Federal Circuits, 5th Cir. (August 18, 1999)
Docket number: 98-20713
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* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR .
R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT No. 98-20713 Summary Calendar MAVERICK TUBE CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, VERSUS DOUGLAS E. COX; et al, Defendants, NORTH TEXAS PIPE & STEEL, INC.; STEEL TRADING CORPORATION OF AMERICA; AMERICAN METALS TRADING, INC.; REPUBLIC PIPE & TUBE, INC.; UNITED TUBULAR; ROBERT E. RICHARDSON; STEVEN HAUCK; DONNA STEFFES TUTTLE; RICHARD HICKS, Defendants-Appellees.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (H-96-CV-4219) August 16, 1999 Before HIGGINBOTHAM, JONES and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.PER CURIAM: * Maverick Tube Corporation (Maverick) brought this cause of action against the named defendants (Defendants) alleging We review a district courtÂ’s decision to grant summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court, and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. 3 By late November of 1994, Maverick had been notified by Colorado Tubulars Company that suppliers were selling Maverick pipe at below-market prices. Maverick immediately began an investigation to determine if the pipe was counterfeit, a situation which could potentially expose Maverick to massive product li ability claims. After determining that the pipe was genuine, Maverick continued its investigation, and by January 9, 1995, had obtained a confession to a theft scheme from Maverick employee Doug Cox. The district court held that M averick had been put on notice of a potential cause of action by November 29th or 30th of 199 4. The limitations period for such a lawsuit is two years. 4 Because Maverick did not file suit until December 6, 1996, the district court held that the statute of limitations had expired.Maverick concedes that in ordinary circumstances, the limitations period begins to run as soon as the claimant suffers an injury, in t his case beginning with the theft of the pipe. 5 Maverick argues that the “discovery rule” exception to this general rule is applicable here. Under Texas law, the limitations period does not begin to run until the injured party discovers his injury if: (1) the nature of the injury is inherently undiscoverable; and (2) the evidence of the injury is objectively verifiable. 6 Defen dants contend that the theft of 101 truckloads of oilfield pipe can in no way be considered “inherently undiscoverable,” and the discovery rule is therefore inapplicable.While that argument may have some merit, we decline to adopt Defendants position in that regard, as we hold that, even assuming the discovery rule to be app licable, the limitations period for filing this lawsuit expired before December 6, 1996.During the course of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the district judge made the following statement regarding the limitations period: “ItÂ’s two years after the company has sufficient data to be aware of a probable injury. And there is simply no dispute here that the information Maverick had on the 29th, 30th, 31st, through the 5th, was sufficient to lead them inexorably to a solution of their problem within the week.” 7 W e agree. We have previously held that discovery “occurs when a plaintiff has knowledge of such facts as would cause a reasonably prudent person to make an inquiry that would lead to the discovery o f the cause of action.” 8 Clearly, Maverick had such knowledge once Colorado Tubular gave them information regarding pipe for sale at below-market prices. As Maverick failed to file suit within two years of obtaining this information, the limitations period expired. S ee KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison County Hous. Fin. Corp ., 988 S.W.2d 746 (Tex.S. Ct., Mar. 20, 1999).The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED . 2 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 3 Bodenheimer v. PPG Industries, Inc. , 5 F.3d 955, 956 (5th Cir. 1993) 4 Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a). 5 Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, Inc. , 889 S.W.2d 259, 262 (Tex. 1994). 6 Computer Associates v. Altai , 918 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Tex. 1994) 7 Record vol. 3, p. 7-8. 8 Vaught v. Showa Denko K.K. , 107 F.3d 1137, 1140 (5th Cir. 1997)(internal citations omitted)Try vLex for FREE for 3 days
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