[D O NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED

F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

March 14, 2006

N o . 05-13608

THOMAS K. KAHN

N o n - A r g u m e n t Calendar CLERK

D . C. Docket No. 05-00674-CV-H-S

S A N D R A JOHNSON GARDNER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

JIMMY A. BELL,

Attorney,

EVERALD F. THOMPSON,

Attorney,

Defendants-Appellees.

A p p e al from the United States District Court

fo r the Northern District of Alabama

(M a rch 14, 2006)

B efo re MARCUS, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

P E R CURIAM: S a n d r a Johnson Gardner appeals the judgment on the pleadings against her c la im of legal malpractice and argues the district court erroneously determined her c la im was time-barred under the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act. See Ala.

C o d e § 6-5-574(a). We affirm.

Jimmy A. Bell and Everald F. Thompson are attorneys who represented G ard n er in a putative class action suit against the Department of Veteran Affairs.

Gardner alleged that Bell and Thompson failed to respond timely to a request for ad m issio n s the Department served on Gardner that was due on June 4, 2002. The D ep artm en t refused a request by Bell and Thompson to extend the time to respond an d filed a notice of default of discovery obligation. On September 30, 2002, Bell an d Thompson allegedly facilitated a fraud on the court by enlisting a plaintiff to fo rg e the signature of a judge on a motion to extend discovery. On January 3, 2 0 0 3 , the district court granted summary judgment for the Department on the basis o f the discovery default and attempted fraud.

On January 7, 2005, Gardner, a resident of Alabama, filed suit against Bell an d Thompson in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, and sought $ 1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 in damages for legal malpractice. Bell and Thompson, both residents o f Maryland, removed the action to federal court and moved for judgment on the p lead in g s on the ground that Gardner's claim was time-barred under the Alabama L e g a l Services Liability Act. See Ala. Code § 6-5-574(a). The district court g ran ted judgment on the pleadings because Gardner's claim was time-barred.

Gardner appeals pro se and argues the district court erroneously concluded th a t Gardner's claim of legal malpractice was time-barred and ignored evidence sh e offered with her pleadings. We liberally construe Gardner's arguments in d e f er en c e to her pro se status. See McBride v. Sharpe, 25 F.3d 962, 971 (11th Cir. 1 9 9 4 ). "We review a judgment on the pleadings de novo. . . . [and] accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to th e nonmoving party." Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (1 1 th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). "Judgment on the pleadings is ap p ro p riate where there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is en titled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.

The district court correctly concluded that Gardner's claim of legal m alp ractice was time-barred. Under the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act, claim s of legal malpractice "must be commenced within two years after the act or o m is sio n or failure giving rise to the claim, and not afterwards." Ala. Code § 6 -5 -5 7 4 (a); see Dennis v. Northcutt, 887 So. 2d 219, 220 (Ala. 2004). The L iab ility Act includes a savings clause that provides, "[I]f the cause of action is not d is co v e re d and could not reasonably have been discovered within such period, then th e action may be commenced within six months from the date of such discovery o r the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, w h ich ev er is earlier." Ala. Code § 6-5-574(a); see Dennis, 887 So. 2d at 220.

Although the district court considered Alabama law unsettled regarding w h eth er to use an "occurrence rule" or "damage rule" to calculate the period of lim ita tio n s , Gardner's claims are time-barred under either rule. The alleged m alp ractice "occurred" either on June 4, 2002, when Bell and Thompson allegedly failed to respond timely to the request for admissions, or on September 30, 2002, w h e n Bell and Thompson allegedly facilitated a fraud on the court. Gardner was "d a m a g e d " on January 3, 2003, the date the district court granted summary ju d g m e n t for the Department on the basis of the alleged malpractice. Gardner filed su it on January 7, 2005, more than two years after even the latest of those dates.

The savings clause likewise is inapplicable because Gardner reasonably could have k n o w n of either the alleged "occurrences" of legal malpractice or the "damage" cau sed by the alleged malpractice within two years.

AFFIRMED.