PRECEDENTIAL

U N IT E D STATES COURT OF APPEALS

F O R THE THIRD CIRCUIT

N o . 05-4974

UNITED AUTOMOBILE WORKERS LOCAL 259

SOCIAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT,

v. METRO AUTO CENTER,

Appellant.

O n Appeal from the United States District Court

f o r the District of New Jersey

(N o . 03-cv-02123)

D istrict Judge: Honorable Joseph A. Greenaway, Jr.

A rg u e d November 8, 2006

B e f o re : SLOVITER, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit

Judg es.

(F ile d September 4, 2007)

J o s e p h M. Labuda (Argued)

M ilm a n & Heidecker

3 0 0 0 Marcus Avenue, Suite 3W3

L a k e Success, NY 11042

C o u n s e l for Appellant

J e re m y E. Meyer (Argued)

C le a ry & Josem

1 4 2 0 Walnut Street, Suite 300 P h ila d e lp h ia , NY 19102 C o u n s e l for Appellee O P IN I O N OF THE COURT C H A G A R E S , Circuit Judge.

T h is is an appeal from an award of attorneys' fees for an a c tio n brought by a union pension and welfare fund against an e m p lo ye r pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security A c t of 1974, 29U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 ("ERISA"). After granting a motion for summary judgment in favor of the fund, the District C o u rt ordered the employer to pay attorneys' fees. The employer a p p e als , arguing that the District Court should have dismissed the f u n d 's application for fees as untimely and, in the alternative, that th e amount of the award was unreasonable.

We conclude that the motion for fees was timely and that the f e e award was reasonable. Accordingly, we will affirm the District C o u rt. In so doing, we consider two questions left unanswered by th i s Court's previous decisions: first, whether a trial court must aw ard interest under 29U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(B) on an employer's d e lin q u e n t contributions that were unpaid at the time a suit was f ile d but paid by the time of judgment, and, second, whether p ro p o rtio n a lity necessarily limits mandatory fee awards in the E R IS A context. We answer yes to the first question and no to the second.

I.

P la in tif f United Automobile Workers Local 259 Social S e c u rity Fund ("the Fund") is a union pension and welfare fund.

D e f en d a n t Metro Auto Center ("Metro") is an employer obligated b y a collective bargaining agreement to pay monthly contributions to the Fund. On May 7, 2003, the Fund filed a complaint in the U n ite d States District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to ERISA § 515, 29U.S.C. § 1145, seeking unpaid contributions to ta lin g $1,928.00, as well as interest on the unpaid contributions a n d attorneys' fees. In March 2004, while the action was pending, M e tro paid the Fund $964.00, but denied that it owed the Fund a n o th e r $964.00.

The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

B y an order dated December 8, 2004, the District Court denied M etro 's motion for summary judgment and granted the Fund's m o tio n . The District Court Judge signed the order on December 1 3 , 2004, and the clerk entered it on December 14, 2004.

O n January 14, 2005, the Fund moved for attorneys' fees a n d costs in the amount of $35,304.89 pursuant to ERISA § 5 0 2 (g )(2 )(D ), 29U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D), which instructs courts to a w a rd reasonable fees to prevailing plans in actions to collect d e lin q u e n t contributions under ERISA § 515, 29U.S.C. § 1145.

O n October 20, 2005, the District Court entered an order granting th e Fund $28,623.14 in fees, a $6,681.75 reduction from the a m o u n t requested. The District Court concluded the full amount re q u e ste d was unreasonable because it included fees for work spent o n legal matters not necessary to the successful claim for c o n trib u tio n s . The District Court refused Metro's request to reduce th e award in order to create proportionality between the fee award an d the underlying damages. Additionally, the District Court rejected Metro's objection that 67 hours of charges were " e x ce ss iv e ," noting Metro provided "no specific explanation s e ttin g forth why this Court should agree." United Auto. Workers, L o c a l 259 Soc. Sec. Dep't v. Metro Auto Ctr., No. 03-cv-02123, s lip op. at 4 (D.N.J. Oct. 20, 2005) (unpublished) (order granting m o tio n for fees).

II.

It is undisputed that ERISA mandates an award of re a so n a b le attorneys' fees when, as here, a fund prevails in an a c tio n for unpaid contributions pursuant to 29U.S.C. § 1145. See 2 9U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D); Bd. of Trs. of Trucking Employees of N . Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Centra, 983 F.2d 495, 509 (3d Cir. 1 9 9 2 ); Penn Elastic Co. v. United Retail & Wholesale Employees U n io n , 792 F.2d 45, 47-48 (3d Cir. 1986). The relevant procedures f o r filing requests for fees are dictated by the Federal Rules of Civil P r o c e d u re and the Local Civil Rules of the United States District C o u rt for the District of New Jersey. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d); D .N .J. L. Civ. R. 54.2; Planned Parenthood of Cent. N.J. v. Att'y G en . of N.J., 297 F.3d 253, 259-61 (3d Cir. 2002).

M e tro appeals the award granted to the Fund on two g ro u n d s . First, Metro argues the District Court should have d is m is s e d the Fund's application for fees as untimely. Second, M e tro argues the fee award is unreasonable.

Because the District Court's order of October 20, 2005, re d u c ed the fee award to a definite amount, it was a final decision.

S e e Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 426 F.3d 694, 7 0 1 (3d Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over the D is tric t Court's order granting fees. See 28U.S.C. § 1291.

A.

W e first consider whether the Fund's request for fees was tim e ly. We review the legal interpretation of procedural rules de n o v o . Planned Parenthood, 297 F.3d at 259.

R u le 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides th a t motions for attorneys' fees must be filed no later than fourteen d a ys after entry of judgment, unless otherwise provided by statute o r order of the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B). Rule 54.2 of the L o c a l Civil Rules of the United States District Court for the D is tric t of New Jersey provides "an attorney seeking compensation f o r services or reimbursement of necessary expenses shall file with th e Court an affidavit within 30 days of the entry of judgment or o rd e r, unless extended by the Court," setting forth information a b o u t the services rendered. We have previously held that Local C iv il Rule 54.2 extends the time within which to file for fees from f o u rte e n days to thirty as a standing order of the district court. See P la n n e d Parenthood, 297 F.3d at 261.

In this case, the Fund filed its application for attorneys' fees o n January 14, 2005, thirty-one days after the clerk entered the D is tric t Court's summary judgment order. The parties agree that th e rules provide a thirty-day time period within which to file a re q u e st for fees, and they agree that the clock starts to run when the D is tric t Court enters final judgment on the underlying claim. They d is a g re e , however, about whether December 14, 2004, the date of e n try of the summary judgment order, should be considered the d a te of entry of a final judgment giving rise to the fee request.

.

A t the outset, we must consider the application of Rule 58 o f the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the time period for a m o tio n for fees. Rule 58 is most well known for clarifying the time w ith in which an appeal must be taken, but it also clarifies the tim in g of post-trial motions.1 Rule 58(a) provides "[e]very ju d g m e n t and amended judgment must be set forth on a separate d o c u m e n t" except for those disposing of certain motions. If a s e p a ra te document is required, but no separate document is issued, a court must deem the judgment's date of entry as 150 days after its e n try in the civil docket. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(b). We mechanically a p p ly Rule 58 to prevent uncertainties as to the date on which a ju d g m e n t is entered, see United States v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216, 2 2 1 -2 2 (1973) (per curiam); In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 454 F .3 d 235, 243-44 (3d Cir. 2006), because "[d]etermining the date o f entry is critical for motion practice under the Federal Rules of C iv il Procedure[] and for the timely filing of a notice of appeal." U n ite d States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 287 (3d Cir. 2003) (f o o tn o te omitted). M e tro argues Rule 58(a) does not require a separate d o c u m e n t for a judgment to trigger the time period of a Rule 54(d) f e e s motion. The text of Rules 58 and 54 require that we reject this a rg u m e n t. Rule 58 addresses the "time of entry" for judgments for th e "purposes of these rules" and Rule 54 requires motions for fees to be filed within 14 days after the "entry of judgment." Rule 58 en u m era tes certain exceptions to its formalities, none of which are re lev a n t here.2 Therefore, when an order does not comply with R u le 58, there is no immediate "entry of judgment" triggering the tim e period for Rule 54(d) motions. In such circumstances, the tim e period begins 150 days after entry of the order, as set forth in R u le 58(b).3 A cc o rd in g ly, if the District Court's December 14 summary ju d g m e n t order is not a separate document, the time period for an a p p lic a tio n for fees provided by Rule 54(d) (and extended by D .N .J . L. Civ. R. 54.2) began to run 150 days after December 14.

M o r e specifically, if the December 14 order was not a separate d o c u m e n t, the Fund's motion for fees was timely.

.

A n order is considered a separate document for purposes of R u le 58 if it satisfies three requirements: "first, the order must be s e lf -c o n ta in e d and separate from the opinion; second, the order m u s t note the relief granted; and third, the order must omit (or at le a st substantially omit) the District Court's reasons for disposing o f the parties' claims." Cendant Corp., 454 F.3d at 241 (citing L o c a l Union No. 1992 of Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Okonite C o ., 358 F.3d 278, 285 (3d Cir. 2004)).

Here, the District Court's order granting summary judgment s a tis f ie d the first and third requirements of the separate-document ru le , but did not specify the relief to which the Fund was entitled.4 made pursuant to Rule 54. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, 2002 advisory c o m m itte e 's note ("[I]n the cases in which court and clerk fail to c o m p l y with this simple requirement [of a separate document], the m o tio n time periods set by Rules 50, 52, 54, 59, and 60 begin to ru n after expiration of 150 days from entry of the judgment in the c iv il docket as required by Rule 79(a)."); see also Fiorelli, 337 F.3d a t 287 (using Rule 58 to determine the timeliness of a motion to set a s id e a conviction pursuant to 28U.S.C. § 2255).

4 The order was a self-contained document and did not in c lu d e the court's reasoning. It provided, in its entirety: T h is matter having come before the Court on the c ro s s -m o tio n s of the parties (Docket Nos. 24, 25, 26 and 27) f o r summary judgment, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; and th is Court having reviewed the parties' submissions and h a v in g heard oral argument; and for the reasons set forth in th i s Court's forthcoming Opinion and upon good cause M e tro argues the amount of the relief could easily be determined b y 29U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2), even though the amount was not e x p licit in the District Court's order. See Vitale v. Latrobe Area H o s p ., 420 F.3d 278, 281 (3d Cir. 2005) (describing a narrow e x c ep tio n to the general rule regarding final orders that treats an o rd e r as final as long as the relief can be determined through a m e c h an ic a l and uncontroversial calculation even if relief is not s p e c if ie d in the order); Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 372 F .3 d 193, 200 n.8 (3d Cir. 2004) (same).5 S e c tio n 1132(g)(2) of title 29 of the United States Code d ic ta te s the relief prevailing funds are due in a § 1145 action for u n p a i d contributions. It provides, In any action under this subchapter by a fiduciary for or on b e h a lf of a plan to enforce section 1145 of this title in which a judgment in favor of the plan is awarded, the court shall a w a rd the plan- ( A ) the unpaid contributions, ( B ) interest on the unpaid contributions, (C ) an amount equal to the greater of- (i) interest on the unpaid contributions, or (ii) liquidated damages provided for under the plan in a n amount not in excess of 20 percent (or such higher p e rc e n ta g e as may be permitted under Federal or State law) o f the amount determined by the court under subparagraph (A ), (D ) reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the action, to be p a id by the defendant, and ( E ) such other legal or equitable relief as the court deems a p p ro p r ia te .

F o r purposes of this paragraph, interest on unpaid c o n trib u tio n s shall be determined by using the rate provided u n d e r the plan, or, if none, the rate prescribed under section 6 6 2 1 of Title 26.

T h e Fund argues the District Court did not simply have an u n c o n tro v e rs ia l, ministerial calculation to perform once it granted s u m m a ry judgment because this Court has not provided guidance o n how to interpret 29U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(B). Specifically, given t h a t Metro paid a portion of the delinquent contributions while litig a tio n was pending, the Fund asserts it was unclear whether the D is tr ic t Court would award interest on those previously paid fees, a s well as interest on the portion still unpaid by the time of j u d g m e n t .6 In awarding a "judgment in favor of the plan" the District C o u rt had to award "the unpaid contributions" and the "interest on th e unpaid contributions." 29U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(A), (B). The p h ra se "unpaid contributions" in 29U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(B) could re f er either to contributions owed at the time suit commenced or c o n trib u tio n s owed at the time judgment was entered. Several c o u rts have determined that § 1132(g)(2) remedies apply to all c o n trib u tio n s that are unpaid at the time a plan files suit, even if th o s e debts are partially satisfied before judgment. See Operating E n g 'r s Local 139 Health Benefit Fund v. Gustafson Constr. Corp., 2 5 8 F.3d 645, 654 (7th Cir. 2001); Nw. Adm'rs, Inc. v. A lb ertso n 's, Inc., 104 F.3d 253, 257 (9th Cir. 1996); Iron Workers D is t. Council v. Hudson Steel Fabricators & Erectors, Inc., 68 F.3d 1 5 0 2 , 1507 (2d Cir. 1995); Carpenters Amended & Restated Health B e n . Fund v. John W. Ryan Constr. Co., 767 F.2d 1170, 1172 (5th C i r. 1985); see also Carpenters & Joiners Welfare Fund v. G ittle m a n Corp., 857 F.2d 476, 478 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding the te rm "unpaid contributions" in § 1132(g)(2)(C) means " c o n trib u tio n s unpaid at the time suit was filed, rather than co n trib u tio n s which were delinquent for some time but which were p a id up before suit was filed").

At least one court, however, has prevented a fund from r e c o v e r in g interest on delinquent contributions that were paid b e tw e e n filing and judgment. Mich. Carpenters Council Health & W elfa re Fund v. C.J. Rogers, Inc., 933 F.2d 376, 388 (6th Cir. 1 9 9 1 ). In C.J. Rogers, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit re a so n e d that § 1132(g)(2)(B) "appl[ies] only if there [are] unpaid c o n trib u tio n s on the date of the award" because 1132(g)(2) " p ro v id e s that upon `a judgment in favor of the plan' the court shall a w a rd the plan `the unpaid contributions' and `interest on the u n p a id contributions.'" Id. at 388 (quoting § 1132(g)(2)(A) & (B) (e m p h a s is added by C.J. Rogers, Inc.)).

We conclude the better interpretation of § 1132(g)(2)(B) re q u ire s that plans be awarded interest on contributions unpaid at th e time the suit is filed. As the Court of Appeals for the Second C irc u it acknowledged, § 1132(g)(2)(B) refers to unpaid c o n trib u tio n s "not to establish a limit on qualifying judgments, but ra th e r because the amount of an award of interest or liquidated d a m a g e s should logically be predicated upon the amount of the u n p a id contributions originally at issue." Iron Workers, 68 F.3d at 1 5 0 7 . The payment of interest compensates plans for one kind of " `c o st[ ] incurred in connection with delinquencies,'" that is, the lo s s of interest. Bd. of Trs. of Hotel & Rest. Employees Local 25 v . JPR, Inc., 136 F.3d 794, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Staff of S e n . Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., S . 1076, The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments of 1980: S u m m a r y and Analysis of Consideration (Comm. Print 1980) 4 3 -4 4 ); see also Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund for N. Cal. v . Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., 484 U.S. 539, 546 n.12 (1 9 8 8 ). The purpose of the provision would be defeated if we a llo w e d employers to avoid paying interest simply by satisfying th e ir debt moments before the court issues judgment. See Iron W o rk e rs, 68 F.3d at 1508 ("Permitting delinquent employers to a v o id paying § 1132 penalties after suit is filed . . . would largely th w a rt the purpose of § 1132(g)(2) to provide plan fiduciaries with a n effective weapon against delinquent employers. It would also a n o m a lo u sly cause only employers with legitimate legal arguments (. . . awaiting final judgment) to pay ancillary relief.") (citations o m itte d ); John W. Ryan Constr., 767 F.2d at 1175 ("In fact, [the d ef en dan t-em p lo ye r' s ] interpretation of § 1132(g)(2) would reward b a d faith employers who insist on the spectre of adverse judgment b e f o re making payments they know or even concede to be d elin q u en t and, at the same time, penalize good faith employers w h o litigate delinquencies through judgment because of a genuine d isp u te about whether money is owed."); Gilles v. Burton Constr.

C o ., 736 F.2d 1142, 1146 n.6 (7th Cir. 1984) ("After suit is filed, w e doubt that employers who are delinquent in their contributions c a n avoid the mandatory relief provisions of section 1132(g)(2) th ro u g h the device of offering to pay only the overdue c o n t r i b u t io n s . " ) .

A c c o rd in g ly, the District Court could properly award the F u n d interest on those delinquent contributions that Metro paid w h ile the action, brought pursuant to 29U.S.C. § 1145, was p en d in g . We recognize, however, that neither the District Court n o r the parties knew our position on this issue at the time of the s u m m a ry judgment order. The parties could not be assured of the re lief that would be awarded after the grant of summary judgment.

B e c a u se the District Court's order granting summary ju d g m e n t provided neither the amount of relief granted, nor left o n ly a ministerial calculation, the order cannot be considered a se p a ra te document for purposes of Rule 58. Without a separate d o c u m e n t, the thirty-day limit for the fee request did not begin to ru n until 150 days after entry of the order. The Fund's request for f e e s was therefore timely.

B.

W e turn next to the reasonableness of the fee award. We re v ie w a district court's award of fees for abuse of discretion and re v ie w a district court's factual determinations, "including [the c o u rt's ] determination of an attorney's reasonable hourly rate and th e number of hours he or she reasonably worked on the case," for c le a r error. Interfaith Cmty. Org., 426 F.3d at 703 n.5. We e x e rc is e plenary review over the legal standard that the district c o u rt used in calculating the award. See id.; Bell v. United P rin ce to n Props., Inc., 884 F.2d 713, 718 (3d Cir. 1989).

M e tro argues the District Court awarded an unreasonably h ig h fee to the Fund. In addition to complaining that the hours a w a rd e d were excessive and the work was vaguely described, M e tro contends that the District Court erred by not reducing the fee a w a rd so as to make it proportional to the amount of the underlying d a m a g e s recovered. Since we have not previously ruled on w h e t h e r a fee awarded pursuant to 29U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D) must b e proportional to the amount of unpaid contributions recovered, w e will focus our attention on that issue. Before we reach it, h o w e v e r , we will briefly address Metro's other claims.

.

E R IS A allows a prevailing plan to recover "reasonable a tto rn e y's fees." 29U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D). "The most useful sta rtin g point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee" is th e lodestar calculation. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1 9 8 3 ). Under this well-settled approach, a court determines the re a so n a b le number of hours expended on the litigation multiplied b y a reasonable hourly rate. The product is a presumptively re a so n a b le fee, but it may still require subsequent adjustment. Id. a t 434; Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean A ir, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986). In this case, Metro does not ch allen g e the hourly rate charged but does suggest the hours claim ed by the Fund, and awarded by the District Court, were e x c e s s iv e and insufficiently supported.

In requesting, challenging, and granting attorneys' fees, s p e c if ic ity is critical. A request for fees must be accompanied by " f airly definite information as to hours devoted to various general a c tiv itie s, e.g., partial discovery, settlement negotiations, and the h o u rs spent by various classes of attorneys." Evans v. Port Auth., 2 7 3 F.3d 346, 361 (3d Cir. 2001). And "[w]here the d o c u m e n ta tio n of hours is inadequate, the district court may reduce th e award accordingly." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433.

W h ile the Fund's records describing the hours spent on v a rio u s activities could have benefitted from added specificity, the d e ta il they provided allowed the District Court to determine w h eth e r the costs claimed were unreasonable for the work p e rf o rm e d . See Washington v. Phila. County Ct. Com. Pl., 89 F.3d 1 0 3 1 , 1037 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[S]pecificity should only be required to the extent necessary for the district court to determine if the h o u rs claimed are unreasonable for the work performed.") (q u o tatio n marks and citation omitted). Moreover, we agree with th e District Court that Metro's complaints of excessive hours were i m p r e c is e . See Bell, 884 F.2d at 720 ("[W]e emphasize that the a d v e rs e party's submissions cannot merely allege in general terms th a t the time spent was excessive."). Metro did not provide the D is tric t Court with adequate justifications to reduce the hours of th e Fund's fees, and has not presented them to us. We will not d is tu rb the court's conclusion that the number of hours expended o n the successful 29U.S.C. § 1145 action was reasonable.

Metro additionally argues that the District Court erred in not re d u c in g the fee award in light of Metro's offer of judgment made p u rs u a n t to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.7 C o u rts have recognized that "fees accumulated after a party rejects a substantial offer provide minimal benefit to the prevailing party." M o r i a r t y v. Svec, 233 F.3d 955, 967 (7th Cir. 2000). Metro, h o w e v e r, never presented the Fund with a "substantial offer." M e tro initially offered to settle for the amount of unpaid c o n trib u tio n s , but its offer did not include costs, fees, or interest in cu rred up to that point by the Fund. The Fund rejected the offer, in d ic a tin g that it would be a breach of fiduciary duty for the Fund to waive interest on the unpaid contributions. Metro again failed to provide a substantial offer when it responded to this rejection--it r e d u c ed its offer by half.

W e see no reason to overturn the District Court's finding of re a so n a b le hours and reasonable rates, and we do not agree with M e tro that its offer of judgment needed to factor into the award.

T h e District Court fulfilled its obligation to consider carefully the re a so n a b len e ss of the fee request and made no clear errors in its f in d in g s of fact.8 .

H a v in g concluded that the District Court did not err in its is not admissible except in a proceeding to determine costs." As a p p lie d to a fee-shifting statute, if the statute indicates attorneys' f e e s are part of the costs, then fees are included in Rule 68's posto f f e r costs. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 9 (1985) ("[A]ll c o sts properly awardable in an action are to be considered within th e scope of Rule 68 `costs.' Thus, absent congressional e x p re ss io n s to the contrary, where the underlying statute defines `c o sts ' to include attorney's fees, we are satisfied such fees are to b e included as costs for purposes of Rule 68."). Compare 29 U .S .C . § 1132(g)(2)(D) (allowing recovery of "fees and costs") w ith 42U.S.C. § 1988(b) (allowing recovery of "fee[s] as part of th e costs"). Metro does not argue the cost-shifting provision of R u le 68 applies to this case and the Fund does not challenge the a d m is s ib ility of Metro's Rule 68 offer in this proceeding.

8 The District Court's reduction of the Fund's fee request b y $6,681.75 further demonstrates its thoroughness. lo d estar calculation, we now turn to whether the District Court s h o u ld have downwardly adjusted the lodestar because the fee a w a rd was disproportionate to the amount of the unpaid c o n trib u tio n s recovered. Although multiplying a reasonable n u m b e r of hours by a reasonable rate produces a presumptively re a so n a b le fee, that "does not end the inquiry. There remain other c o n sid e ra ti o n s that may lead the district court to adjust the fee u p w a r d or downward." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434; see also D e la w a re Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. at 565. The c a te g o rie s of considerations that justify adjusting the lodestar have c h a n g ed over time. "Originally, it was contemplated that the lo d e sta r could be adjusted upward or downward depending on a v a rie ty of factors, see Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. of Phila. v. A m e ric a n Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 1 6 7 -6 9 (3d Cir. 1973), but more recently the Supreme Court has sh a rp ly limited the number of factors which can be considered in a d ju s tin g the lodestar amount." Brytus v. Spang & Co., 203 F.3d 2 3 8 , 242 (3d Cir. 2000). See City of Burlington v. Dague, 505 U .S . 557, 567 (1992) (holding courts may not adjust the lodestar a m o u n t because an attorney was retained on a contingent-fee b a sis ); Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 898-99 (1984) (holding the n o v e lty and complexity of a case are reflected in the lodestar and d o not warrant post-lodestar adjustment); Id. at 899 (holding an u p w a rd adjustment to the lodestar for quality of service is only ap p lica b le in "exceptional" cases).

T h e question for us here--whether courts must downwardly a d ju st a 29U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D) fee award to keep it p ro p o rtio n a l to the damages--is as of yet unaddressed by the S u p r e m e Court. The Supreme Court has, however, addressed d isp ro p o rtio n a te attorneys' fees awarded in the civil rights context.

A four-Justice plurality of the Court in City of Riverside v. Rivera, 4 7 7 U.S. 561 (1986), refused to adopt a "rule of proportionality" f o r 42U.S.C. § 1988 fees because such a rule "would make it d if f icu lt, if not impossible, for individuals with meritorious civil rig h ts claims but relatively small potential damages to obtain r e d re s s from the courts" and thus would undermine "Congress' p u rp o s e in enacting § 1988." City of Riverside, 477 U.S. at 578 (B ren n an , J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.).

J u s tic e Powell cast the fifth vote to affirm the fee award of $ 2 4 5 ,4 5 6 .2 5 for a case in which plaintiffs were awarded $ 33,350 in d am ag es. Id. at 585-86 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). In th e margin of his concurring opinion, Justice Powell stated "[i]t p ro b a b ly will be the rare case in which an award of private d a m a g e s can be said to benefit the public interest to an extent that w o u ld justify the disproportionality between damages and fees re f le c te d in this case." Id. at 586 n.3.

Ju stic e Powell's footnote in City of Riverside seems to s u g g e st courts should generally award only proportionate fees, and s h o u l d consider the public interest served by the underlying case b e f o re awarding disproportionate fees. See, e.g., Moriarty v. Svec, 2 3 3 F.3d 955, 967-68 (7th Cir. 2000) (relying on Justice Powell's c o n c u rre n c e to support the proposition that "proportionality co n ce rn s are a factor in determining what a reasonable fee is"). In C u n n in g h am v. City of McKeesport, 807 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1986), h o w e v e r, we determined Justice Powell's opinion did not mandate th a t courts adopt a "rule of proportionality." In that case, we stated w e did not have to "[apply] the thrust of Justice Powell's somewhat e n ig m a tic footnote" and require courts to "consider the extent to w h ic h the public interest was vindicated by the award if the fee s o u g h t is disproportionate to the damages awarded." Id. at 53. We e x p la in e d , F irs t, this interpretation represents at most the view of a lo n e Justice and was not endorsed by any of the other eight . . . . Second, we have doubts about Justice Powell's sta tem e n t that only the rare case justifies disproportionate f e e awards . . . . Finally, we consider application of Justice P o w e ll's reasoning problematic . . . . In the absence of an e x p lic it mandate, we are reluctant to begin the difficult task o f developing standards by which we might incorporate p ro p o rtio n a lity principles into the attorney's fee calculus.

Id. at 53-54 (citation and footnote omitted); see also Washington, 8 9 F.3d at 1041.

T h u s, we have rejected a rule of proportionality in civil rig h ts cases. See, e.g., id. ("[A] court may not diminish counsel f e es in a section 1983 action to maintain some ratio between the f e es and the damages awarded."). And, when asked to limit our re je c tio n of proportionality to 42U.S.C. § 1988 fee awards, we re f u se d . In Northeast Women's Center v. McMonagle, the plaintiff b ro u g h t a civil action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt O rg a n iz a tio n s Act, 18U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 ("RICO"). 889 F.2d 466, 4 6 8 (3d Cir. 1989). We declared that "nothing in the language or th e legislative history of either § 1988 or [18U.S.C.] § 1964(c) [ p ro v id in g fees for RICO litigation] . . . support[s] the application o f a proportionality rule in the latter, but not the former." Id. at 4 7 4 .9 T h e language of these previously interpreted statutes--42 U .S .C . § 1988(b) (". . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the p re v a ilin g party, other than the United States, a reasonable a tto r n e y 's fee as part of the costs . . . ") and 18U.S.C. § 1964(c) (p la in tif f "shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the c o st of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee . . . ")--is sim ilar to the ERISA provision at issue here (". . . the court shall a w a rd the plan . . . reasonable attorney's fees and costs of the a c tio n . . .").1 0 See Dague, 505 U.S. at 562 (implying that case law c o n stru in g the meaning of "reasonable" applies uniformly to fee- s h if tin g statutes with similar language); Indep. Fed'n of Flight A tte n d a n ts v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 759 n.2 (1989) (emphasizing th a t "fee-shifting statutes' similar language is a strong indication th at they are to be interpreted alike") (quotation marks omitted); s e e also Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 , 233 (2005) (" [ W ]h e n Congress uses the same language in two statutes having s im ila r purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after the o th e r, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both statutes."). Nothing in the text o f 29U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D) suggests that to be "reasonable," fees m u s t be proportional, cf. 42U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)(B)(i) (providing th a t a prisoner will not be awarded fees in a § 42U.S.C. § 1988 a c tio n unless "the amount of the fee is proportionately related to th e court ordered relief for the violation"), and Metro offers no a rg u m e n t specific to ERISA's mandatory fee structure to ease our lo n g s ta n d in g concerns with requiring proportionality. As we have p re v io u s ly explained with regard to another fee-shifting statute, " [ h ]a d Congress believed . . . that attorneys' fees should be a w a rd e d only in some proportion to the plaintiff's damages, it c o u ld have easily eliminated or modified the attorneys' fees p r o v isio n ." Northeast Women's Ctr., 889 F.2d at 474. We will " n o t impose such a change by judicial fiat." Id.

R e je c tin g a proportionality rule with regard to § 1 1 3 2 (g )(2 )(D ) is consistent with the purpose of the provision.

E R IS A provides "for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready a c ce s s to the Federal courts" in order to "protect interests of p a rtic ip a n ts in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries." See 2 9U.S.C. § 1001(b). When employers violate their obligations to m a k e contributions as described by § 515 of ERISA, 29U.S.C. § 1 1 4 5 , then § 502 of ERISA, 29U.S.C. § 1132, provides a federal c a u s e of action.

Originally, ERISA allowed courts to award attorneys' fees in their discretion. In enacting the Multiemployer Pension Plan A m e n d m e n ts Act of 1980, Congress amended ERISA to address th e "substantial number of employers" who "fail[] to make their `p ro m is e d contributions' on a regular and timely basis." Advanced L ig h tw e ig h t Concrete, 484 U.S. at 546.1 1 In the provisions of 29 U .S .C . § 1132(g)(2), Congress required courts to award attorneys' fe es and other remedies to prevailing plans. The Supreme Court h a s stated that "[t]he legislative history of these provisions explains th a t Congress added these strict remedies to give employers a stro n g incentive to honor their contractual obligations to contribute a n d to facilitate the collection of delinquent accounts." Id. at 547.

" E R IS A clearly assumes that [benefit plan] trustees will act to ensure that a plan receives all funds to which it is entitled." C e n t. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 4 7 2 U.S. 559 , 571 (1985). When delinquencies are small, the cost o f recovery may be disproportionate, and requiring proportionality w o u ld , in effect, discourage plans from taking their claims to f e d era l courts. Moreover, § 1132(g)(2) was enacted to encourage e m p lo ye rs to make timely contributions, assist plans in their re c o v ery of delinquent contributions, and discourage excessive litig a tio n by defendants. See Advanced Lightweight Concrete, 484 U .S . at 546; JPR, 136 F.3d at 803-04. Funds are burdened by e m p lo ye rs who needlessly extend or complicate litigation for small d e lin q u e n c ie s just as they are burdened by employers who n e e d le s s ly extend or complicate litigation for larger delinquencies.

W e do not read § 1132(g)(2) to limit the fee award of a plan s u f f e rin g the former situation simply because the amount of u n d e r lyin g recovery is less. W e are not alone in concluding that requiring p ro p o rtio n a lity would neglect the language of ERISA and frustrate its purpose. See Bldg. Serv. Local 47 v. Grandview Raceway, 46 F .3 d 1392, 1401 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[I]n ERISA cases, there is no re q u ire m e n t that the amount of an award of attorneys' fees be p ro p o rtio n al to the amount of the underlying award of damages"); B d . of Trs. of the Hotel & Rest. Employees, Local 25 & E m p lo ye rs ' Health & Welfare Fund v. Madison Hotel, Inc., 43 F.

S u p p . 2d 8, 14 (D.D.C. 1999) (adopting the view of the Court of A p p e a ls for the Sixth Circuit that there is no proportionality re q u ire m e n t) ; see also Operating Eng'rs Pension Trusts v. B&E B a c k h o e , Inc., 911 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1990) (refusing to ad o p t a "`de minimus' rule to bar litigation where only a few hours tru s t contribution is owing"). We join these courts to the extent th e y reject a proportionality rule for mandatory fees awarded p u rs u a n t to ERISA.1 2 In 29U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D), there is no ra tio of reasonability to which fees and damages must conform.

.

B e f o re we conclude, we address our dicta in Ursic v. B eth le h e m Mines, 719 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1983). In that case, we d e c la re d that "[w]hen monetary damages are awarded, the trial c o u rt must consider the relationship between the fee award and the a m o u n t of recovery . . . both in the context of determining the lo d e sta r and in determining whether to adjust the fee upward or d o w n w a rd ." Id. at 677; see also Bell, 884 F.2d at 723 n.9 (d e sc rib in g language in Ursic as dicta). Ursic's approach to fee a w a rd s is consistent with the Supreme Court's declaration that " `th e most critical factor' in determining the reasonableness of a f e e award `is the degree of success obtained.'" See Farrar v. H o b b y, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 4 3 6 ). As we have explained, comparing damages awarded with the a m o u n t of damages requested "may be one measure of how s u c c es s f u l the plaintiff was in his or her action, and therefore `may b e taken into account when awarding attorneys' fees.'" See W a sh in g to n , 89 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Abrams v. Lightolier, 50 F .3 d 1204, 1222 (3d Cir. 1995)). Because the focus is on the " d e g re e of success," and not success as defined in absolute n u m b e rs , this comparison does not necessitate proportionality. We a re aware, however, that our language in Ursic could be interpreted to support a proportionality rule, and, although Metro does not rely o n that case, we briefly discuss how later Supreme Court cases p re v e n t such an interpretation.

In Ursic, we stated that for a fee to be reasonable, "there m u s t be a correlation between the `hours worked' and `the total re c o v ery.'" Ursic, 719 F.2d at 677. We went on to state that "[t]he m e re fact that a fee is authorized by statute does not empower the c o u rts to set extravagant or disproportionate fees. The key word is `re a so n a b le ' and that means in relation to the main litigation." Id. a t 678.1 3 It is clear that Ursic remains good law insofar as it s u g g e sts courts consider "billing judgment" in determining re a so n a b le hours. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. To determine w h e th e r the fee request excludes hours that are "excessive, re d u n d a n t, or otherwise unnecessary," a district court can consider th e damages sought and obtained. See id. But insofar as we stated in Ursic that the amount of damages recovered should be co n sid e red identically in determining whether an attorney's hours a re reasonable and whether the lodestar needs adjustment, the S u p re m e Court has since indicated that this kind of "double c o u n tin g " is inappropriate. See Dague, 505 U.S. at 562-63; Del.

V a lle y Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. at 565; Blum, 465 U.S. at 899900.

More importantly, any implication in Ursic that all fees must b e proportional to be reasonable is inconsistent with City of R iv e rsid e v. Rivera. As explained above, in that case, a plurality re f u se d to require proportionality in awarding a "reasonable a tto rn e y's fee" for successful civil rights litigation. City of R iv e rsid e , 477 U.S. at 576 (plurality opinion). Justice Powell jo in e d the plurality in affirming the disproportionate fee award.

Id. at 585 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). City of Riverside, th e r e f o re , holds that reasonable fees can, at least in certain c irc u m s ta n c es , be disproportionate with the amount of underlying re lie f . See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (" W h e n a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale e x p la in in g the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding o f the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those M e m b e r s who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest g ro u n d s.") (quotation marks and alterations omitted).

In light of the text and purpose of 29U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2), S u p r e m e Court case law, and our precedent, we hold that the D is tric t Court did not err in refusing to adjust downwardly the lo d e s ta r calculation simply because the fee award was d is p ro p o rtio n a te to the damages award.

III.

F o r the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District C o u rt's award of attorneys' fees to the Fund in the amount of $ 2 8 ,6 2 3 .1 4 .

1 See 11 Charles A. Wright, et. al, Federal Practice & P ro c ed u re § 2781 (1995): R u le 58 is intended to resolve "the old, old question of w h e n is a judgment a judgment." It is of great importance in litigation to know precisely what the judgment is and w h e n it was entered. The time in which to make post-trial m o tio n s runs from the entry of judgment as does the time w h e n execution may issue. Most important, however, is the f a ct that the time for appeal runs from the entry of the ju d g m e n t.

2 The exceptions to Rule 58 are listed in Rule 58(a)(1): E v e ry judgment and amended judgment must be set forth on a separate document, but a separate document is not re q u ire d for an order disposing of a motion: (A ) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (B ) to amend or make additional findings of fact u n d er Rule 52(b); (C ) for attorney fees under Rule 54; (D ) for a new trial, or to alter or amend the judgment, u n d e r Rule 59; or (E ) for relief under Rule 60. M e tro argues that the District Court's summary judgment order did n o t need to be a separate document because Rule 58 provides "a s e p a ra te document is not required for an order disposing of a m o tio n . . . for attorney fees under Rule 54." Fed. R. Civ. P.

5 8 (a )(1 ) & (a)(1)(C) (emphasis added). Metro misunderstands the im p o rt of this exception to the separate-document requirement. The e x c ep tio n would be relevant if the Court was concerned with the tim e lin e ss of an appeal from an order denying a motion for fees, but it is not relevant to whether an application for fees was timely. T h e re is no exception to the separate-document requirement for o rd e rs deciding underlying cases in which fees can be sought.

3 The Advisory Committee Notes confirm that Rule 58's f o rm a litie s are intended to clarify the time periods for motions appearing, IT IS on this 8th day of December, 2004, O R D E R E D that Defendant's motion for summary ju d g m e n t on Plaintiff's complaint and on its Counterclaim (D o c k e t Nos. 24, 25, and 26) in this matter are DENIED; an d it is further ORDERED that Plaintiff's cross-motion for su m m ary judgment on its Complaint and Defendant's C o u n te rc la im (Docket No. 27) should be GRANTED; and it is further O R D E R E D that a copy of this Order be served on th e parties within 7 days of the entry of this Order. U n i t e d Auto. Workers, Local 259 Soc. Sec. Dep't v. Metro Auto C tr., No. 03-cv-02123 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2005) (order granting pl. m o tio n for summary judgment).

5 For the purposes of this appeal, we will assume that this e x c ep tio n to "final judgment" applies to the separate-document re q u ire m e n ts of Rule 58.

6 The Fund does not argue that the District Court's ability to award "legal or equitable relief as the court deems appropriate,"

2 9U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(E), prevented the relief from being u n co n tro v ersially and ministerially calculated after the court g r a n te d summary judgment. We, therefore, do not address this a rg u m e n t.

7 Rule 68 provides that if judgment finally obtained is not m o re favorable than the offer of judgment, the offeree must pay the co sts incurred after the offer. Rule 68 further provides that "[a]n o f f e r not accepted shall be deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof 9 We have previously been asked to consider the p ro p o rtio n a lity of attorney fee awards in the ERISA context. Bell v . United Princeton Props., Inc., 884 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1989). In B ell we considered, but did not resolve, the inverse of Metro's arg u m en t. The plaintiff in that case challenged a district court's re d u c tio n of a fee award, claiming the court improperly required p ro p o rtio n a lity between the attorneys' fees and the damages award. W e commented that whether it would be an abuse of discretion for a court to apply a proportionality rule to ERISA fees "is not s e lf -e v id e n t." Bell, 884 F.2d at 724. We did not reach the p l a in tif f 's claim because "[t]he district court nowhere articulated th a t its reduction was based on a theory of proportionality." Id. 10 The language of these provisions differ in one key re sp e c t: 42U.S.C. § 1988(b) and 18U.S.C. § 1964(c) allow for f e es as part of costs, where as 29U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2)(D) allows for fe es and costs. This difference may have significance, see supra n o te 7, but it does not alter the meaning of "reasonable."

11 A Senate report regarding the amendments to ERISA re c o g n iz e d the "`[f]ailure of employers to make promised c o n trib u tio n s in a timely fashion imposes a variety of costs on p la n s. While contributions remain unpaid, the plan loses the b e n e fit of investment income . . . . [C]osts are incurred in detecting a n d collecting delinquencies. Attorneys fees and other legal costs a ris e in connection with collection efforts.'" Advanced L ig h tw e ig h t Concrete, 484 U.S. at 546 n.12 (quoting Senate C o m m itte e on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., S . 1076, The Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of

1 9 8 0 : Summary and Analysis of Consideration 43 (Comm. Print

1 9 8 0 )) (emphasis removed).

12 To support a proportionality rule, Metro cites to Moriarty v . Svec, 233 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2000), which states "d isp ro p o rtio n ality is not determinative . . . [but] the district court's f e e order should evidence increased reflection before awarding a tto rn e y's fees that are large multiples of the damages recovered or m u ltip le s of the damages claimed." Id. at 968; see also id. at

9 6 7 -6 8 (declaring "proportionality concerns are a factor in d e te rm in in g what a reasonable fee is"). In that case, the Court of A p p ea ls for the Seventh Circuit relied on Justice Powell's c o n c u rre n c e in City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561 (1986) for its understanding of the relevance of proportionality. See M o ria rity, 233 F.3d at 967-968 (citing City of Riverside, 477 U.S. a t 585-86 & n.3). We note that our interpretation of the import of Ju stic e Powell's concurrence, as described in Cunningham v. City o f McKeesport, 807 F.2d 49, 53-54 (3d Cir. 1986), apparently d if f ers from the interpretation of the Court of Appeals for the S e v e n th Circuit.

13 In Ursic, we established the factors a court must consider in determining whether to award fees pursuant to 29U.S.C. §

1 1 3 2 (g )(1 ). Those factors are inapplicable to a fee award m a n d a te d by 29U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). See Bd. of Trs. of Trucking E m p l o ye e s of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Centra, 983 F.2d

4 9 5 , 508-09 (3d Cir. 1992).