[D O NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED

U .S . COURT OF APPEALS

E L E V E N T H CIRCUIT

O c to b e r 17, 2006

N o . 06-10071 T H O M A S K. KAHN

N o n - A r g u m e n t Calendar CLERK

D . C. Docket No. 04-02420-CV-TWT-1

C Y N T H IA LIPSCOMB,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

A p p e al from the United States District Court

fo r the Northern District of Georgia

(O cto b er 17, 2006)

B efo re BIRCH, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.

P E R CURIAM:

C yn th ia Lipscomb appeals the district court's order affirming the

C o m m issio n er's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits, 4 2U.S.C. § 405(g), and supplemental security income, 42U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).

After review, we REVERSE and REMAND to the district court.

I. BACKGROUND The magistrate judge's report, which references the administrative law ju d g e 's ("ALJ") decision stating the relevant facts, accurately recites the medical ev id en ce and procedural history of this case, and therefore, it is unnecessary for us to recount it here. On appeal, Lipscomb argues that the ALJ failed to properly a d d r e ss the significance of Lipscomb's anemia when determining her residual fu n ctio n al capacity ("RFC"). Lipscomb also argues the ALJ failed to properly co n sid er the side-effects of Lipscomb's medications. Lipscomb contends that the d istrict court erred in failing to remand the case to the ALJ for consideration of "n ew evidence." Lipscomb asserts that the ALJ failed to show good cause for r eje ctin g Dr. Abdol Azaran's opinions. Finally, Lipscomb contends the ALJ erred in failing to recontact Dr. Kim Hammerberg for clarification of his medical o p in io n .

II. DISCUSSION O u r review in this case is to determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were ap p lied . See Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997).

"Substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla, i.e., evidence that must do m o r e than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established, and such relev an t evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the co n clu sio n ." Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, we do not reweigh the evidence or s u b s titu te our judgment for that of the Commissioner, but instead review the entire r ec o r d . Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1997).

L ip sco m b argues the ALJ failed to explain adequately the significance of L ip s c o m b 's anemia when formulating Lipscomb's RFC. If a claimant alleges m o re than one impairment, the ALJ must consider the impairments in combination in order to determine whether the claimant is disabled. Jones v. Dep't of Health & H u m an Servs., 941 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1991) (per curiam). Where the ALJ fin d s that the claimant suffers from a severe combination of impairments, the ALJ m u st consider that combination of impairments throughout the entire disability d eterm in atio n process. 20 C.F.R. § 416.923; see also Davis v. Shalala, 985 F.2d 5 2 8 , 532 (11th Cir. 1993). Should the ALJ fail to consider properly a plaintiff's co n d itio n despite evidence in the record of diagnosis, remand is required. Vega v. C o m m 'r of Soc. Sec., 265 F.3d 1214, 1219 (11th Cir. 2001). T h e ALJ made it clear during step two of the five-step sequential evaluation p ro cess that Lipscomb's primary source of restriction was congenital scoliosis.

More important, the ALJ stated, "[Lipscomb] has other conditions, none of which im p o ses any significant and additional limitation of function." R2 at 14. The ALJ co n sid ered Lipscomb's anemia to be among these "other conditions." Id.

(sp ecifically considering her diagnosis of "iron deficient anemia"). Accordingly, th e ALJ properly explained his views on Lipscomb's anemia.

Additionally, the ALJ's conclusions regarding Lipscomb's anemia are su p p o rted by substantial evidence. See Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560. During the ad m in istrativ e hearing, Lipscomb failed to mention her anemia. Also, none of the m ed ical reports indicate Lipscomb suffered from significant limitations specifically d u e to her anemia. While Dr. Janet Riddle noted on an RFC form that Lipscomb h ad iron-deficiency anemia that caused fatigue, Dr. Riddle did not list any lim itatio n s caused by Lipscomb's fatigue. In addition, Dr. Shahla Zaidi made one n o tatio n acknowledging that Lipscomb had anemia, but he did not list any lim itatio n s related to the condition. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the A L J 's findings regarding Lipscomb's anemia.

N ex t, Lipscomb argues that the ALJ failed to consider the side-effects of L ip sco m b 's medications. An ALJ has a duty to investigate the possible sid e-effects of medications taken by a claimant. See Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F .2 d 731, 737 (11th Cir. 1981). When there is no evidence that a claimant is taking m ed icatio n s that cause side-effects, the ALJ is not required to elicit testimony or m ak e findings regarding the effect of medications on the claimant. See Passopulos v . Sullivan, 976 F.2d 642, 648 (11th Cir. 1992).

L ip sco m b testified that she was taking a variety of medications, one of w h ic h , Lorazepam, made her dizzy and paranoid. Lipscomb also stated that her sco lio sis and her high blood pressure caused dizziness and lightheadedness.

During the RFC analysis, the ALJ did not separately address the amount and im p act of the dizziness and lightheadedness caused by each of these three sources.

Instead, the ALJ generally stated that Lipscomb "experiences dizziness and lig h th e a d e d n e s s that often require her to lie down." R2 at 18. The ALJ then stated th a t he did not find that, "[Lipscomb's] testimony supports limitations greater than th o se determined in this decision[.]" Id. "[T]here is no rigid requirement that the A L J specifically refer to every piece of evidence in his decision." Dyer v. B a rn h a rt, 395 F.3d 1206, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). Therefore, it was u n n ec es sa ry for the ALJ to discuss specifically each potential cause of Lipscomb's d izzin ess when determining the scope of Lipscomb's limitations.

Also, substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings on the effects of L ip s c o m b 's medications. At the administrative hearing, Lipscomb stated that L o razep am made her dizzy and paranoid. But she also testified that she took the L o r a ze p a m at bedtime, and thus, it is reasonable to infer that she did not suffer sig n ifican t limitations. Lipscomb failed to mention any other side-effects or s p e cif ic limitations caused by her other medications. In fact, Lipscomb testified th at her doctor told her that her dizziness probably was due to her high blood p ressu re. While Lipscomb points to two instances when she complained of d iz zin e s s to her doctors, there is no indication that Lipscomb's dizziness was ever c o n n e cte d to her medication. In addition, Dr. Riddle noted on an RFC medical f o r m that Lipscomb had no medication side-effects. Accordingly, substantial ev id en ce supports the ALJ's findings regarding the effects of Lipscomb's m e d ic a tio n s .

L ip s c o m b also contends that new evidence from Dr. Hammerberg, her tr ea tin g orthopedic surgeon, required remand under 42U.S.C. § 405(g). We "may at any time order additional evidence to be taken before the Commissioner of S o cial Security, but only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is m a te ria l and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence in to the record in a prior proceeding." 42U.S.C. § 405(g). We review de novo the d is tr ic t court's determination regarding whether to remand to the Commissioner b ased on new evidence. Vega, 265 F.3d at 1218. We will remand a case based on n ew evidence if the applicant shows that: "(1) there is new, noncumulative ev id en ce; (2) the evidence is `material,' that is, relevant and probative so there is a r ea so n a b le possibility that it would change the administrative result; and (3) there is good cause for the failure to submit the evidence at the administrative level." Milano v. Bowen, 809 F.2d 763, 765-66 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). Such ev id en ce must relate to the time period on or before the date of the ALJ's decision.

20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b).

U p o n thorough review of the record and careful consideration of the parties' b r ie fs , we find that the district court erred in failing to remand this case for review o f the new evidence. The evidence, a March 2005 questionnaire completed by Dr.

H a m m e rb e r g , is new and noncumulative because no similar evidence was p resen ted at the administrative hearing. See Cannon v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 1541, 1 5 4 6 (11th Cir. 1988). The good cause requirement is also satisfied. The March 2 0 0 5 questionnaire did not exist at the time of the administrative proceedings. See C h erry v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 1186, 1192 (11th Cir. 1985). Furthermore, the C o m m issio n er does not contend nor is there any evidence to suggest that the M arch 2005 questionnaire reflects any bad faith attempt by Lipscomb to m an ip u late the administrative process. See Milano, 809 F.2d at 767. Additionally, D r. Hammerberg indicated that his questionnaire answers related to his perception o f Lipscomb's condition as it existed prior to the ALJ's decision. Specifically, Dr.

H am m erb erg reviewed: (1) his own treatment records, dated 10 February 2000, to 2 2 November 2002; (2) the treatment records of Dr. Azaran, dated 25 September 1 9 9 6 , to 9 June 2003; (3) the treatment records of Dr. Zaidi, dated 29 March 2002, to 30 June 2002; and (4) the exam records of Dr. Riddle, dated 29 December 2002.

Therefore, the new evidence relates to the time period on or before the ALJ's d ecisio n . See 20 C.F.R. § 404.970(b).

Finally, the new evidence is "`material,' that is, relevant and probative so th a t there is a reasonable possibility that it would change the administrative result." See Caulder v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 872, 877 (11th Cir. 1986). Importantly, the ALJ f o u n d that Dr. Hammerberg's earlier findings were "other substantial evidence" an d "entitled to greater weight in the evaluation of disability." R2 at 17. The ALJ h e a v ily relied on Dr. Hammerberg's medical reports and opinions when d eterm in in g Lipscomb's RFC. In making the RFC determination, the ALJ found th at the medical reports of Drs. Azaran and Hammerberg were inconsistent. The A L J then limited the weight given to Dr. Azaran's opinions because, among other th in g s , "Dr. Azaran is not a specialist in orthopedics and his conclusions are in co n sisten t with the well-supported findings of Dr. Hammerberg, an orthopedic su rg eo n ." Id. But in the March 2005 questionnaire, after having reviewed his and o th er doctors' treatment records, Dr. Hammerberg agreed with two of Dr. Azaran's o p in io n s on Lipscomb's capabilities. Specifically, Dr. Hammerberg indicated that th e limitations imposed by Dr. Azaran in January and February 2002 were r e a s o n a b le .

The ALJ also relied on a form Dr. Hammerberg filled out in November 2 0 0 2 to reject Lipscomb's evidence that she was unable to bend, stoop, pull, lift, or reach without pain. But Dr. Hammerberg did not completely fill out that form, leav in g blank the question regarding whether Lipscomb needed to change positions o r posture due to pain more than once every two hours. In the March 2005 q u e stio n n a ir e, however, Dr. Hammerberg indicates that Lipscomb's medical c o n d itio n can reasonably be expected to cause "a need to alternate at will between s ittin g and standing during the day due to fatigue, or to obtain relief from pain." R1-19 at unenumerated attachment.

Given the credit the ALJ gave to Dr. Hammerberg and because Dr.

H am m erb erg provided more specific opinions about Lipscomb's capabilities in the M arch 2005 questionnaire, it is possible that the new evidence, if credited, could ch an g e the administrative result. For these reasons, we remand this case so that the A L J can consider this new evidence. We decline to review the issue of whether the A L J properly limited the weight of Dr. Azaran's opinion because the ALJ's co n sid eratio n of the new evidence may impact the analysis of that issue.

Furthermore, the question of whether the ALJ erred in failing to contact Dr.

H am m erb erg for clarification of his opinion is moot.

W e reverse the opinion of the district court and remand this case to the d is tr ic t court with instructions to remand to the Commissioner for further p ro ceed in g s consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED