The Equal Protection Clause

The Path of Constitutional Law (2007)

Charles D. Kelso; R. Randall Kelso - Professors of Law
Section: Sub-Part Three: Civil War Amendments And Due Process Generally
Permanent Link: http://vlex.com/vid/the-equal-protection-clause-453384
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Summary:

§ 26.1 A Summary of Equal Protection Review of Classifications in the Law: Rational Basis, Intermediate Scrutiny, and Strict Scrutiny Review: § 26.1.1 Equal Protection Standards of Review: § 26.1.1.1 The Rational Basis Test. § 26.1.1.2 Heightened Scrutiny Tests. § 26.1.2 Determining Whether Heightened Scrutiny Should Apply: § 26.1.2.1 The Basic Guidelines for Heightened Scrutiny Today. § 26.1.2.2 The Carolene Products Decision and Historical Notes on What Level of Scrutiny to Apply. § 26.1.3 The Burden of Proof and What Governmental Interests Can be Considered Under Different Standards of Review. § 26.1.4 Which Inquiries are Questions of Law versus Questions of Fact. § 26.2 Classifications Involving Strict Scrutiny: § 26.2.1 Racial, Ethnic, or National Origin Discrimination: § 26.2.1.1 Facial Discrimination Cases: A. The Original Natural Law Era. B. The Formalist Era. C. The Holmesian Era. D. The Instrumentalist Era. E. The Modern Natural Law Era. § 26.2.1.2 Non-Facial Race Discrimination: The Intent Requirement. § 26.2.1.3 Constitutional Law on Desegregation of the Public Schools: A. An Overview. B. Cases From the Instrumentalist Era: 1. Step One: School Segregation Declared Unconstitutional. 2. Step Two: Principles Developed to Guide Lower Courts in Finding Violations and Developing Remedies. 3. Step Three: Limits Placed on Remedial Orders. 4. Step Four: Initial Consideration of Concluding Desegregation Litigation. C. The Modern Natural Law Era. § 26.2.1.4 The Constitutionality of Affirmative Action Programs Based on Race: A. Initial Approaches to Affirmative Action. B. Post-Bakke Developments During the Instrumentalist Era. C. The Modern Natural Law Era. D. Affirmative Action in the Context of School Admissions Policies. § 26.2.1.5 Racial Redistricting Cases. § 26.2.1.6 Racial Discrimination in the Context of the Criminal Justice System: A. Peremptory Challenges Based on Race. B. Race Discrimination in Prison Management and Control. § 26.2.2 Classifications Disadvantaging Aliens: § 26.2.2.1 Alienage Classifications in State Law: A. Classifications Applied to Legal Resident Aliens: Strict Scrutiny, with Political Function Exception Triggering Only Rational Review. B. Classifications Applied to Illegal Aliens: Rational Review for Adults, Intermediate Review for Children Attending School. § 26.2.2.2 Alienage Classifications in Federal Law: Rational Review Applied. § 26.2.3 Classifications Discriminating on the Basis of Religion. § 26.3 Classifications Involving Intermediate Scrutiny: § 26.3.1 Gender Discrimination: § 26.3.1.1 Gender Discrimination Cases Before 1970: Only Rational Basis Review. § 26.3.1.2 Gender Discrimination Cases After 1970: Movement to Intermediate Review. § 26.3.1.3 Problems in Identifying Gender Discrimination. § 26.3.1.4 Government Affirmative Action Programs Based on Gender. § 26.3.2 Discrimination Based Upon Illegitimacy. § 26.4 Classifications Involving Rational Basis Scrutiny: § 26.4.1 Standard Social and Economic Regulatory Legislation. § 26.4.2 Classifications Involving Wealth. § 26.4.3 Classifications that Disadvantage Non-Resident Corporations. § 26.4.4 Classifications Involving Age: Children or the Elderly. § 26.4.5 Classifications Involving Physical or Mental Disabilities. § 26.4.6 Classifications Involving Sexual Orientation. § 26.5 Classifications Interfering with Fundamental Rights: § 26.5.1 Right To Travel. § 26.5.2 Access to Courts. § 26.5.3 Right to Vote and Access to the Ballot. § 26.5.4 No Fundamental Right of Equal Funding for Public Education.

Citations:

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Cir. - Cheryl J. Hopwood, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. State of Texas, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees, v. Thurgood Marshall Legal Society and Black Pre-Law Association, Movants-Appellants. Douglas Carvell, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. State of Texas, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees, v. Thurgood Marshall Legal Society, and Black Pre-Law Association, Movants-Appellants. Cheryl J. Hopwood, Et Al., Plaintiffs, Cheryl J. Hopwood, Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. State of Texas, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees. Douglas Carvell, Et Al., Plaintiffs, Douglas Carvell, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. State of Texas, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees., 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Cir. - Chester A. Lauth, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Daniel L. Mccollum, Defendant-Appellee., 424 F.3d 631 (7th Cir. 2005)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Cir. - Darlene Jespersen, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harrah'S Operating Company, Inc., Defendant-Appellee., 392 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2004)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Cir. - Keeley Tatsuyo Hunter, a Minor, By Gina F. Brandt, Her Mother and Next Friend, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. the Regents of the University of California, and Theodore R. Mitchell, Defendants-Appellees., 190 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 1999)

U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Cir. - Valentin Soskin, Bei Dei Howe, Eva Rosenthal, Vatchagan Tatevosian, Ginda K. Gelfand, Yakov Gelfand, Dubale Shibeshi, Sarin Perlman, on Their Own Behalf and on Behalf of all Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Karen Reinertson, in Her Official Capacity as Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing, Defendant-Appellee. United States of America, Intervenor., 353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004)


See all quotations

Extract:

The Equal Protection Clause

§ 26.1 A Summary of Equal Protection Review of Classifications in the Law: Rational Basis, Intermediate Scrutiny, and Strict Scrutiny Review

The Equal Protection Clause of § 1 of the 14th Amendment provides: "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." By explicit text, this provision applies only to "State" action, i.e., the actions of states and their political subdivisions, cities and counties. The federal government is not limited by the text of the 14th Amendment. However, in 1954, the Court held in Bolling v. Sharpe,1 discussed at § 26.2.3.1.B n.178, that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, which does limit the federal government, has an Equal Protection "branch," so that the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, which textually applies only to "States," applies to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. To reach this result, the Court stated in Bolling that "discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process."

In a later case, Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,2 the Court noted that the "Court's approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." This has remained Court doctrine, despite occasional dicta to the contrary, as in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,3 where the Court stated, "[T]he two protections are not always coextensive. Not only does the language of the two Amendments differ, but more importantly, there may be overriding national interests which justify selective federal legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual state." The Court stated in 1995 in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,4 "[E]qual protection obligations imposed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments [are] indistinguishable. . . . We do not understand a few contrary suggestions appearing in cases in which we found special deference to the political branches of the Federal Government to be appropriate [citing Hampton, discussed at § 26.2.2.2 nn.346-47] to detract from this general rule." Thus, Equal Protection Clause principles apply today to any form of "state action," whether federal, state, or local governmental action, or private action "fairly attributable" to the government, as discussed under the state action doctrine at § 21.1. As a matter of pleading, one pleads under the Equal Protection branch of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause for challenges to the federal government, and under the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment for challenges to state and local action.

The Court's decision in Bolling was unanimous, and no Justice since Bolling has expressed disagreement with the proposition that equal protection principles apply to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Admittedly, arguments can be made that prior to the 14th Amendment the federal government was not bound, and Congress did not consider itself bound, by equal protection principles.5 Further, it can be argued that nothing in the history or drafting of the 14th Amendment, or congressional practice soon thereafter, was intended to change that result. Indeed, the text that became the Equal Protection Clause "expressly bound both the states and the national government when originally presented to the Joint Committee on Reconstruction by Thaddeus Stevens on April 21, 1866," but after "a week of consideration, the Joint Committee removed the provision's express application to the federal government when on April 28 - after Republican party caucusing - it replaced Stevens's original proposal with John Bingham's substitute formulation [which became the current version with its state-centered text] just before finalizing its workproduct."6 Nevertheless, given the unanimous view of the Justices since Bolling to the contrary, application of equal protection principles to the federal government is, practically speaking, a matter of "settled law." "Settled law" is defined at § 4.3.2 nn.79-85.

Binding all levels of government to principles of equal protection is consistent not only with a literal commitment to equal citizenship of a society at the formalist Stage 4 level of moral reasoning, discussed at § 15.4.1 nn.60-65, but also is consistent with the commitment of a society at Stage 6 to giving each individual equal concern and respect, discussed at § 15.4.1 nn.77-79, including those individuals traditionally or customarily discrimination against at Stage 4. In America, this included minorities, women, the mentally or physically disabled, and illegitimate children, among others. It is also consistent with full elaboration of the meaning of the Declaration of Independence and its promise that all individuals are endowed with equal inalien...



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