Federal Circuits, 8th Cir. (August 07, 1981)
Docket number: 79-1367,79-1708
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US Code - Title 21: Food and Drugs - 21 USC 374 - Sec. 374. Inspection
US Code - Title 21: Food and Drugs - 21 USC 355 - Sec. 355. New drugs
U.S. Supreme Court - Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987)
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Cir. - No. 95-35167., 93 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 1996)
Robert W. Saitz, St. Louis, Mo., Marc L. Sandberg, St. Louis, Mo., Irl B. Baris, St. Louis, Mo., for appellants.
Sanford M. Litvack, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D. C., Barry Grossman, Susan J. Atkinson, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellee; J. Patrick Glynn, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., of counsel.Before LAY, Chief Judge, and STEPHENSON and ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.James C. Jamieson, Sr., and James C. Jamieson, Jr., individuals, and Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Pharmacare Generic Drugs, Inc., Pharmacare, Inc., and Payless Pharmacy, Inc., corporations, appeal a judgment finding them guilty of criminal violations of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. They also appeal a civil order of condemnation and forfeiture of certain drug manufacturing equipment pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 334(b). The criminal case, which resulted in convictions on one count of conspiracy to violate the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and ten substantive counts of counterfeiting, misbranding, and adulterating of drugs, and the civil case were consolidated for trial before the district court1 by consent of the parties.The trial, which consumed more than twenty days, ended on January 17, 1978. The district court on March 29, 1979, filed its findings of fact in the criminal case. On July 23, 1979, an order, memorandum, and findings2 were filed in the civil case. Each of the individual defendants was sentenced to imprisonment for terms of eight years and a fine of $5,000.00 on each of ten of the counts. The court suspended imposition of sentence as to count IV and placed the individuals on probation for a period of five years following the completion of the sentence of imprisonment under the other counts. Each of the four corporate defendants was fined the sum of $2,000.00 on each of the eleven counts, or $22,000.00 apiece, for a total of $88,000.00.Asserted grounds for error are (1) that the searches and seizures conducted by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) agents were in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, (2) that certain statements made by the defendants to FDA agents were inadmissible because of violations of the Fifth Amendment, and (3) that the evidence was insufficient as to all criminal counts and the civil order of forfeiture and condemnation. In the main, we affirm.I. The FactsJamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Jamieson-McKames) is a Missouri corporation with its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri. The company manufactured, purchased, packaged, labeled, distributed, and sold drugs from before June 1972 until November 1975. Jamieson-McKames sold drugs directly to doctors, clinics, and pharmacies through defendants Pharmacare, Inc., and Payless Pharmacy, Inc. Jamieson-McKames's activities were carried out by defendant James C. Jamieson, Sr.; defendant James C. Jamieson, Jr.; James C. Jamieson, III, a part-time employee; and approximately five other employees.Jamieson, Sr., was the president and treasurer of Jamieson-McKames and a member of its board of directors. He was also a member of the board of directors and vice-president and secretary of Pharmacare Generic Drugs and during 1975 a member of the board of directors of Pharmacare.Jamieson, Jr., a board member, vice-president, and secretary of Jamieson-McKames, was also a member of the board of directors, president, and treasurer of each of the other corporate defendants.Defendants Pharmacare, Inc. (Pharmacare), Payless Pharmacy, Inc. (Payless) and Pharmacare Generic Drugs, Inc. (Pharmacare Generic) were also Missouri corporations engaged in the business of manufacturing, purchasing, packaging, labeling, distributing, and selling drugs. In addition, Pharmacare and Payless operated five and two retail pharmacies respectively. The operations of Pharmacare, Pharmacare Generic, and Payless were closely interrelated with each other and with those of Jamieson-McKames. For example, the two Pharmacare pharmacies doing business in doctors' offices were opened only after an agreement was reached between Jamieson-McKames and the doctors in whose offices the pharmacies operated. Jamieson-McKames stocked the pharmacies, hired their employees, paid their bills, and shared the profits with the doctors. Drugs were frequently labeled with Pharmacare Payless Pharmacy labels whether the drug was for a Payless or a Pharmacare pharmacy, or for a pharmacy unconnected with any of the defendants.Bills owed by the pharmacies operated by Payless and Pharmacare were forwarded to their common principal place of business, which was at the same location as Jamieson-McKames's principal place of business at 3227-29 Morganford Road in St. Louis. All of Pharmacare Generic's activities were carried out by Jamieson-McKames employees. Pharmacare Generic had no employees of its own, other than corporate officers.On October 29, 30, and 31, and November 3, 1975, federal and state agents entered and searched the premises of Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc., and Pharmacare, Inc., at 3227 Morganford Road, St. Louis, Missouri. Samples of drugs were taken, documents were taken, quantities of drugs were embargoed, the premises and contents photographed, and machinery seized. On October 29 and 30, 1975, defendant's premises at 714 West Pierce Road, Wentzville, Missouri, were also searched, and similar items were seized.A civil complaint for forfeiture of certain items of equipment in the defendant's possession was filed by the government in the district court on December 19, 1975, alleging that the equipment was used or designed for use in making counterfeit drugs. Jamieson-McKames Pharmaceuticals, Inc., denied the allegations in its answer filed February 19, 1976.Thereafter, on May 12, 1977, defendants were charged in an 11-count indictment with counterfeiting, adulterating, and misbranding drugs and conspiracy to counterfeit, adulterate, and misbrand drugs. The indictment also charged that the defendants committed all of these acts with the intent to defraud and mislead, rendering such felonies punishable under 21 U.S.C. § 333(b).II. The Fourth AmendmentThe appellants contend that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the failure of the court to suppress evidence seized by government agents from the defendants' business premises at Wentzville, Missouri, and at the Morganford Road site in St. Louis, and from a building in St. Louis operated by the Chambers Medical Group.The Wentzville SearchThe seizures at the Wentzville pharmacy were conducted on the authority of a notice to inspect authorized by 21 U.S.C. § 374(a).3 The employee in charge was given a copy of the notice to inspect, but no warrant to inspect was obtained.The Supreme Court has held that warrantless searches are generally unreasonable, and that commercial premises as well as homes are within the Fourth Amendment's protection. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1820, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978). An exception from the search-warrant requirement has, however, been delineated for industries "long subject to close supervision and inspection," Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77, 90 S.Ct. 774, 777, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970), and "pervasively regulated business(es)," United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 316, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 1596, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972). Colonnade involved the liquor industry, and Biswell the interstate sale of firearms. The threshold question therefore is whether the drug-manufacturing industry should be included within this class of closely regulated businesses.The appellants argue that the drug-manufacturing industry is no more closely regulated than any number of industries involved in interstate commerce, and that therefore the rule of Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, requiring a warrant in the absence of consent before an administrative search can take place, should apply. In Barlow's, the Supreme Court held that warrantless searches authorized by § 8(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 657(a), violated the Fourth Amendment. There, however, the government sought to inspect work areas not open to the public on the premises of an electrical and plumbing contractor. In Barlow's the argument that all businesses involved in interstate commerce had "long been subject to close supervision" of working conditions was urged by the Secretary of Labor but explicitly rejected by the Court. In rejecting this argument and others the Court specifically preserved the Colonnade-Biswell exception to the warrant requirement. The Court indicated that there were other industries, covered by regulatory schemes applicable only to them, where regulation might be so pervasive that a Colonnade-Biswell exception to the warrant requirement could apply. 436 U.S. at 313, 321, 98 S.Ct. at 1820, 1824.Such warrantless searches are upheld because "when an entrepreneur embarks on such a business, he has chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation," id. at 313, 98 S.Ct. at 1820 and " 'in effect consents to the restrictions placed on him'." Ibid., citing Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 271, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2538, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). Further, in the face of a long history of government scrutiny, such a proprietor has no "reasonable expectation of privacy." Ibid.We think the drug-manufacturing industry is properly within the Colonnade-Biswell exception to the warrant requirement. The drug-manufacturing industry has a long history of supervision and inspection. The present Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act has its origins in the Food and Drug Act of 1906, 34 Stat. 768. That Act was an attempt by Congress "to exclude from interstate commerce impure and adulterated food and drugs ..." and to prevent the transport of such articles "from their place of manufacture." McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 128, 33 S.Ct. 431, 433, 57 L.Ed. 754 (1913).The Biswell Court acknowledged that the history of regulation of interstate firearms traffic was "not as deeply rooted" as the history of liquor regulation, but included firearms within the warrant exception because their regulation was of "central importance to federal efforts to prevent violent crime and to assist the states in regulating the firearms traffic within their borders." United States v. Biswell, supra, 406 U.S. at 315, 92 S.Ct. at 1596. This passage teaches that the nature of the federal or public interest sought to be furthered by the regulatory scheme is important to our analysis. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, 436 U.S. at 337, 98 S.Ct. at 1833 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is difficult to overstate the urgent nature of the public-health interests served by effective regulation of our nation's drug-manufacturing industry. Furthermore, virtually every phase of the drug industry is heavily regulated, from packaging, labeling, and certification of expiration dates,4 to prior FDA approval before new drugs can be marketed.5 The regulatory burdens on the drug-manufacturing industry are weighty, and that weight indicates that the drug manufacturer accepts the burdens as well as the benefits of the business and "consents to the regulations placed on him." Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, 436 U.S. at 313, 98 S.Ct. at 1820.The final lesson of Barlow's is that the reasonableness of warrantless searches is dependent on the "specific enforcement needs and privacy guarantees of each statute." Id. at 321, 98 S.Ct. at 1824. In Barlow's the Court was unconvinced that requiring OSHA officials to obtain administrative warrants when consent to inspect was withheld would cripple the effectiveness of the enforcement scheme. The Court reasoned that most businessmen were likely to consent to inspections, and the Secretary's argument that a warrant requirement would impede enforcement was inconsistent with the fact that OSHA regulations promulgated by the Secretary themselves provided for obtaining warrants, even though the statute did not require it. Id. at 316-20, 98 S.Ct. at 1822-24. This Court is aware of no similar FDA regulation.6Regulation of the drug industry differs from the OSHA situation in another significant way. The class sought to be protected by OSHA regulation of safety of work areas is made up of employees, who are in the work place itself and free to report violations at any time.7 The protected class in the area of drug manufacturing is the consuming public, which has no way of learning of violations short of illness resulting from the consumption of defective drug products. In this sense the enforcement needs of drug-industry regulation are considerably more critical than those before the Court in Barlow's.As for privacy guarantees, the Supreme Court points out that a warrant provides assurances that the proposed "inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan containing specific neutral criteria." Id. at 323, 98 S.Ct. at 1825 (footnote omitted). The notice of inspection used in this case satisfies at least some of these criteria. It informs the "owner or agent in charge" (§ 374(a)) of the "scope and objects of the search." Barlow's, supra, 436 U.S. at 323, 98 S.Ct. at 1825. Although the notice of inspection makes no express reference to reasonableness under the Constitution, it clearly states that notice is given pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 374, which is enacted by the Congress. The name of the firm and address is also prominently listed. Further, the notice of inspection reproduces large portions of § 374(a), stating the areas and objects to be searched; that the inspection is to take place at reasonable times; that certain records are to be made available to the inspector; that each inspection must be made with reasonable promptness; that each inspection must be accompanied by a separate notice; and that the purpose of any inspection of a prescription-drug operation is discovery of information "bearing on whether prescription drugs (are being) adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of" the Act or on other violations of the Act.8 21 U.S.C. § 374(a). Equally important, the Notice of Inspection informs the owner of what cannot be examined by the inspector. Inspections relating to prescription drugs do not extend to financial data, pricing data, and certain data regarding sales, personnel, and research.9 Ibid.In sum, the authorizing statute now before the Court was not painted with so broad a brush as the one rejected in Barlow's, the enforcement needs are more critical in the drug-manufacturing field, and the interests of the general public are more urgent. We hold that inspections authorized by § 374 are "reasonable" and therefore not inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment. Thus, this case falls within the "carefully defined classes of cases" which are an exception to the search-warrant requirement.10 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1730, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). We share, to a degree, the fears expressed by appellants that many businesses are thoroughly regulated by the United States, and that an undue extension of our rationale might obliterate much of the Fourth Amendment's protection. On balance, however, we are persuaded that the capacity for good or ill of the manufacture of drugs for human consumption is so great that Congress had power to enact § 374(a).Having concluded that drug manufacturing is a "pervasively regulated" industry does not end our inquiry,11 but establishes only that Congress has broad authority to place restrictions on that industry that might otherwise violate the Fourth Amendment. A question remains as to whether the conduct of the government in this case conforms with the statutory scheme provided by the Congress.The Court in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, supra, confronted a very similar issue. There Internal Revenue Service agents, suspecting a violation of the federal excise tax law, sought to inspect an establishment where liquor was being served.12 The owner refused to open a locked storeroom and asked if the agents had a search warrant. The agents answered that they didn't need a warrant, broke the lock, entered, and found evidence of regulatory violations.After emphasizing the long history of regulation of the sale of liquor, the Court acknowledged the broad authority of Congress to provide for inspections under the liquor laws. Colonnade, supra, 397 U.S. at 75-76, 90 S.Ct. at 776-777. Under the existing statutory scheme, however, the Court concluded that Congress had not provided for "forcible entries without a warrant," id. at 77, 90 S.Ct. at 777. This conclusion was based on Congress's provision of a separate penalty for a dealer's refusal to permit an inspection.13 Compare Biswell, supra, 406 U.S. at 314, 92 S.Ct. at 1595. Consent being absent, the search was held invalid, and the evidence suppressed.The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act contains provisions, similar to those addressed in Colonnade, which punish refusals to permit inspections by imprisonment up to one year, or a fine of not more than $1,000, or both. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(f) and 333(a).14 It follows, therefore, as in Colonnade, that an inspection pursuant to a § 374 notice to inspect is authorized only when there is a valid consent. If consent is withheld, a separate violation of the Act occurs, and the FDA inspectors are required to obtain a warrant before the inspection can proceed.This brings us to the problem presented by the search at the Wentzville site. Here, as in Colonnade, the critical issue is whether there was consent to the inspection.15 Unfortunately this issue was not expressly resolved in the court below. The magistrate approved the Wentzville inspection but made no findings on the consent issue.16 Although there is evidence in the record from which consent could have been found, the trier of fact was not required to believe it, and we are not at liberty to make our own findings. Therefore, as to Counts VII and VIII, the counts as to which evidence was taken from the Wentzville site, the judgments of conviction will be vacated, and the cause remanded for the making of further findings on the issue of consent. The district court may hold a further hearing on this issue if it wishes, but the existing record may be sufficient.We add a word of clarification as to the meaning of the term "consent" as we intend it in this context. We do not mean, by imposing a requirement of "consent," to require a factual determination as to whether appellants, with respect to the Wentzville site, knowingly and understandingly relinquished a known right. The question is whether appellants refused to permit entry or inspection, thereby violating 21 U.S.C. Sec . 331 (f). If they did so refuse, then FDA was obliged to obtain an administrative warrant in order to effect the inspection, and could also seek a separate criminal prosecution for the refusal itself. If appellants did not refuse to permit entry or inspection, then they "consented" to the search and seizure, as we use that term here. This formulation, while it may not answer every question that may arise with respect to searches and seizures pursuant to Sec. 374 notices of inspection, seems to us to be the most logical way to harmonize Biswell and Colonnade. As the court said in United States v. Litvin, supra, 353 F. Supp. at 1338:Therefore, as in Colonnade, if defendant refused entry to the Food and Drug Administration inspectors he was in violation of Sec. 331(f) and subject to one-year imprisonment and/or $1000 fine. But if defendant refused entry, the inspectors had no right to enter the storeroom, and following Colonnade, any evidence seized as a result of the search must be suppressed.The Morganford Road InspectionThe inspection and seizures conducted at the Morganford Road site were supported not only by a statutory notice, but also by a Warrant for Inspection issued by a United States Magistrate on October 23, 1975, and a Warrant for Arrest of Property issued by the clerk of the district court on October 29, 1975.17 Appellants now argue that the inspection and seizures were illegal because the application for the warrant for inspection did not comply with traditional probable-cause standards. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, however, teaches that "(p)robable cause in the criminal law sense is not required ..." to secure a warrant for an administrative search. 436 U.S. at 320, 98 S.Ct. at 1824. Probable cause for administrative-search purposes may be based on "specific evidence of an existing violation," ibid. (footnote omitted), or a "showing that 'reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an ... inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular (establishment).' " Ibid., citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1735, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). Those standards are met here, where the application for the inspection warrant contained evidence of numerous violations of the FDCA, sworn to by an FDA investigator.18Appellants next argue that the inspections were part of an ongoing criminal investigation, and that therefore a warrant issued on less than criminal probable cause was not sufficient to authorize a search.19 It is our view that a warrant based on an administrative showing of probable cause is valid in this pervasively regulated industry. To hold otherwise would be inconsistent with our conclusion, already expressed, that warrantless entry under a notice of inspection does not violate the Fourth Amendment in the drug-manufacturing field. Probable-cause standards are relaxed because the business person engaged in this industry has a lesser expectation of privacy.The appellants cite Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 512, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1951, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978), for the proposition that where the government has probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, access to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution requires a warrant issued upon a traditional showing of probable cause. Tyler involved a series of searches by a fire marshal at the scene of a fire. During the initial inspection two containers of flammable liquid were found. Suspecting arson, the fire chief summoned police and turned over the containers. Later that day the marshal, continuing his initial investigation, discovered suspicious burn marks on some carpet and other evidence of arson. Some weeks later fire officials returned to the premises on several occasions to gather evidence. The Supreme Court held thatan entry to fight a fire requires no warrant, and that once in the building, officials may remain there for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of the blaze. Thereafter, additional entries to investigate the cause of the fire must be made pursuant to the warrant procedures governing administrative searches. Evidence of arson discovered in the course of such investigations is admissible at trial, but if the investigating officials find probable cause to believe that arson has occurred and require further access to gather evidence for possible prosecution, they may obtain a warrant only upon a traditional showing of probable cause applicable to searches for evidence of a crime.Id. at 511-12, 98 S.Ct. at 1950-51 (citations omitted).The answer is that Tyler did not involve pervasively regulated industries, which the Supreme Court has referred to as "exceptions" that are "responses to relatively unique circumstances." Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 313, 98 S.Ct. at 1820. The rule in Tyler rests on a different foundation from the rule applicable to pervasively regulated industries. In Tyler the Court saidthere is no diminution in a person's reasonable expectation of privacy nor in the protection of the Fourth Amendment simply because the official conducting the search wears the uniform of a firefighter rather than a policeman, ....436 U.S. at 506, 98 S.Ct. at 1948. In the case of the inspection to discover the cause of a fire, the reasonable expectation of privacy remains, but the basis for the pervasively-regulated-industry exception to the warrant requirement is that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. See Barlow's, 436 U.S. at 313, 98 S.Ct. at 1820. Therefore, Tyler is not determinative.For these reasons we hold that in the case of a pervasively regulated industry warrants based on an administrative showing of probable cause are valid so long as the extent of the intrusion is limited to the purposes specified in the statute.20 In Barlow's the Supreme Court indicated that specific evidence of an existing violation (and the FDA had such evidence here) could justify a search based upon an administrative warrant, even though OSHA contains criminal as well as civil penalties. See 29 U.S.C. § 666. Thus the evidence from the Morganford Road site was not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and was properly admissible at trial.21 The question of consent, discussed above with respect to the Wentzville site, does not arise here, because the agents did obtain a warrant based on a valid administrative showing.The Chambers Medical Group SearchDuring the course of the trial an issue arose concerning several searches of a dispensary in the ground-floor area of the Chambers Medical Group building in St. Louis, owned by a Dr. Salit. Appellants question the legality of these searches.A Dr. Eckert testified that he and Dr. Salit were "partners" in a "corporation" engaged in the practice of medicine in the building. The doctors made arrangements with Jamieson, Jr., to open a dispensary on the lower floor of "their" building. Jamieson, Jr., was to pay rent, hire employees, pay for the utilities, stock the dispensary, and pay all other ancillary expenses, and at the end of each month the profits were to be divided between the doctors' corporation and Jamieson, Jr. There was further testimony that the dispensary ceased doing business on October 29, 1975, after there were reports in the press of the searches at Morganford Road. During and after the period when the dispensary was operating (roughly April 1975 to October 29, 1975), both doctors and their employees had unlimited access to the dispensary and had their own keys.The agent who conducted the searches testified that he visited the store on November 7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 17, and 24, 1975. He also testified that after he presented his credentials Dr. Eckert let him in and gave permission to collect samples. The district court ruled that Dr. Eckert had capacity to consent to the search and that he did give his consent to the FDA inspector. The lower court's ruling was based on United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), in which the Supreme Court saidproof of voluntary consent (to a warrantless search), ... is not limited to proof that consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.Id. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993 (footnote omitted).We agree with the district court. The agent obtained entry to the dispensary area after Dr. Eckert "offered him a key," and there were no threats or overbearing assertions of authority. The doctors and Jamieson, Jr., were in effect in business together, and Dr. Eckert's authority to consent to the searches cannot be seriously questioned. Therefore the searches at the Chambers Medical Group building were not in violation of the Fourth Amendment.III. Miranda WarningsAppellants next argue that certain statements made by the defendants to FDA agents during the searches were inadmissible at trial because Miranda warnings were not given. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The district court held that Miranda was not applicable because "the evidence failed to establish that defendants ... were in a custodial situation, subject to arrest."Evidence presented at trial showed that FDA agents are without authority to make arrests, that the defendants' movements were not restricted during the time of the search, and that there were no threats or coercion. Evidence also indicated that appellants' employees were free to go about their business, and that consultation with attorneys was not limited. There is ample evidence to support the district court's finding, and the statements were therefore properly admitted at trial.IV. Sufficiency of the EvidenceAppellants next argue that there was insufficient evidence to support conviction of any of the 11 counts charged. The substantive counts II through XI will be discussed first, with the conspiracy charge, count I, discussed last.Count IICount II of the indictment alleged, and the district court found, that the defendants sold counterfeit Motrin tablets to a Dr. Zack Barnes of Kansas City, Missouri, with the intent to defraud and mislead. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(g)(2), 331(i)(3), and 333(b). A "counterfeit drug" is defined asa drug which, or the container or labeling of which, without authorization, bears the trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device, or any likeness thereof, of a drug manufacturer ... other than the person or persons who in fact manufactured, processed, packed, or distributed such drug and which thereby falsely purports or is represented to be the product of ... such other drug manufacturer ....21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(2). "Motrin" is the trademark of the Upjohn Company used for the drug ibuprofen since 1970. Upjohn has never authorized any of the defendants to manufacture ibuprofen or to use the trademark Motrin. Since October 1974, Upjohn has manufactured and distributed Motrin tablets, which are coated, round, orange tablets with the logo "Upjohn 750" on one side. When Motrin was first marketed, demand exceeded supply, resulting in a nation-wide shortage from late 1974 until late 1975. During the Motrin shortage in June of 1975, Jamieson, Jr., ordered and received 200,000 magnesium salicylate tablets from C.M. Bundy Company of Cincinnati, Ohio. At Jamieson, Jr.'s, request C.M. Bundy manufactured the tablets to resemble a Motrin tablet. Sometime after this, in response to an order by Dr. Zack Barnes, Jamieson-McKames sent Dr. Barnes a bottle with "Motrin" printed on a Pharmacare Payless label, thereby falsely representing the contents as Motrin.22We affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction on count II. Where a trial, like this one, is to the court rather than a jury, the standard of review is "whether there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the government, to support the fact determination by the trial court." United States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,Try vLex for FREE for 3 days
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