[D O NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

F O R THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED

U .S . COURT OF APPEALS

E L E V E N T H CIRCUIT

January 18, 2007

N o . 06-12193 T H O M A S K. KAHN

CLERK

D . C. Docket No. 04-02082-CV-1-TWT

T E R E S A ELDRIDGE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

WACHOVIA CORPORATION LONG-TERM DISABILITY PLAN,

WACHOVIA'S BENEFITS COMMITTEE,

WACHOVIA CORPORATION,

LIBERTY LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY OF BOSTON,

Defendants-

Counter-Claimants-

Counter-Defendants-

Appellees,

LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellee.

A p p e al from the United States District Court

fo r the Northern District of Georgia

(J a n u a ry 18, 2007)

B efo re BIRCH and PRYOR, Circuit Judges, and COVINGTON,* District Judge.

P E R CURIAM: T eresa Eldridge appeals the summary judgment against her claims under the E m p lo yee Retirement Income Security Act relating to the termination of her longterm disability benefits ("LTD benefits") under the Wachovia Corporation LongT e rm Disability Plan. She contends that the district court erred when it affirmed th e termination of her LTD benefits, refused to permit discovery, and declined to im p o se penalties on the administrators of the Plan for failure to provide certain P lan documents. We affirm.

"W e review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying th e same legal standards that controlled the district court's decision." Levinson v. R elian ce Standard Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 2001). Although "E R IS A provides no standard for reviewing decisions of plan administrators," W illiam s v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 373 F.3d 1132, 1134 (11th Cir. 2004), we h av e adopted a "well-defined series of steps in reviewing a denial of benefits d ecisio n in an ERISA case," Tippitt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 457 F.3d 1 2 2 7 , 1231-32 (11th Cir. 2006). "`At each step, the court makes a determination th at results in either the progression to the next step or the end of the inquiry.'" Id. at 1232 (quoting HCA Health Servs. of Ga., Inc. v. Employers Health Ins. Co., 240 F .3 d 982, 993 (11th Cir. 2001)).

O n ly the first two steps are relevant to this appeal. In step one, the court "ex am in [es] the plan documents to determine whether they grant the administrator d iscretio n " in making a benefits determination. Id. at 1232. The parties to this ap p eal agree that the administrator had discretion. In step two, the court reviews th e decision by the administrator to determine whether it was "wrong." See id. A d e c is io n is "wrong" if, after a review of the decision from a de novo perspective, "th e court disagrees with the administrator's decision." See Williams, 373 F.3d at 1 1 3 8 & n.8; see also HCA Health Servs., 240 F.3d at 993 n.23. The record is r es tr ic te d to "the facts as known to the administrator at the time the decision was m a d e ." Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 890 F.2d 1137, 1139 (11th Cir. 1 9 8 9 ). If the decision by the administrator was "right," the inquiry ends, and the co u rt affirms the decision. See Tippit, 457 F.3d at 1232.

A n additional standard of review governs the remaining issues in this appeal.

We review both discovery rulings, Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits, Inc., 363 F.3d 1 1 1 3 , 1121 (11th Cir. 2004), and the refusal of a district court to impose penalties u n d er section 502(c) of ERISA, 29U.S.C. § 1132(c); see Hunt v. Hawthorne A sso cs., Inc., 119 F.3d 888, 914 (11th Cir. 1997), for abuse of discretion. E ld r id g e presents three arguments. She contends that the district court erro n eo u sly affirmed the termination of her LTD benefits, abused its discretion by refu sin g to permit discovery, and erred by declining to impose penalties on the ad m in istrato rs of the Plan for failure to provide certain Plan documents. We d iscu ss each issue in turn.

E ld rid g e first contends that Liberty Life Assurance Company of Boston ("L ib erty Life"), the claims administrator for the Plan, and Wachovia's Benefits C o m m ittee, the Plan administrator, erroneously terminated her LTD benefits. She asserts that the administrators based the termination on an incorrect definition of d is ab ility from an outdated Plan document and the administrators committed sev eral procedural errors. We disagree.

Even under the definition of disability that Eldridge advances, the decision b y the administrators was not "wrong." Eldridge contends that the administrators sh o u ld have assessed whether she was "unable to perform all of the material and su b stan tial duties pertaining to the occupation [she] held at the time the disability b eg an ." The record before the administrators established that Eldridge was able to p erfo rm some material and substantial duties of her job as a senior vice president, a sed en tary job.

When we review the record de novo, we do not disagree with the decision by th e administrators. On January 28, 2002, Liberty Life requested updated medical in fo rm atio n from Eldridge. Eldridge provided an Attending Physician's Statement fro m Howard Ehrenfeld, M.D., who opined that Eldridge could work an eight-hour w o r k day at a "sedentary job." On March 21, Liberty Life informed Eldridge that L T D benefits would not be approved beyond March 31. Liberty Life had reviewed v a r io u s medical records, including treatment notes from her surgeon, which stated th a t Eldridge "has very little difficulty doing anything when she appears to set her m in d but . . . really has no desire to go back to work." E ld rid g e appealed to Liberty Life. On July 15, Eldridge submitted ad d itio n al medical documentation in support of her appeal, including a q u estio n n aire completed by Dr. Ehrenfeld on June 28. The responses in the q u es tio n n aire differed materially from Dr. Ehrenfeld's Attending Physician's S ta te m en t.

Liberty Life independently gathered supplemental information. Gale B r o w n , M.D., a consulting physician for Liberty Life, reviewed Eldridge's medical d o c u m e n ta tio n and opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that E ld rid g e could perform sedentary work on a full-time basis with accommodation fo r her neck. Liberty Life also obtained video surveillance of Eldridge driving to sev eral locations, standing at length, walking normally, squatting, bending at the w aist, gesturing with both arms, conversing, entering and exiting her car without d ifficu lty, and holding a purse in her right hand.

The alleged procedural errors committed by the administrators do not alter o u r analysis. Although the administrators did not obtain a vocational analysis or an independent medical evaluation, Eldridge bore the burden of proving that she w as entitled to LTD benefits. Horton v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 141 F.3d 1 0 3 8 , 1040 (11th Cir. 1998). She failed to submit sufficient evidence.

Eldridge next asserts that the district court should have permitted discovery to determine which definition of disability should have been applied to the term in atio n of her LTD benefits. The district court did not abuse its discretion.

Discovery was unnecessary, because the record was restricted to the evidence that w as before the administrators and the question which definition of disability should h a v e been applied is a legal one.

F in a lly , Eldridge contends that the district court should have imposed p en alties on the administrators under section 502(c) of ERISA for failure to p r o v id e her certain Plan documents. Even if we assume that the administrators co u ld have been subject to penalties under section 502(c), the district court did not ab u se its discretion by declining to impose penalties. Eldridge failed to explain an y prejudice from the alleged failure to provide documents. Scott v. Suncoast B e v e ra g e Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d 1223, 1232 (11th Cir. 2002).

T h e judgment of the district court is A F F IR M E D .

* The Honorable Virginia M. Hernandez Covington, United States District Judge for the Middle District of Florida, sitting by designation.