* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR .

R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-30919 WALTER THOMAS JACKSON, Petitioner-Appellant, versus CARL CASTERLINE, Respondent-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana USDC No. 98-CV-1934 July 14, 2000 Before JOLLY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * Walter T. Jackson was transferred from state custody, where he was awaiting trial on state charges, to federal custody pursuant to a writ o f habeas corpus a d prosequendum . In the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, he was sentenced to 78 months imprisonment, to be followed by 36 months of supervised release, for the crime of assisting offenders in order to hinder and prevent their apprehension by disposing of evidence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3. The sentencing court did not specify whether this federal sentence was t o be served consecutively to or concurrently with JacksonÂ’s pending sentencing in state court on charges of robbery and of receiving stolen property. He was returned to state custody and an Alabama state court subsequently sentenced Jackson to fifteen yearsÂ’ imprisonment for receiving stolen property and two years for robbery, to run concurrently. The state judge ordered that the state sentence be served concurrently with JacksonÂ’s federal sentence.

Imprisoned in a state penitentiary in 1992, Jackson was paroled in 1997. He was then transferred to federal custody to begin serving his federal sentence. Jackson petitioned the Bureau of Prisons to designate, nunc pro tunc , the Alabama state facility as a BOP-authorized facility so that th e time he served in state custody could be credited toward service of his federal sentence.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a)-(b), this petition was rejected, on grounds that such a designation would not be consistent either with the intent of the federal sen tencing court or the goals of the criminal justice system. Jackson then filed this writ under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking review of this administrative denial.

Upon de novo review, see Royal v. Tombone , 141 F.3d 596, 599 (5th Cir. 1998), we conclude that the district court did not err in rejecting JacksonÂ’s petition. Neither the federal sentence nor the sentencing proceedings provided evidence that the sentencing court intended that JacksonÂ’s federal sentence be served c oncurrently with JacksonÂ’s pending state sentence. Because JacksonÂ’s PSR identified the pending state charges, we can assume that the district court like ly was aware of JacksonÂ’s pending state proceeding. Indeed, the federal sentence imposed was at the top of the guideline range, and the sentenc ing judge discussed the possibility of an upward departure beca u se JacksonÂ’s criminal h istory category did not reflect adequately the seriousness o f JacksonÂ’s past criminal behavior.

Given the absence of intent that his federal sentence should run concurrently (and evidence to the contrary), the BOP Regional Director was well within his discretion to deny Jackson§§ 3584(a), 3585(a)-(b); 1 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); BOP Program Statement 5160.03 ¶¶ 5-7. The BOPÂ’s conclusion that JacksonÂ’s request would be inconsistent with the intent of the federal sentencing court or the goals of the criminal justice system appears well-founded in the record. The state courtÂ’s intent that JacksonÂ’s state sentence be served concurrent to his federal sentence is of no effect in this appeal. S ee, e.g. , Jake v. Herschberger , 173 F.3d 1059, 1065-66 (7th Cir. 1999). Finally, Jackson argues that the BOP should have awarded him credit towards his federal sentence for time spent in state custody even though that time was counted towar ds his state sentence.

Because he received credit on his state sentence for the time served before his federal sentence commenced, the BOP was prohibited from awa rding Jackson this credit. S ee 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) (§ 2241 petition. 2 The judgment of the district court is A F F I R M E D. 1 See United States v. Wilson , 503 U.S. 329, 331-32 (1992)(holding that the Att orney General, through the Bureau of Prisons, determines if credit will be awarded to prisoners for time spent in custody prior to the commencement of their federal senten ces). “Credit [on a federal sentence] for state incarceration is given pursuant to 18 U.S.C. [3585(b)] only when it was exclusively the product of such action by federal law- enforcement officials as to justify treating the state jail as the practical equivalent of a federal one.” U nited States v. Dovalina , 711 F.2d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1983)(internal quotation and citation omitted)

2 Because of inadequate briefing, Jackson has abandoned his equal protecting argument. Even pro se litigants must brief arguments in order to preserve them. S ee Yohey v. Collins , 985 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1993). Jackson merely quotes a Supreme Court case regarding the standard for reviewing e qual protection claims. We therefore conclude that he has abandoned this claim. See Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner , 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987)