[D O NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

DECEMBER 14, 2006

THOMAS K. KAHN

N o . 06-13615

CLERK

N o n - A r g u m e n t Calendar

D . C. Docket No. 05-00236-CV-W-E

JA N IC E BROWN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

CITY OF OPELIKA, AL,

Defendant-Appellee.

A p p e al from the United States District Court

fo r the Middle District of Alabama

(D ecem b er 14, 2006)

B efo re TJOFLAT, BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

P E R CURIAM:

In this case, the district court granted the City of Opelika summary judgment

o n Janice Brown's claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42U.S.C.

§ 2000e-3(a), that the City retaliated against her, i.e., terminated her employment, b ecau se she had made a complaint of racial discrimination, activity protected by T itle VII.1 The district court ruled against Brown on the ground that she failed to e sta b lis h the first prong a prima facie case for retaliation. She now appeals that r u lin g .

The court's ruling appears in its order of May 30, 2006, at pages 5-8. We fin d no error in the ruling and therefore affirm the court's judgment.

"[T]o establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff m u st prove the following elements: (1) she participated in an activity protected by T itle VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal co n n ectio n between the participation in the protected activity and the adverse em p lo ym en t decision." Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 587 (11th C ir. 2000). A plaintiff can show participation in a protected activity by d e m o n s tr atin g that she had a subjective, good-faith belief that her employer was en g ag ed in unlawful employment practices and that her belief was objectively reaso n ab le in light of the facts and record presented. Little v. United Techs., C a rr ie r Transicold Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997). "T o establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show that the decisionm ak ers were aware of the protected conduct, and that the protected activity and the a d v e r se action were not wholly unrelated." Gupta, 212 F.3d at 590 (internal citatio n omitted). "Discrimination is about actual knowledge, and real intent, not co n stru ctiv e knowledge and assumed intent. When evaluating a charge of em p lo ym en t discrimination, then, we must focus on the actual knowledge and actio n s of the decision-maker." Walker v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 286 F .3 d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted).

Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the defendant to reb u t the presumption of retaliation by producing legitimate reasons for the adverse em p lo ym en t action. Sullivan v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1059 (1 1 th Cir. 1999). If the defendant offers legitimate reasons, the presumption of re taliatio n disappears. Id. The plaintiff must then show that the employer's p ro ffered reasons for taking the adverse action were actually a pretext for p ro h ib ited retaliatory conduct. Id.

We affirm the district court's judgment because, as the court correctly noted, th e record contained no evidence that Brown engaged in a protected activity by m a k in g a complaint about racial discrimination or harassment. Brown admitted th at she never mentioned the word "race" when she complained about Kirby's b e h a v io r , that she had no knowledge of Kirby making any racially derogatory co m m en ts, and that Kirby took out her anger on everyone, including the white o ffice assistant. Moreover, Brown did not engage in a protected activity because sh e never voiced a complaint that the City was engaged in an unlawful e m p lo y m e n t practice. Even if Brown had a subjective belief that Kirby was h arassin g and discriminating against her on the basis of race, this belief was not o b jectiv ely reasonable in light of the facts presented. Specifically, Brown c o n c e d e d that Kirby took out her anger on everyone, including the white office assistan t. To the extent that the office assistant was treated differently, Brown co n ced ed that the assistant had different responsibilities than hers.

AFFIRMED.

1 Janice Brown is an African American woman. In addition to asserting a claim under Title VII, she sought relief for the alleged retaliation under 42U.S.C. § 1983. The district court denied her § 1983 claim on the theory that Title VII provides the sole relief for a claim of retaliation. Brown does not challenge that ruling in her appeal; we therefore do not consider it.