibility it would change the ALJ's decision. Furthermore, although th e letter did not exist at the time of the administrative proceedings, Vlamakis has n o t shown good cause for not obtaining a letter from Dr. Gaulkin at an earlier date.

The evidence upon which Dr. Gaulkin's letter was based had been available since 1 9 9 7 , several years before the administrative proceedings began. Accordingly, the d istrict court did not err in declining to remand the case to the Commissioner on th e basis of Dr. Gaulkin's letter.

AFFIRMED.