Kuraba Yangesen of Meremanda v The State

• Jurisdiction: Papua New Guinea
• Judge: Prentice CJ, Raine DCJ, Pritchard J
• Judgment Date: 30 November 1978
• Citation: [1978] PNGLR 465
• Court: Supreme Court
• Year: 1978
• Judgement Number: SC141

Supreme Court: Prentice CJ, Raine DCJ, Pritchard J

Judgment Delivered: 30 November 1978

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

[SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE]

KURABA YANGESEN OF MEREMANDA

V

THE STATE

Waigani

Prentice CJ Raine DCJ Pritchard J

28 November 1978

30 November 1978

CRIMINAL LAW — Appeal against conviction — Whether plea of guilty improperly entered — Unequivocal plea — Accused represented by counsel — Prima facie proof of charge — Appeal dismissed.

An accused was indicted on a charge of dangerous driving causing death and pleaded guilty. When called up for sentence the accused said on the allocutus that a steering pin came out and the trial judge then invited counsel for the accused to give this some thought, which having been done, the matter was proceeded with on the basis that the plea be regarded as one to a charge of dangerous driving "simpliciter".

On appeal against conviction on the ground that the plea of guilty should not have been entered,

Held

(1) There are occasions when it is proper for a court of appeal to say that a trial judge should have refused to accept a plea of guilty or should have set it aside.

(2) In the circumstances, including the representation by counsel throughout, the formal unequivocal plea of guilty, fortified by a second similar plea to a lesser charge, and the fact that the dangerous driving of the accused prior to the allegation of mechanical defect, was, prima facie, established, the plea of guilty was properly entered.

Appeal

This was an appeal against conviction on a charge of dangerous driving, on the ground that a plea of guilty should not have been entered.

Counsel

A. K. Amet, for the appellant.

K. B. Egan, for the respondent.

Cur. adv. vult.

30 November 1978

PRENTICE CJ RAINE DCJ PRITCHARD J: This is an unusual appeal, as the facts and the grounds of appeal will demonstrate.

The appellant was indicted on a charge of dangerous driving causing death under s. 336 (4) of the Criminal Code. At his trial the notes of the learned trial judge reveal that prior to arraignment, as is usual here, the prosecutor gave the judge a short outline of the case so that his Honour could arraign the accused in a way that would be comprehended by the latter. His Honour noted the following:

"Particulars of charge:

Unlicensed learner's permit.

Speed excessive in the circumstances.

Toyota loaded with nineteen people — ten would have been excessive.

Fell down steep embankment — sixty to eighty feet below road level."

When arraigned the appellant said "True". Mr. Sevua, counsel for the appellant, then announced his appearance and said that he had "no application"; in other words, that he did not apply, under s. 575, to enter a plea of not guilty on behalf of his client, as can be done in a proper case.

His Honour then read the depositions and accepted the plea of guilty.

When called up for sentence the accused said on the allocutus that a steering pin came out, and this was then reasserted by his counsel. It seems clear that his Honour felt that this must have occurred, if it occurred at all, at a point when the admitted dangerous driving had well and truly commenced, but before the point of time when remedial action might have prevented the Toyota Stout plunging down the cliff. So his Honour intervened, most properly, and invited counsel to give this some thought. His Honour was concerned lest there be some doubt that the admitted dangerous driving actually...