BLD-365 N O T PRECEDENTIAL

U N IT E D STATES COURT OF APPEALS

F O R THE THIRD CIRCUIT

N O . 07-2708

K E V I N RAZZOLI,

Appellant

v. U .S . NAVY; U.S. PAROLE COMMISSION; U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL

G O N Z A L E Z ; WARDEN LACKAWANNA COUNTY PRISON;

S C R A N T O N POLICE DEPARTMENT

O n Appeal From the United States District Court

F o r the Middle District of Pennsylvania

(D .C . No. 06-cv-01834)

D is tric t Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik

S u b m itte d For Possible Dismissal Under 28U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action

U n d e r Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

S e p te m b e r 7, 2007

B e f o re : MCKEE, FUENTES AND VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES

(F ile d October 2, 2007)

OPINION

P E R CURIAM In 1987, Kevin Razzoli was convicted of attempted murder and other offenses by a N a v y Court Martial and sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment. Pursuant to 10U.S.C.

§ 858, he was transferred to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons to serve his s e n te n c e. Razzoli has previously been paroled on multiple occasions. On three o c c a s io n s , Razzoli's parole was revoked because he violated the terms of the parole. Just p r io r to another parole, his parole date was delayed after an altercation with his case m a n a g e r. In November 2004, Razzoli filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28U.S.C.

§ 2241 in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania reg ard ing the revocation of his parole in 2004. That petition was dismissed and this Court af firm ed . See Razzoli v. FCI Allenwood, 200 Fed. Appx.166 (2006).1 R a z z o li was most recently paroled on July 27, 2006, from USP-Beaumont, Texas.

Razzoli again violated parole conditions and a warrant was issued for his arrest. On A u g u s t 9, 2006, Razzoli pled guilty to disorderly conduct in Lackawanna County Central C o u rt. After serving his state sentence, Razzoli remained in the custody of the L a c k aw a n n a County prison as a detainee for his parole violation. On August 28, 2006, th e United States Parole Commission provided Razzoli with notice that there would be a h e a rin g to determine whether his parole should be revoked because of the disorderly c o n d u c t charge (among other things). Razzoli was transferred to a federal institution in P h ila d e lp h ia for the hearing, which was conducted in December 2006. At the hearing, R a z zo li waived counsel and admitted to the disorderly conduct conviction. The C o m m iss io n ordered Razzoli's parole revoked due to the conviction on the disorderly c o n d u c t charge and sentenced Razzoli to fourteen months of imprisonment with a p re s u m p tiv e parole date of October 3, 2007.

Razzoli thereafter filed the instant pro se § 2241 petition in September 2006.

Although not a model of clarity, Razzoli's petition appears to allege that he should be re le a se d from confinement because: (1) he has not had a naval clemency hearing since the 1 9 9 0 s; (2) he was arrested in 2006 pursuant to a Pennsylvania statute that does not exist; a n d (3) the 2006 parole revocation proceedings violated his Due Process rights. The D is tric t Court dismissed Razzoli's petition, concluding that each of Razzoli's claims was w ith o u t merit. The District Court also denied Razzoli's pending motions for declaratory ju d g m e n t, issuance of subpoenas, suspension of time, expedited evidentiary hearing, and th e recusal of the Honorable Edwin M. Kosik.

We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district c o u rt's denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28U.S.C. § 2241.

B e c a u se we find that Razzoli's appeal presents no substantial question, we will s u m m a rily affirm the District Court's judgment. See Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P.

1 0 .6 .

With respect to Razzoli's claim that his rights have been violated because he has n o t had a naval clemency hearing since the 1990s, Razzoli raised a similar claim in his p rio r § 2241 petition. We previously determined that Razzoli is not entitled to annual c le m e n c y hearings because he is under the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the Bureau of P r is o n s and is not entitled to different treatment because he was convicted by a Navy c o u rt martial. See Razzoli, 200 Fed. Appx. at 168-69 (quoting 10U.S.C. § 858(a)).

Moreover, Razzoli fails to cite any authority in his current petition that supports his p o s itio n .

We also agree with the District Court that Razzoli's claim that he was illegally a rre ste d pursuant to a statute that does not exist is without merit. Razzoli was arrested for a violation of 18 Pa. C. S. § 3926(a)(4), a statutory section which has been in effect since 1 9 7 3 and was amended in 1995. Further, Razzoli's assertions in his habeas petition that h is arrest pursuant to this state statute constituted illegal retaliation for his filing of u n id e n tif ie d civil rights actions or that defendants maintained false and inaccurate records a re not supported by the record.

In addition, Razzoli appears to allege that his Due Process rights were violated w h e n the Commission failed to comply with 18U.S.C. § 4214(a)(1)(A) and various f e d e r a l regulations. In support of this claim, he alleges that he was entitled to a "fast h e a rin g " within the area of his violation and "access to records [and the ability to] su b p o en a witnesses who [were] involved with his parole violation." The District Court p ro p e rly dismissed this claim. Revocation of parole is not part of a criminal prosecution a n d thus the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such a proceeding does not apply to parole revocations. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). Razzoli appears to h a v e received all the process that he was due under Morrissey. Further, as the District C o u rt explained, Razzoli was not entitled to the issuance of subpoenas. A revocation h e a rin g is not a forum where a parolee may "relitigate issues determined against him in o th e r forums, as in the situation presented when the revocation is based on the conviction o f another crime." Id. at 490. Even assuming arguendo that the United States Parole C o m m is s io n failed to comply with certain procedures, Razzoli fails to explain what p re ju d ice , if any, he has suffered because of the Commission's putative actions. At his h e a rin g before the Commission, Razzoli admitted to a disorderly conduct conviction, and th e Commission ordered Razzoli's parole revoked based on this conviction.

F in a lly, the District Court properly denied Razzoli's motion for the recusal of the H o n o ra b le Edwin M. Kosik.2 A reasonable person knowing all of the circumstances w o u ld not harbor doubts about Judge Kosik's impartiality. See Selkridge v. United of O m a h a Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 167 (3d Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted).

For these reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court's judgment. To the e x ten t Razzoli attempts to raise any issues for the first time on appeal, we decline to a d d re s s them.

1 In that case, we determined that Razzoli had committed the attempted murder o f f en s e that he was court-martialed for on October 15, 1986. As a result, we determined th a t his case was governed by the old parole law.

2 As noted above, the order appealed from also disposed of a number of other m o tio n s . We are satisfied that the District Court properly resolved these motions.