[D O NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

OCT 23, 2006

THOMAS K. KAHN

N o . 06-11170

CLERK

N o n - A r g u m e n t Calendar

D . C. Docket No. 05-00057-CV-J-32-MMH

F R E D LORENZO BROOKS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondents-Appellees.

A p p e al from the United States District Court

fo r the Middle District of Florida

(O cto b er 23, 2006)

B efo re BLACK, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

P E R CURIAM:

F lo rid a prisoner Fred Lorenzo Brooks appeals the district court's denial of h is petition for a writ of habeas corpus, brought pursuant to 28U.S.C. § 2254, as b arred by the one-year statute of limitations of the Antiterrorism and Effective D e ath Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), 2 8U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). On May 25, 2000, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed B ro o k s' conviction, but remanded the case for resentencing. Brooks' § 2254 p etitio n only attacked his original conviction, not his resentencing.

Brooks asserts the district court erred in calculating the statute of limitations u n d er the AEDPA from the date the Florida Supreme Court decision became final.

Brooks contends the statute of limitations should have been calculated beginning w ith the date of his resentencing. The district court granted a certificate of ap p ealab ility (COA) limited to this specific issue.

We review de novo the district court's determination that a petition for h ab eas corpus was time-barred under 28U.S.C. § 2244(d). Jones v. Nagle, 349 F .3 d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003). The one-year statute of limitations for filing a w rit of habeas corpus runs from the latest of four triggering dates, including "the d ate on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the ex p iratio n of the time for seeking such review." 28U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). A state p r is o n e r 's conviction becomes final when the U.S. Supreme Court denies certio ra ri or issues a decision on the merits, or when the 90-day period in which to f ile a certiorari petition expires. Bond v. Moore, 309 F.3d 770, 773-74 (11th Cir. 2 0 0 2 ). This time period is tolled during the pendency of a properly filed motion fo r post-conviction relief in state court. 28U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). "When a p etitio n er who has been resentenced brings an application challenging only his o rig in al judgment of conviction, the one-year statute of limitations under the A E D P A runs from the date the original judgment of conviction became final and n o t the date the resentencing judgment became final." Rainey v. Sec'y for the D ep 't of Corr., 443 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11th Cir. 2006).

This case is controlled by our decision in Rainey. Because Brooks' habeas p etitio n challenged only his judgment of conviction, without any challenge to his r es en te n c in g judgment, the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations began when h is judgment of conviction became final. Id. Measuring the limitations period fro m that date, Brooks' habeas petition was untimely. We decline to consider any o th er argument Brooks attempts to raise on appeal because those arguments fall o u tsid e of the scope of the COA. See Murray v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1 2 5 1 (11th Cir. 1998).

AFFIRMED.