UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

THIS SUMMARY ORDER WILL NOT BE PUBLISHED IN THE FEDERAL REPORTER

AND MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO THIS OR ANY

OTHER COURT, BUT MAY BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THIS OR ANY

OTHER COURT IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR

IN ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the

Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 13th

day of April, two thousand and six.

PRESENT:

HON. ROGER J. MINER,

HON. JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

HON. ROSEMARY S. POOLER,

Circuit Judges.

Varinder Parkash Singh,

Petitioner,

-v.- No. 04-5021-ag

NAC

Alberto R. Gonzales,

Respondent.

FOR PETITIONER: Hector Roman, New York, New York.

FOR RESPONDENT: Thomas A. Marino, United States Attorney for the Middle District

of Pennsylvania (Stephen R. Cerutti II, Assistant United States

Attorney "on the brief"), Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a decision of the Board of

Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the

petition for review is DENIED.

Varinder Parkash Singh, through counsel, petitions for review of the BIA's decision affirming an immigration judge's ("IJ's") denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). We presume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history of the case.

Where, as here, the BIA summarily affirms the IJ, the Court reviews the IJ's decision as the final agency determination. See, e.g., Twum v. INS, 411 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir. 2005). This Court reviews the agency's factual findings, including adverse credibility determinations, under the substantial evidence standard. See 8U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Jin Hui Gao v. United States Att'y Gen., 400 F.3d 963, 964 (2d Cir. 2005).

The IJ found Singh not credible because a government investigation concluded that no "Randhawa Hospital" in Batala, India, existed, which was where Singh claimed he had been treat ed on four occasions for injuries he had acquired due to beatings by Indian police. Singh argues that the IJ should not have relied so heavily on the government's investigation report because it was not cross-examined and relied on double hearsay.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires a party to pursue all possible relief within the deciding agency before seeking federal judicial review of an unfavorable administrative decision. Howell v. INS, 72 F.3d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1995). Singh's counsel failed to object to either the admissibility or the weight given to the government's report.

Because Singh failed to raise these issues before either the IJ or BIA, he did not exhaust his remedies and this Court lacks jurisdiction to review these issues. Furthermore, the issue of weight, which Singh challenges in his petition for review, is more of a fact-based determination on which this Court generally defers to the agency's judgment. See 8U.S.C. §1252(b)(4)(B); Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2005).

Because withholding of removal requires a heavier burden of proof, it follows that an applicant who fails to establish his eligibility for asylum necessarily fails to establish eligibility for withholding of removal. Ramsameachire, 357 F.3d 169, 183 (2d Cir. 2004). Because Zhou failed to argue his CAT claim before either this Court or the BIA, the claim is deemed both waived and unexhausted. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 542 n.1, 546 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005); Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2005).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. Having completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DENIED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34(d)(1).

FOR THE COURT: Roseann B. MacKechnie, Clerk By: