* Pursuant to 5 T H C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit FILED December 2, 2003 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 03-20469 Summary Calendar DORRIS N. GLOVER, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. H-01-CV-3843 Before SMITH, DeMOSS, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * Dorris N. Glover appeals the district courtÂ’s summary judgment affirming the CommissionerÂ’s decision to deny her applications for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income pursuant to the Social Security Act. Glover argues that the administrative law judge (ALJ) relied on defective hypothetical questions in denying her disability benefits and that consequently the ALJÂ’s decision was not su pported by substantial evidence; that the ALJ failed to properly consider her s ubjective complaints of pain; and that the ALJ abused her discretion in denying GloverÂ’s request for a medical expert to testify at the hearing. Contrary to GloverÂ’s contentions, the hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert (VE) by the ALJ were not defective, as the questions reasonably incorporated all of the disabilities recognized by the ALJ. Bowling v. Shalala , 36 F.3d 431, 436 (5th Cir. 1994). GloverÂ’s counsel was also given the opportunity to suggest to the VE additional disabilities, including GloverÂ’s pain and the side effects of her pain medication, not recognized by the ALJÂ’s findings. Id. Although Glover contends that the ALJÂ’s findings based on the hypothetical questions were not sufficiently supported, record e vidence adequately supports the disabilities recognized by the ALJ, see id. , and substantial evidence supports the ALJÂ’s finding that GloverÂ’s limitations were not totally disabling. S ee Johnson v. Bowen , 864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (5th Cir. 1988). The ALJ considered all of the evidence presented at the administrative hearing. The ALJ determined that although Glover had severe impairments, she was still capable of performing s ubstantial gainful activity. These findings are supported by the medical records Glover submitted in support of her applications. S ee Johnson , 864 F.2d at 343-44.

Furthermore, the ALJÂ’s determination regarding the disabling nature of GloverÂ’s pain is entitled to considerable deference. C hambliss v. Massanari , 269 F.3d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 2001). In light of this G:\opin-sc\03-20469.opn.wpd standard, and considering the lack of objective medical evidence corroborating GloverÂ’s subjective complaints of pain, we must uphold the ALJÂ’s conclusion that GloverÂ’s alleged pain was not sufficient enough to prevent substantial gainful employment. See id. ; Johnson , 864 F.2d at 347.

Finally, although Glover cont ends that the ALJ abused her discretion in denying her request for a medical expert to testify at her hearing, G lover points to no evidence that, had the ALJ allowed a medical expert to testify, would have been adduced at the hearing and that could have changed the result of the proceeding.

Brock v. Chater , 84 F.3d 726, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1996). B ecause Glover fails to show that she was prejudiced by the ALJÂ’s denial of her request for a medical expert, her argument that the ALJ abused her discretion is without merit. See id. Accordingly, the district courtÂ’s judgment is AFFIRMED.