* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-51159 Summary Calendar JEREMY DUNCAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus F. WHITTEN PETERS, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, Defendants-Appellees. DEBRA L. DUNCAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus F. WHITTEN PETERS, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE, Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from United States District Court for the Western District of Texas (USDC Nos. SA-98-CV-486 & 98-CV-487) July 27, 1999 Before POLITZ, BARKSDALE and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge: * The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees on the basis of Feres v. United States , 340 U.S. 135 (1950) and Gaspard v. United States , 713 F.2d 1097 (5 th Cir. 1983). In F eres, the Court held that members of the armed forces could not bring a claim against the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act (§ 1346(b) (1994), for injuries that “arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.” 340 U.S. at 146. In Gaspard , we observed that the Feres doctrine extended to bar suits by relatives of service members, when a “crucial element” of the relativeÂ’s claim is the in-service injury to the service member. 713 F.2d at 1102. Following G aspard Â’s lead, the court below granted summary judgment because it found that a “crucial element” of Plaintiffs-A ppellantsÂ’ injury was a military investigation into a service member related to them. Because we agree with the reasoning of the district court, we affirm its decision.

F ACTUAL & P ROCEDURAL B ACKGROUND This case begins with a milit ary investigation into the kidnaping and murder of Heidi Seeman, daughter of Air Force Master Sergeant Curtis Seeman. As a possible suspect, Air Force investigators focused on Major Robert Eric Duncan (“Major Duncan”), Seeman’s one-time supervisor. Duncan allegedly made threats against Seeman shortly after Duncan had been reassigned and before Seeman’s daughter was abducted.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Deb ra L. Duncan (“Debra”) and Jeremy Duncan (“Jeremy”) (collectively, “Duncans”) are Major’s Duncan’s wife and son. In separate complaints brought pursuant to the FTCA, the Duncans alleged that Air Force investigators intentionally inflict ed emotional distress upon them. Debra complained that investigators inappropriately contacted her em p loyers, questioning persons there and demanding her personnel records. Jeremy’s complaint involved similar contacts the investigators had with his schools and friends. According to the Duncans’ complaints, at the time of these contacts, the investigators were acting “within the scope of their office or employment” and were hoping to turn Debra and Jeremy against Major Duncan.

Although the DuncansÂ’ complaints named as defendants the Air Fo rce and its Acting Secretary F. Whitten Peters, the United States Attorney entered an appearance in the cases, listing the United States as the defendant and st yling each pleading Duncan v. United States . When the United Sta t es moved to consolidate the two cases, the district court granted the request.

Subsquently, the United States filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on the basis of Feres . The district court granted the GovernmentÂ’s request for summary judgment, holding that the DuncansÂ’ actions were barred by the Feres doctrine.

D ISCUSSION I Relying on Feres , the court below granted summary judgment to the United States. Although we have held that the appropriate course of action, when a court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Feres , is to dismiss the case pursuant to F ED . R. C IV . P. 12(b)(1), we have also held that a district courtÂ’s grant of summary judgment on that basis is harmless error. S ee Capozzoli v. Tracey , 663 F.2d 654, 657 n.2 (5 th Cir. Dec. 1981). We review d e novo a determination that a district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. S ee Schoemer v. United States , 59 F.3d 26, 28 (5 th Cir. 1995).

Such a determination is acceptable only when, accepting as true the facts as set out by the nonmoving party, it appears certain that a plaint iff can prove no set of facts that would justify relief. S ee Saraw Partnership v. United States , 67 F.3d 567, 569 (5 th Cir. 1995).

II We pause to observe that the Duncans brought t heir FTCA actions against DefendantsAppellees the Air Force and Acting Secretary F. Whitten Peters, and not against the United States. 2 Under the express terms of the FTCA, only the United States § 2679(a) (1994). Accordingly, we have held that an FTCA plaintiff “must name the United States as the sole defendant.” See McGuire v. Turnbo , 137 F.3d 321, 324 (5 th Cir. 1998). When a plaintiff has brought a claim against a federal agency or employee, we have dismissed the claim fo r lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. S ee, e.g., Galvin , 860 F.2d at 183; Gregory v. Mitchell , 634 F.2d 199, 204-05 (5 th Cir. 1981); C arr v. Veterans Admin. , 522 F.2d 1355, 1356 (5 th Cir. 1975).

There are certain circumstances present in the case at bar, however, that to our knowledge no court has addressed in this context and which arguably cut against our applying this rule. First, the United States entered a general appearance in this case, even though it had not been named as a defendant in an FTCA suit. Next, when the United States moved to consolidate the cases, it styled the case as one against the United States. Finally, after expressly noting that FTCA actions could be brought only against the United States, the district courtÂ’s judgment also styled the case Duncan v. United States . All this, despite (1) no explicit order substituting the United States as the defendant; and (2) no alteration to the district courtÂ’s docket sheets, which continued to list the Air Force and Acting Secretary Peters as the defendants.

Because we find that the district court correctly dismissed the DuncansÂ’ causes of action, we need not resolve the potentially difficult issue whether the district court should also have dismissed the case on the basis of faulty pleading as well. Accordingly, we turn to the heart of the DuncansÂ’ appeal.

III In 1950, the Feres Court excluded members of the armed forces from the application of the FTCA. Service members are barred from bringing tort suits against the Go vernment for injuries arising out of or in the course of their service. See 340 U.S. at 146. In 1987, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine, citing three rationales for retaining it: (1) that the relationship between the Government and service members is distinctively federal in character, and liability under the FTCA wo uld inappropriately subject the Government to state-law torts; (2) that service members have access to an alternate scheme of benefits; and (3) that suits brought by service members improperly involve the judiciary in sensitive milit ary affairs at the expense of milit ary discipline and effectiveness.

See United States v. Johnson , 481 U.S. 681, 688-90 (1987).

In a case de cided several months before F eres , we held that the dependent of a service member could pursue an FTCA claim against a milit ary hospital that had negligently treated her. S ee Costley v. United States , 181 F.2d 723, 726 (1950). We later explained that C ostley was reconcilable with Feres because the negligent conduct in Costley was “directed to the dependent alone and [did] not involve any decisions by the milit ary toward enlisted personnel.” S cales v. United States , 685 F.2d 970, 974 (5 th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). We cautioned that when a dependent’s suit would place the judiciary “in the position of quest io ning t he propriety of decisions or conduct of fellow members of the Armed Forces,” Feres would apply. I d. Accordingly, we held that a child could not bring an FTCA claim against the United States for a birth defect allegedly caused by a rubella vaccination his mother received during her service in the Air Force. S ee id. Similarly, in G aspard we rejected the claims of wives of se rvice members that radiation exposure to their husbands had independently caused the wives to experience emotional distress. S ee 7 1 3 F.2d at 1101. We observed that, because a “crucial element” of the wives’ claims was the “in-service injury inflict ed on their husbands,” Feres barred the claims. Id. at 1102.

With this background in mind, we agree with the district court that the Duncans’ claims are precluded under F eres and its progeny. Their complaints do not allege that the Government ’s torti ous conduct was “directed to the dependent[s] alone and [did] not involve any decisions by the milit ary toward enlisted personnel.” S cales , 685 F.2d a t 974. Rather, the complaints specifically alleged that when the Air Force investigators contacted Debra’s employers and Jeremy’s schools, the investigators were acting within the scope of their office and hoping ulti m ately to turn Major Duncan’s family against him. This is not a situation like C ostley , in which the milit ary hospital negligently and directly treated only the milit ary dependent. Instead, the circumstances are similar to Scales , in which t he military acted toward the service member but caused injury to the service member’s dependents. The Duncans’ claims are that they suffered injury as a result of an “in-service injury,” specifically the Air Force’s investigation into Major Duncan. S ee Gaspard , 713 F.2d at 1102.

Their suits improperly asked the district court to “question[] the propriety of decisions or conduct of” members of the armed forces, the Air Forces investigators. S cales , 685 F.2d at 974. Therefore, we hold that Feres bars such claims.

C ONCLUSION Because we find that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction under Feres to consider the DuncansÂ’ causes of action, we do not reach the governmentÂ’s additional argument premised on the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM the decision of the district court.

2 Although the parties do not address this aspect of our subject-matter jurisdiction, this court is obliged to do so sua sponte . See In re Bass , 171 F.3d 1016 (5 th Cir. 1999).