Certiorari to the Court of Appeals of Georgia -- 156 Ga. App. 663., Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part. All the Justices concur, except Smith, J., disqualified.

James S. Owens, Jr., Robert L. Goldstucker, Ross Arnold, for appellant.

This case is here on certiorari. Taylor v. Greiner, 209 Ga. 98, 108 (70 SE2d 734) (1952); 1 EGL 107, Abuse of Process, Malicious Prosecution and False Imprisonment, 19, 20 (1977 Rev.); see 52 AmJur2d, Malicious Prosecution, 10, 11. [2] We reaffirm this rule and decline to hold that the expense of defending a disciplinary proceeding where one's license to pursue one's livelihood is at stake falls into a different category than defense of other civil litigation. See Dixie Broadcasting Corp. v. Rivers, supra; 52 AmJur2d, Malicious Prosecution, 19-20. We therefore affirm the second division of the Court of Appeals' opinion.

2. Having determined that a cause of action for malicious abuse of process was barred by the statute of limitations and that a cause of action for malicious use of process would not lie in the absence of special damages other than those incident to defending the proceeding, the Court of Appeals held that a cause of action would lie for malicious interference with property. We must disagree. To hold that by instituting proceedings concerning a professional before a state board charged with regulating that profession, the complainant is subject to pay the professional's expenses of defense in a suit for malicious interference with property would place too onerous a burden on potential complainants and would unjustifiably interfere with the governmental purposes served by providing such procedures for aggrieved citizens. Dr. Greiner did not lose his license to practice nor any patients. He and Mr. Giddings were required only to defend their practices before the appropriate tribunal. The interest of professionals in protecting their livelihood from unjustified attack can be fully protected by the timely filing of suit for malicious abuse of process where the complaint was brought "wrongfully and unlawfully for a purpose which it is not intended by law to effect . . .," Brantley v. Rhodes-Haverty Furn. Co., 88 Ga. App. 131 (76 SE2d 229) (1953).

1981