Regina v Sirakuras [1964] PNGLR 18

• Jurisdiction: Papua New Guinea
• Judge: Smithers J
• Judgment Date: 19 November 1963
• Citation: [1964] PNGLR 18
• Court: Supreme Court
• Year: 1964
• Judgement Number: No318

Full Title: Regina v Sirakuras [1964] PNGLR 18

Supreme Court: Smithers J

Judgment Delivered: 19 November 1963

1 Evidence—confessions; Interpreters

2 Confession inadmissible; involuntary; standard of proof—reasonable satisfaction; no evidence 2 interpreters or accused understood his right to remain silent

CRIMINAL LAW—Confessions—Voluntariness—Standard of proof of voluntariness—Correct mode of administering caution to an accused person through interpreters.

In deciding whether the voluntariness of a confession has been proved to his reasonable satisfaction the trial judge must have regard to the evidence, the nature of the allegation made against the accused and the consequences which may flow from a finding that the allegation has been established. Where therefore on a charge of wilful murder the Crown tendered a confession allegedly made by the accused, an ignorant primitive native detained in custody at Madang far from his home area, to a police officer through two interpreters and the accused had previously denied participation in the killing and the evidence of the police officer did not indicate a realisation that he must in administering the caution make sure that the accused understands that he may remain silent.

Held:

The confession was not shown to have been voluntarily made and must be rejected.

The correct mode of administering a caution by a police officer to a native through native interpreters discussed.

Indictment:

The facts appear from the judgment.

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Smithers J: The accused is charged with wilful murder and there is tendered against him a confession made to a police officer.

Mr O'Regan who appears for the accused, contends that the confession was not made voluntarily.

The onus on this issue is on the Crown. The Crown must prove affirmatively that the confession was a voluntary one. It is not necessary to prove this beyond reasonable doubt but it must be proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the judge.

An opinion that a fact exists may be held by a person according to indefinite gradations of certainty, from the almost tentative opinion which would rest on the weighing down of the balance of probabilities by the merest featherweight, to complete certainty. A question arises therefore as to when it can be said that opinion ripens into reasonable satisfaction of the existence of the fact.

Such a state of reasonable satisfaction cannot be attained or established independently of the nature and consequences of the facts to be proved.

A tribunal of facts may be said to be reasonably satisfied of a fact is established, it feels justified in acting on the basis that it is in issue, and the gravity of the consequences of a finding that the fact is established, it feels justified in acting on the basis that it is established.

Having regard to the probability that in a case like the present the confession will carry perhaps decisive weight on the issue of guilt, the gravity of the consequences of a finding of voluntariness is of high degree. I think that this particular consequence is, in law within the range of consequences relevant on the issue of voluntariness.

It follows that before the tribunal can be reasonably satisfied that the confession was made voluntarily the evidence must be such as to induce satisfaction, not beyond reasonable doubt, but perhaps not far from it. It cannot exist alongside the persistence of any substantial doubt. In this case I do not feel justified in acting on the basis that this confession has been shown to be voluntary.

It is an essential condition of the voluntariness of a confession that the accused person should really understand that he is under no compulsion to speak, that he is free to speak or not to speak. Indeed it seems to me, with respect to the general run of cases in this Territory, that if this condition is satisfied a confession will seldom be rejected.

The fundamental problem for the judge therefore is whether he can be satisfied that the accused did understand, in particular, that he was free to refrain from speaking. In cases where an accused person comes to a police officer for the express purpose of confessing, and perhaps also to seek protection, proof of voluntariness is obviously easily provided. This, however, is not one of those cases. In this case the accused displayed a disposition to deny participation in the crime and did not confess until he had been in actual police custody in cells at Madang for at least one night and part of two days.

It appears that the crime took place...